Models of philosophical thought experimentation by Tapsell, Jonathan Andy
MODELS OF PHILOSOPHICAL
THOUGHT EXPERIMENTATION
Jonathan Andy Tapsell
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Master of Philosophy of 
the Australian National University

STATEMENT
This thesis is solely the work of its author. No part of it has previously been submit-
ted for any degree, or is currently being submitted for any other degree. To the best
of my knowledge, any help received in preparing this thesis, and all sources used,
have been duly acknowledged. 
____________________________________
Jonathan Andy Tapsell
4 September 2014

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank the chair of my supervisory panel, Daniel Nolan, for his advice and guid-
ance. I also thank my partner, Leah Horsfall, for her love and support. This thesis
would never have come into existence if it were not for them.

ABSTRACT
The practice of thought experimentation plays a central role in contemporary philo-
sophical methodology. Many philosophers rely on thought experimentation as their
primary and even sole procedure for testing theories about the natures of properties
and relations. This test procedure involves entertaining hypothetical cases in imagin-
ative thought and then undergoing intuitions about the distribution of properties and
relations in them. A theory’s comporting with an intuition is treated as evidence in
favour of it; but a clash is treated as evidence against the theory and may even be re-
garded as falsifying it.
The epistemic power of thought experimentation is mysterious. How can exper-
iments carried out within the mind enable us to discover truths about the natures of
properties  and  relations  like  knowledge,  causation,  personal  identity,  reference,
meaning, consciousness, beauty, justice, morality, and free will? This epistemologic-
al challenge is urgent, but a model of philosophical thought experimentation would
seem to be a necessary propaedeutic to any serious discussion of it. An adequate
model would make the relevant test procedure explicit, thereby assisting in the iden-
tification of points of potential epistemic vulnerability.
In this monograph I advance the propaedeutical model-building work already
done by Timothy Williamson,  Anna-Sara  Malmgren,  and Jonathan Ichikawa and
Benjamin Jarvis. Following the lead of these philosophers, I focus on a single Get-
tier-style thought experiment and the problem of identifying the real content of the
Gettier intuition. My first contribution is to establish the inadequacy of all of the ex-
isting models. Each of them, I argue, fails to solve the content problem. It emerges
from my discussion, however, that Ichikawa and Jarvis’s truth in fiction approach
holds out the prospect of a solution.
My second contribution is to develop and defend a new way of implementing
the general idea behind the truth in fiction approach. The model I put forward does a
better overall job of modelling Gettier-style thought experiments than any of the ex-
isting models. It has none of the defects which render those models inadequate and I
am unable to find any major defects peculiar to it. This should make us feel confid-
ent that my model is adequate. Moreover, since the Gettier-style thought experiment
I focus on is paradigmatic, we should also feel confident that my model will general-
ise naturally to other philosophical thought experiments.
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1. Introduction
The practice of thought experimentation plays a central role in contemporary philo-
sophical methodology. A thought experiment is a special activity carried out within
the imagination in order to test a theory or hypothesis. Experiments of this kind
stand in marked contrast to empirical experiments, which involve testing theories by
means of sensory observation of objects and events in the external physical world.
Philosophers generally rely on thought experimentation as their primary and even
sole test procedure; they rarely, if ever, get out of the armchair and go into the labor-
atory.1 Such a heavy reliance on thought experimentation is perhaps one of the most
conspicuous differences between the methodology of philosophy and the methodo-
logy of the natural sciences. There can be no doubt, of course, that thought experi-
mentation  has  made  valuable  and  sometimes  crucial  contributions  to  the
development of modern science, especially physics. To appreciate the significance of
its scientific contribution we need only reflect on the famous thought experiments
devised by Galileo, Newton, and Einstein.2 On the whole, however, thought experi-
mentation is methodologically secondary to empirical experimentation in the sci-
ences. The opposite goes for philosophy. Whereas the scientist pays most heed to the
verdicts of the tribunal of perceptual experience, the philosopher chooses instead to
bring  his  theories  almost  exclusively  before  the  tribunal  of  the  imagination.  As
1 This statement might seem a bit anachronistic given the rise of so-called experimental philosophy
in recent years. Experimental philosophy involves conducting surveys of laypeople and using the
resultant empirical data to inform philosophical debates. However, despite the large amount of at-
tention it has attracted, the proportion of philosophers who actually participate in this endeavour
is, I think, very small. Furthermore, among those few philosophers who do engage in it, there are
different views about the kind and degree of relevance of survey data to philosophical debates.
One idea is that survey data constitutes evidence for or against theories of philosophically inter-
esting properties and relations. Another is that it constitutes evidence for or against theories of
how laypeople think about philosophically interesting properties and relations. And yet a further
idea is that it constitutes evidence against the reliability of philosophical thought experimenta-
tion. The first of these ideas is operative in only some experimental philosophy research. See Al-
exander  (2012)  for  a  good introduction  to  the  field  of  experimental  philosophy. Knobe  and
Nichols (2008) collect some of the classic papers.
2 See Sorensen (1998) for general discussion of thought experimentation as it has been used in the
work of these and other scientists.
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James Brown and Yiftach Fehige (2011: 2) have remarked, “[p]hilosophy without
thought experiments seems unthinkable. […] Philosophy, even more than the sci-
ences, would be severely impoverished without thought experiments.”
The procedure for testing theories in imaginative thought may be roughly char-
acterised as follows. We first of all target a theory for evaluation. The target theory is
taken to entail a modal connection between the specific properties or relations it is
about, and thus to have implications for the distribution of those properties or rela-
tions in a range of possibilities, most of which are non-actual. We next consider a
hypothetical case which we regard as falling within the modal scope of the target
theory. This could be a case we think up ourselves, or it could be conveyed to us via
a written description or some other medium. (Note that for a case to be hypothetical
is simply for it to be entertained by the mind in imaginative thought. Although the
hypothetical cases deployed in thought experimentation can, and usually do, fail to
be realised in the actual world, they need not. Hypotheticality is grounded in imagin-
ative mental activity, but since some of what we imagine could turn out to be really
happening somewhere, hypotheticality does not entail non-actuality.) The final step
of the procedure is to check the target theory’s modal implications against our intu-
ition about the distribution of the relevant properties or relations in the hypothetical
case. In a positive thought experiment the target theory comports with our intuition
and this is treated as at least some evidence in favour of it. We allow the target the-
ory to survive another day. If, on the other hand, the target theory clashes with our
intuition, this is treated as evidence against it. In both philosophy and science, but
most  particularly in  philosophy, a  negative thought  experiment  may even be  re-
garded as enough to outright falsify the theory under evaluation.
The two thought experiments devised by Edmund Gettier (1963) as tests of the
traditional theory of knowledge are paradigmatic examples. Knowledge, according
to the traditional theory, is justified true belief; but Gettier claimed his thought ex-
periments demonstrate otherwise, and the vast majority of philosophers who have
carried them out agree with him. The traditional theory of knowledge, which argu-
ably goes back as far as Plato, is nowadays widely acknowledged to have been re-
futed by Gettier’s thought experiments.3 Gettier is credited with having made one of
3 That, at any rate, is how things are portrayed in philosophical lore. We might find Williamson’s
comments on the status of Gettier’s thought experiments reassuring here. “Sociologically,” says
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the greatest discoveries about the nature of knowledge in the history of epistemo-
logy, viz. that justification is not enough to make a true belief into knowledge. This
discovery triggered an explosive research programme and continues to influence de-
bates in epistemology right up to the present day.4 Other paradigms of philosophical
thought experimentation include such famous examples as Frank Jackson’s (1982)
neuroscientist  experiment,  Hillary  Putnam’s  (1975)  twin  earth  experiment,  John
Searle’s (1980) Chinese room experiment, Saul Kripke’s (1980) Schmidt/Gödel ex-
periment, and Philippa Foot’s (1967) and Judith Jarvis Thomson’s (1976) trolley ex-
periments—the list could go on. Like Gettier’s thought experiments, these have all
had enormous influence in their relevant sub-fields.
Given that thought experimentation is absolutely central to philosophical in-
quiry, it would be good to have a decent account of how it works. The question of
the epistemic power of thought experimentation is often said to be especially urgent.
It is natural to think that the principal or ultimate objective of much philosophical in-
vestigation is to discover truths about the natures of properties and relations in the
world, not merely the words we use to talk about them or the concepts we use to
think about them. Epistemology, for example, is naturally thought of as the branch
of  philosophy which  investigates  the  nature  of  knowledge,  not  merely  the  word
“knowledge” and its cognates, or the concept of knowledge. A similar point may be
made about most other branches of philosophy. They are most naturally thought of
as  investigating the  natures  of  things  like causation,  personal  identity, reference,
meaning, consciousness, beauty, justice, morality, and free will. But how, if at all, is
it possible to discover truths about the natures of such properties and relations just
Williamson (2007: 180), “the phenomenon is remarkable. Gettier had no previous publications
and was unknown to most of the philosophical profession; he did not write as an establish author-
ity. […] His three-page article turns on two imaginary examples. Yet his refutation of the justified
true belief analysis was accepted almost overnight by the community of analytic epistemologists.
His thought experiments were found intrinsically compelling.” As is always to be expected in
philosophy, though, not everyone has been persuaded. See Shope (1983: 26-33) for discussion of
some of the early counter-arguments. Some prominent recent defenders of the traditional theory
of knowledge include Hetherington (2001; 2011) and Weatherson (2003).
4 As BonJour (2002: 51) has pointed out, it is quite plausible “that Gettier’s paper has given rise to
a larger body of philosophical literature, consisting of replies, criticisms of replies, etc., in pro-
portion to its size than any other piece of philosophical writing.” Shope (1983) discusses the
early history of the burgeoning research programme. Although interest in finding a solution to the
Gettier problem has gradually and naturally waned over the sixty-year period since Gettier pub-
lished his paper, attempts at solving it still steadily trickle out; furthermore, due to its astounding
influence, the Gettier problem has recently become central to debates about the nature and scope
of philosophical inquiry.
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by carrying out experiments within one’s imagination? How could thought experi-
ments yield new knowledge of reality? The epistemological challenge is to explain
how the practice of thought experimentation enables the mind to access the natures
of philosophically interesting properties and relations. This is a very difficult chal-
lenge and it is not at all obvious how to go about addressing it. We have more than a
rudimentary understanding of how our perceptual apparatus works. The power of
empirical experimentation to yield knowledge of reality is far from incomprehens-
ible. In comparison, the epistemic power of thought experimentation is apt to strike
us as utterly mysterious. This mysteriousness threatens to do away with whatever
epistemic legitimacy we may have attached to the use of thought experiments in
philosophy. It could force us to conclude that, rather than playing with the denizens
of his own imagination, a philosopher investigating, say, the nature of knowledge,
would do better to use his eyes to observe epistemic agents in the real world around
him.5
The epistemological challenge is indeed an urgent one for philosophers, but a
model of philosophical thought experimentation would seem to be a necessary pro-
paedeutic to any serious discussion of it. The reason is that an adequate model would
assist in making the relevant test procedure explicit, and this would in turn assist in
the identification of points of potential epistemic vulnerability. Several philosophers
have already made a start on this project, most notably Timothy Williamson (2005;
2007), Jonathan Ichikawa and Benjamin Jarvis (2009), and Anna-Sara Malmgren
(2011). Their efforts at modelling philosophical thought experimentation have con-
tributed a great deal to our understanding of the practice, but there is much more
work to be done. My aim in the present monograph is twofold: first, to establish the
inadequacy of all of the existing models, and second, to develop and defend a new
model of my own. The model I shall put forward not only has considerable advant-
ages over its rivals but—as far as I am able to determine anyway—it neither par-
takes in any of their worst vices nor suffers from any major defects peculiar to itself.
I shall concentrate my efforts on developing an adequate model of a single Get-
tier-style thought experiment. This is the same approach to modelling as that taken
5 That  might  be  the  recommendation  of  proponents  of  naturalised  epistemology, starting  with
Quine (1969). See Bishop and Trout (2005) and the series of works by Kornblith (1994; 1999;
2002; 2006) for some more recent proposals to naturalise epistemological investigation.
4
by Williamson and, following him, Ichikawa and Jarvis as well as Malmgren. Al-
though such an approach to modelling could seem to lack a certain generality, it
makes up for it, in my view, by firmly anchoring our discussion in reality. The use of
a concrete example during the process of model-building does much to facilitate the-
oretical comprehension. In addition, it is more than probable that the majority of
contemporary philosophers are already familiar with the nuts and bolts of Gettier-
style thought experiments, having actually performed them on one or more previous
occasions. This sort of antecedent familiarity with a subject matter also does much
to  facilitate  theoretical  comprehension  when  model-building.  But  the  aforemen-
tioned lack of generality in my approach is more apparent than real anyway. After
all, Gettier-style thought experiments are paradigms of the relevant phenomenon to
be modelled. We therefore have excellent reason to think that the model we come up
with should generalise to other philosophical thought experiments in a natural way.
So, in light of these remarks, let us now proceed to construct a thought experiment
in the style of Gettier’s originals.
1.1. A Gettier-style thought experiment
The theory we are going to test is the traditional theory of knowledge, according to
which knowledge is justified true belief. This is a theory about the nature of know-
ledge. As such, we should take it to entail a modal connection of the metaphysical
kind between the relation of knowledge and the relation of justified true belief, and
thus to have implications for the distribution of those epistemic relations in a very
broad range of  possibilities.  Such broadness  of  modal  scope is  rather  typical  of
philosophical theories. Many scientific theories, in contrast, have a much narrower
modal scope; they only entail modal connections of the nomological kind between
the properties or relations they are about. The modal scope of the traditional theory
of knowledge encompasses not only the sphere of the nomologically possible, but
the sphere of the metaphysically possible as well.6 Put another way, our target theory
6 I am here assuming what I take to be the standard conception of modal reality, according to
which nomological possibility is a proper subset of metaphysical possibility. It is compatible with
this conception that some but not all scientific theories have metaphysical and not merely nomo-
logical modal scopes. The theory that water is composed of H2O molecules, for example, is a sci-
entific theory if anything is;  so if  we are moved by the ideas of Kripke (1980) and Putnam
(1975), we might consider its (implicit) modal scope to encompass both the nomological and the
metaphysical spheres of possibility. Note that there are a few philosophers who have gone so far
as to claim that these modal spheres are in fact identical. They endorse the doctrine that the true
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entails that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, one knows a proposition just in
case one has a justified true belief in it. With the obvious symbolic correspondences,
we may formally represent the entailed modal connection as follows:
(MC) ◻xp (Kxp JTBxp)
We should be wary of simply identifying the traditional theory of knowledge with
(MC), for it is doubtful whether strict biconditionals per se should be interpreted as
making claims about the natures of properties and relations. But the traditional the-
ory of knowledge is true only if (MC) is true; contrapositively, it is false if (MC) is
false. This entailment is what opens the door for us to test the traditional theory of
knowledge by means of an experiment performed within the imagination. More gen-
erally, it is only because of the modal connections they entail that the tribunal of the
imagination has any jurisdiction at all over philosophical and scientific theories.
The procedure for testing the traditional theory of knowledge in imaginative
thought  involves  checking whether  (MC) comports  or  clashes  with  our  intuition
about the distribution of the relations of knowledge and justified true belief in a hy-
pothetical case. To commence our thought experiment, then, we may consider the
following vignette, which for the sake of convenience I shall call the Gettier case:
One day Smith is walking through the Australian countryside. He is an avid and
experienced spotter of native wildlife who has the ability to identify animals
such as kangaroos, wallabies, wombats, koalas, and so on, with a very high de-
gree of reliability. The present conditions, furthermore, happen to be excellent
for spotting native wildlife. Smith looks into a nearby paddock and sees what
looks exactly like a mob of kangaroos standing next to a huge rock formation.
“Ah,” he thinks to himself, “there are kangaroos in this paddock.” As it turns
out, the objects Smith is looking at are not kangaroos at all. They are in fact
sophisticated robots designed to perfectly mimic the appearance and behaviour
of  real  kangaroos.  Even so,  Smith’s belief  in  the  proposition  that  there  are
laws of physics, chemistry, biology, and so on, obtain as a matter of metaphysical necessity. See
for example Bird (2007), Fales (1990), Shoemaker (1980; 1998), and Swoyer (1982). Of course,
since I am assuming the standard conception of modality, I am by implication assuming these
philosophers are mistaken. For critical discussion of their doctrine, see Sidelle (2002).
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kangaroos in the paddock is actually true. A mob of real kangaroos is standing
behind the huge rock formation, completely hidden from his view.7
The foregoing text obviously describes a genuine metaphysical possibility, perhaps
even a nomological possibility. Accordingly, the Gettier case must fall within the
modal scope of the target theory. For the target theory implies that the relation of
knowledge and the relation of justified true belief coincide in all metaphysical pos-
sibilities. If the target theory is true, then those epistemic relations must coincide in
the Gettier case just as they do throughout the rest of the sphere of the metaphysic-
ally possible. This bears on the epistemology of what we are trying to do. If the Get-
tier case fell outside the target theory’s modal scope, or if there were good reason for
thinking it did, then at best our thought experiment would be of dubious evidential
relevance to the truth or falsity of the target theory. At worst it would be wholly be-
side the point. By basing our thought experiment on an obvious metaphysical pos-
sibility,  we  forestall  one  potential  epistemic  threat.  Note,  furthermore,  that  the
description of the Gettier case is neutral insofar as it makes no explicit mention of
the relations of knowledge and justified true belief. It does, to be sure, explicitly spe-
cify that Smith has a justified true belief in the proposition that there are kangaroos
in the paddock. But it does not specify that Smith knows, or fails to know, that pro-
position, nor that he has, or fails to have, a justified true belief in it. This also bears
on the epistemology of our thought experiment. If we were to base it on a more par-
tisan  case  description,  our  thought  experiment  would  risk  begging  the  question
either for or against the target theory. Either way, its evidential relevance would be
diminished, or even destroyed. So the neutrality of the Gettier case forestalls another
potential epistemic threat to what we are trying to do.
With the Gettier case in mind, we may finalise our thought experiment by ask-
ing ourselves about the epistemic status of Smith’s true belief. Intuitively, Smith has
a justified true belief, but does not know, that there are kangaroos in the paddock. It
will be convenient to call this intuition  the Gettier intuition. The Gettier intuition
clashes with (MC) and ipso facto with the target theory. The result of our thought ex-
periment is therefore negative: the target theory’s implications for the distribution of
7 This case is an Australianised variant of Chisholm’s sheep-in-the-field case. See his (1989: 93).
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the relations of knowledge and justified true belief in the Gettier case were not borne
out in the tribunal of the imagination. The orthodox reaction to our thought experi-
ment would be to acknowledge it as a falsification of the traditional theory of know-
ledge. We have, in other words, carried out what philosophical orthodoxy would
consider to be a  successful negative thought experiment. An adequate model of it
must therefore elucidate our ostensibly legitimate transition from the Gettier intu-
ition to the conclusion that the traditional theory of knowledge is wrong.
1.2. The content problem
Taken at face value the Gettier intuition is about a man called “Smith” and his epi-
stemic relationship to the proposition that there are kangaroos in the paddock. As I
reported it in the previous sub-section, the Gettier intuition appears to have the con-
tent that Smith justifiedly and truly believes that there are kangaroos in the paddock
but does not know that there are kangaroos there. The apparent content of the Gettier
intuition may be formally represented as follows, where the singular terms “s” and
“k” are intended to stand for Smith and the proposition about kangaroos respect-
ively:
(AC) JTBsk  Ksk
If (AC) is the real as well as the apparent content of the Gettier intuition, we should
expect to find that our thought experiment leads us straightforwardly to the negation
of the traditional theory of knowledge; for it is plain that (AC) would be a counter-
instance to the left-to-right direction of the strict biconditional (MC). As a matter of
fact, the transition we make to the negation of the traditional theory of knowledge
does seem pretty straightforward. It could therefore be tempting to think that (AC)
must be an integral component of any adequate model of our thought experiment.
But the temptation should be resisted; whatever its initial attractions, (AC) is highly
problematic.
The real content of the Gettier intuition is what we come to accept or believe
when we imaginatively engage with the Gettier case and ask ourselves about Smith’s
epistemic situation in it. If the real content is simply (AC), then given the standard
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framework of classical logic, the Gettier intuition would seem to commit us to the
existence of both an object named “Smith” and an epistemic state of affairs in which
this object has a justified true belief, but does not know, that there are kangaroos in
the paddock. Formally, these commitments may be encapsulated by an existential
claim:
(E) x (x=s  JTBxk  Kxk)
This existential claim is entailed by (AC) in classical logic. However, even if the
idea is not completely absurd, it is most doubtful whether our acceptance of the Get-
tier intuition really imposes any such existential commitments upon us. We can ac-
cept  the  Gettier  intuition  and  reject  or  withhold  judgement  on  the  existential
commitments of its apparent content without thereby exhibiting any obvious irra-
tionality. As a matter of fact, such a combination of attitudes would be perfectly nat-
ural  and reasonable.  Consequently, we should be extremely reluctant  to treat the
apparent content of the Gettier intuition as anything more than merely apparent. The
real content of the Gettier intuition is hidden, and we must find out what it is if we
wish to develop an adequate model of our thought experiment. That is what I shall
call the content problem.8
At this point in our discussion it could be tempting to dismiss the content prob-
lem as an artefact of classical logic. The most natural alternative to classical logic in
the present context is free logic. Free logic gets its name from the fact that it is free
of existential assumptions with regard to terms.9 In the framework of free logic, the
quantifiers range over existent objects just as they do in the standard classical frame-
work, but not all  terms need refer to something in the domain of quantification.
Terms which fail to refer to existent objects are  empty and the formulae in which
they occur are empty-termed. Free logic comes in three kinds, each of which differs
from the other two in how it treats empty-termed atomic formulae. Positive free lo-
gic allows some empty-termed atomic formulae to be true.  Negative free logic re-
quires them to be false. And neutral free logic requires them to be truth-valueless.
8 I have borrowed this name for the problem of identifying the real content of the Gettier intuition
from Malmgren (2011).
9 Lambert (2001) provides a concise introduction to the main ideas and motivations underlying
free logic. See also Bencivenga (1986).
9
Since Smith is  presumably not  an existent object,  the singular  term “s” in (AC)
should be taken to be an empty term, and the first conjunct of (AC) should be taken
to be an empty-termed atomic formulae. It follows that (AC) must come out either
false or truth-valueless in non-positive free logics. Since the Gettier intuition is pre-
sumably true, those logics are of no help vis-a-vis the content problem. If, however,
we interpret (AC) and (E) in accordance with positive free logic, then not only could
(AC) come out true, but it will fail to entail (E).10 It may thus seem that the content
problem vanishes. But actually our model-building endeavours have made no further
headway. For the appeal to positive free logic does nothing but dissolve one mani-
festation of the content problem while giving rise to another. In positive free logic,
we cannot validly infer (MC)’s falsity from (AC); we must first establish that Smith
is an existent object.11 But our thought experiment is successful without our having
to do any such thing. We are simply not required to establish that Smith is an exist-
ent object in order to legitimately transition from the Gettier intuition to the negation
10 This logical point could do with elaboration. Let  α be any term and let Φ(α/x) be the formula
which results from replacing all occurrences of the variable x in Φ with α. The classical principle
of existential generalisation may be stated as follows:
Φ(α/x); so xΦ 
But this principle is invalid in every kind of free logic. The free logic principle of existential gen-
eralisation may be stated using “E” as an existence predicate:
Eα  Φ(α/x); so xΦ
In positive free logic, (AC) does not entail (E) because there is no way to get Es (i.e. Smith’s ex-
istence) from it. Interestingly, the entailment from (AC) to (E) does hold in negative free logic.
This is owing to the fact that negative free logic validates the following:
Φ(α/x)  Eα if Φ(α/x) is atomic
Since (AC) entails its own first conjunct and that conjunct is atomic, we can get Es from (AC) in
negative free logic using conjunction elimination and then the above conditional. We would thus
have everything needed to derive (E) using the free logic principle of existential generalisation.
11 It may be helpful to elaborate on this second logical point as well. Using the symbolism ex-
plained in the previous footnote, the classical principle of universal instantiation may be stated as
follows:
xΦ; so Φ(α/x)
But it is invalid in every kind of free logic. The free logic principle of universal instantiation may
be stated using E as an existence predicate:
xΦ; so Eα  Φ(α/x)
So (MC) entails (Es  Ek)  (Ksk  JTBsk). But in positive free logic this conditional state-
ment is logically compatible with (AC). Thus (AC) is not enough to get us to the negation of
(MC). We also need to establish the conjunction Es  Ek. In the main text I only mention the re-
quirement to establish the first of these two conjuncts, i.e. the existence of Smith. Doing so is suf-
ficient to convey the point I want to make there. But, strictly speaking, we would have establish
the second conjunct as well, i.e. the existence of the proposition that there are kangaroos in the
paddock. Note that, for the reasons discussed in the previous footnote, we can actually get from
(AC) to the negation of (MC) in negative free logic. But the fact that (AC) entails the negation of
(MC) in negative free logic does not make that kind of free logic suitable for dissolving the con-
tent problem. After all, in negative free logic, (AC) both entails (E) and comes out false.
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of (MC) and thence to the conclusion that the traditional theory of knowledge is
wrong. Indeed, as I have already emphasised, it would be perfectly natural and reas-
onable for us to reject or withhold judgement on the existence of Smith. So working
within the framework of free logic would not enable us to avoid treating the appar-
ent content of the Gettier intuition as merely apparent.
Another alternative is to divest the quantifier  in (E) of the existential import
standardly imputed to it in classical logic (and free logic). The entailment from (AC)
to (E) could then be preserved without imposing any unpalatable existential commit-
ments upon us. One approach of this kind involves neutral quantification. In logics
which  deploy neutral  quantification,  the quantifiers  range over  both  existent and
non-existent objects.12 The domain of quantification can include you, me, the Colos-
seum, and my mug, as well as Pegasus, Yahweh, the golden mountain, and the round
square. Inferences to what “there is” are not the same as inferences to existence.
From  the  statement  that  my  mug  is  blue,  we  can  validly  infer  that  “there  is”
something which is blue,  but we cannot validly infer the existence of something
which is blue. From the statement that the round square is round and square, we can
validly infer that “there is” something which is round and square, but we cannot val-
idly infer the existence of something which is round and square. Accordingly, in the
framework  of  neutral  quantification,  (AC)  entails  (E),  but  (E)  only  affirms  that
“there is” something identical to Smith which justifiedly and truly believes, but fails
to know, the proposition that there are kangaroos in the paddock. It is silent as to
whether this alleged entity or thing called “Smith” really exists. The content problem
may thus seem to vanish. Once again, however, we have done nothing but dissolve
one manifestation of the content problem while giving rise to another. The quantifier
 in (MC) is not neutral; it must be stronger. For suppose otherwise. Then falsifying
the traditional theory of knowledge would be as easy as coming up with a descrip-
tion explicitly attributing a non-knowledge justified true belief to some “non-exist-
ent object”. An example, perhaps, is the man who lives on the golden mountain,
draws pictures of the round square, and has a non-knowledge justified true belief.
But even if “there is” such a man, the traditional theory of knowledge obviously can-
not be falsified so easily. Whatever kind of quantification is involved in (MC), it is
12 Routley (1980) discusses and defends neutral quantification at length. See Lewis (1990) for criti-
cism.
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stronger than neutral quantification.13 If, therefore, we confine ourselves to interpret-
ing (AC) and (E) in accordance with the framework of neutral quantification, it is
hard to see how (AC) could have any logical bearing on the truth or falsity of (MC)
and the traditional theory of knowledge. Other approaches to divesting the quantifier
 in (E) of existential import lead to pretty much the same result.14 So the real con-
tent of the Gettier intuition is still hidden and the content problem is still a genuine
problem.
 A further point it is important for me to emphasise here is that the content
problem is a problem about the content of the the Gettier intuition, not its metaphys-
ics. The question of the metaphysics of intuition has to do with the status of intu-
itions  in  the  true  theory  of  the  mind.  Broadly  speaking,  there  are  two  rival
metaphysical  conceptions:  sui  generisism and  reductionism.  According to  the sui
generisist  conception,  intuitions are irreducible propositional attitudes.15 They are
standardly held by its proponents to be conscious representational states (or epis-
odes) with a special kind of phenomenal character. This alleged phenomenology is
variously described as being forceful, assertive, and even revelatory; roughly, it may
be said to consist in something akin to a more or less compelling feeling of ascer-
taining that things are really as they are represented to be.16 Furthermore, although
on the sui generis  conception intuitions  are  non-doxastic  states,  they are held to
causally generate doxastic states like beliefs whenever their  veridicality is not in
doubt. The reductionist alternatives, on the other hand, deny that intuitions comprise
13 More generally, whatever kind of quantification is involved in the modal connections entailed by
our philosophical theories of the natures of properties and relations, it must be stronger than neut-
ral quantification. Otherwise, all such theories would be absurdly easy to falsify. Consider, for
example, the theory that the nature of triangleness is having three straight sides and three angles.
This theory entails a modal connection between the property of triangleness and the properties of
having three straight sides and three angles. But the triangle which lacks three straight sides is tri-
angular and lacks three straight sides. So “there is” something which is triangular and lacks three
straight sides. So the foregoing theory of triangleness is false (assuming the quantifier  in the
entailed modal connection is neutral). But obviously that theory cannot be falsified in this man-
ner. 
14 An approach involving substitutional quantification, for example, would also make it hard to see
how (AC) could logically bear on (MC) and the traditional theory of knowledge. This is owing to
considerations broadly similar to those already discussed in the main text.
15 Proponents of this conception included Bealer (1996a; 1996b; 1998; 2000), Bengson (forthcom-
ing), Chudnoff (2011a; 2011b), Cullison (2010), Huemer (2005), Pust (2000), Tolhurst (1998),
and Tucker (2010).
16 Tolhurst’s description of this alleged phenomenology is representative of what many sui gen-
erisists have in mind. He writes that intuitions and other seemings “have the feel of truth, the feel
of a state whose content reveals how things really are” (1998: 288-9).
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a sui generis class of mental state. Such views typically reduce intuitions in doxastic
terms. Proponents of reductionism hold that intuitions are simply judgements or be-
liefs, inclinations to form beliefs, or perhaps some other kind of doxastic mental
phenomena.17 Sui generisism and reductionism clash over the fundamentality of in-
tuitions. If sui generisism is true, intuitions are basic mental states distinct from all
others; whereas if reductionism is true, the true theory of the mind does not admit of
intuitions as distinct basic mental states. This metaphysical question has provoked a
great deal of philosophical controversy. Thankfully, however, we do not need to re-
solve it in order to address the content problem. To be sure, we should acknowledge
that there is a tight relationship between intuitions and doxastic states like beliefs;
but whether the relationship is a causal one or something deeper is a matter on which
it is appropriate for us to remain neutral.
1.3. Beyond the Gettier intuition’s apparent content
So far we have found that, in order to develop an adequate model of our thought ex-
periment, we have to move beyond the apparent content of the Gettier intuition be-
cause it is illusory. Following a recommendation of Williamson’s, we may begin to
do so by rethinking our earlier handling of Smith and the proposition which Smith
justifiedly and truly believes yet fails  to know. The suspicion is that the content
problem has its roots in the perhaps naïve idea that the “objects” we imagine when
we engage with hypothetical cases are genuine referents of genuine singular terms.
Williamson recommends treating the apparent singular terms in hypothetical cases
such as the Gettier case not as genuine singular terms but rather as “picturesque sub-
stitutes for variables” (Williamson 2007: 184). If we adopt the Williamsonian ap-
proach, we can then represent our case description using the open formula GCxp,
where the variables “x” and “p” occupy the positions for, respectively, the subject
and the proposition. This formula is to be understood as saying that x stands to p as
described by the text of the Gettier case.
17 There are many proponents of doxastic reductionism. See among others Boghossian (2009), Den-
nett  (1987;  1991),  Erlenbaugh  and  Molyneux  (2009),  Ichikawa  (MS),  Ichikawa  and  Jarvis
(2009), Lewis (1983), Lynch (2006), Ludwig (2007), Nimtz (2010a), E. Sosa (1998), van Inwa-
gen (1997), and Williamson (2007). Van Inwagen succinctly encapsulates their general attitude
toward the the metaphysical question as follows: “Our ‘intuitions’ are simply beliefs—or per-
haps, in some cases, the tendencies that make certain beliefs attractive to us, that ‘move’ us in the
direction of accepting certain propositions without taking us all the way to acceptance” (1997:
309).
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The Gettier case itself is, of course, at the very heart of the particular thought
experiment we wish to model. In carrying out the thought experiment, we bring the
Gettier case before our minds and entertain it in imaginative thought. This imaginat-
ive engagement with the Gettier case would seem, furthermore, to involve an appre-
hension of the metaphysical possibility of its being realised by some x and some p.
We take ourselves to be imagining a bona fide way the world might have been. But
it is because we imaginatively engage with the Gettier case and ask ourselves about
Smith’s epistemic situation in it that we come to have the Gettier intuition. Indeed,
the Gettier intuition is an intuition about the Gettier case; more specifically, it is an
intuition about the distribution of the relations of knowledge and justified true belief
in the Gettier case. So, in light of these considerations, we might find it tempting to
think that the metaphysical possibility of some x and some p being such that GCxp
should somehow be an integral component of our model—in other words, that that
metaphysical possibility must at least have something to do with the real content of
the Gettier intuition. This is one temptation which I think it is worth our while to in-
dulge, since it holds out the prospect of a reasonable way forward. Williamson has
provided us with a springboard from which we are able to launch our model-build-
ing endeavours. 
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2. The Necessity Model
A natural first stab is to interpret the Gettier intuition as really expressing a  strict
conditional, one which says, in effect, that in every metaphysically possible realisa-
tion of the text of the Gettier case someone justifiedly and truly believes, but fails to
know, some proposition. Letting “T” stand for the traditional theory that the nature
of knowledge is justified true belief, we would then get the following model of our
thought experiment, which I shall call the Necessity Model:
(1) T ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp)
(2) ◇xp GCxp
(3N) ◻xp (GCxp  (JTBxp  Kxp))
(4) ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp) From (2) and (3N)
                                                                   
(5) T From (1) and (4)
This model shares two important properties with all the other models we are going
to consider. One is that it represents our thought experiment as a valid modal argu-
ment, so the traditional theory of knowledge must be false if the premises are true.
Another is that the intended real content of the Gettier intuition, which is here given
by the strict conditional (3N), obviously has none of the problematic existential com-
mitments associated with the Gettier intuition’s apparent content.
Although I am aware of no one who has ever actually championed the Neces-
sity Model, it is not without its attractions.18 An initial attraction of the model is that
it would seem to do a very good job of approximating the natural progression of the
mental activity we perform when we actually carry out our thought experiment. In
18 To my knowledge, the first philosopher to explicitly discuss the Necessity Model was Williamson
(2005: 6-7; see also 2007: 184-5). His discussion of it is brief and rather contemptuous: he treats
it as a foil for his own model and says nothing at all about any of its attractions. The Necessity
Model is also discussed by Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009: 223-5) and Malmgren (2011: 273-7).
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the first stage of the test procedure, the traditional theory of knowledge is taken to
entail a metaphysical modal connection between the relations of knowledge and jus-
tified true belief, as represented by (1).19 We then go on to consider the Gettier case.
We apprehend in imagination the metaphysical possibility of the Gettier case, as rep-
resented  by  (2),  and ask  ourselves  what  we think  about  the  epistemic  status  of
Smith’s true belief. Reflection on this question eventually gives rise to the Gettier in-
tuition, the real content of which is given by the strict conditional (3N). Thus, our
imaginative engagement with the Gettier case delivers both (2) and (3N), from which
we can easily derive (4), the negation of the metaphysical modal connection we take
to be entailed by the traditional theory of knowledge (i.e. the negation of (MC)). Fi-
nally, with (4) in hand, modus tollens gets us to (5), the conclusion that the tradition-
al theory of knowledge is wrong. From these comments it should be clear that the
Necessity Model is both elegant and sufficiently comprehensive. Each of the forego-
ing stages of the test procedure is modelled in a neat and clear manner; furthermore,
it does not seem as though any crucial stages have been neglected.
The Necessity Model may hold considerable attraction for those sympathetic to
the idea that, in some way or another, the real contents of intuitions always involve
the  concept  of  metaphysical  necessity. According to  Ichikawa and Jarvis  (2009:
223), the idea that “intuitions such as the Gettier intuition are judgements of neces-
sity” is one of the defining elements of the “traditional understanding of philosoph-
ical  methodology.”  Ichikawa  and  Jarvis  along  with  many  other  contemporary
philosophers give their endorsement to this feature of traditional philosophy. George
Bealer, for example, holds that when we have an intuition “it presents itself as neces-
sary: it does not seem to us that things could be otherwise” (Bealer 1998: 207). In
the same vein, Alvin Plantinga holds that having an intuition consists “in finding
yourself utterly convinced that [a proposition] is not only true, but could not have
been false” (Plantinga 1993: 105). Ernest Sosa, too, holds that the contents of our in-
tuitions have a “modally strong character” (Sosa 2007: 62). And Laurence BonJour
holds that in having an intuition we “‘see’ or apprehend that [the truth of a proposi-
tion] is an invariant feature of all possible worlds, that there is no possible world in
which it is false” (Bonjour 1985: 192). Since the Necessity Model posits a strict con-
19 Sorensen gives statements such as (1) the fitting name of “modal extractors” (1998: 136).
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ditional as the real content of the Gettier intuition, it constitutes one way of applying
these kinds of traditional views to the real contents of intuitions generated by philo-
sophical thought experimentation.
However, given the complete absence of the concept of necessity from the ap-
parent content of the Gettier intuition, it might be wondered whether falling into line
with tradition is really warranted. Joel Pust (2000) has pressed a worry of this sort.
According to Pust, Smith’s having a justified true belief without knowledge “does
not occurrently seem necessarily true to the typical person simply presented with the
Gettier case and asked whether the agent in the case does not know” (2000: 38).20
The absence of apparent necessity in the “typical person’s” Gettier intuition moves
Pust to deny the involvement of the concept of necessity in its real content. As he
puts it, we are able to do “a fair amount of philosophy before invoking the concept
of necessary truth” (2007: 38).  But Pust arrives at this conclusion only because he
puts too much faith in the appearances. For the reasons already canvassed, the real
content of the Gettier intuition surely does differ from its apparent content in some
way or another; they cannot be identical. The appearances are in this case illusory
and known to be so. In order to establish that the Necessity Model is inadequate,
therefore, it is not enough to merely draw attention to a difference between (3N) and
the apparent content of the Gettier intuition. After all, we expect and indeed require
there to be at least some difference between them. In addition to drawing attention to
a difference, it is necessary to establish that the difference is cause for serious alarm.
This may be done by bringing out its unpalatable consequences, if there are any.
Pust’s argument poses no problem for the proponent of the Necessity Model because
it does nothing to bring out any unpalatable consequences of the involvement of the
concept of necessity in (3N).
It is possible, however, that Pust has a different line of argument in mind. For,
in addition to thinking that the concept of necessity is not involved in the apparent
content of the “typical person’s” Gettier intuition, he also thinks that “when asked to
consider whether [Smith’s having a justified true belief without knowledge] seems
necessarily the case, one considers whether it could be otherwise and it then seems
necessarily the case” (2000: 38). That is, he thinks that explicit reflection on the
20 The italics in this direct quotation are Pust’s.. I add no italics to any direct quotations. Noting this
fact here obviates the need to clutter the text with repetitions of the phrase “italics in original”.
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question of whether Smith necessarily has a justified true belief without knowledge
gives rise to a non-typical Gettier intuition, the apparent content of which does in-
volve the concept of necessity. Let us grant these observations. Pust could then argue
that the Necessity Model implies that both Gettier intuitions (i.e. the typical one and
the non-typical one) have the same real content (viz. (3N)), and that as a consequence
the model lacks the resources to explain the difference he observes in their apparent
contents. This alternative argument is certainly better than the first one; but even so,
it too does not pose much of a problem for the proponent of the Necessity Model.
One simple and, I think, quite plausible line of reply would be to maintain that al-
though both Gettier intuitions do have (3N) as their real content, their apparent con-
tents differ because consideration of whether Smith necessarily has a justified true
belief without knowledge makes the occurrence of the concept of necessity in (3N)
become manifest,  presumably by drawing the mind’s attention to something it  is
normally prone to overlook. Another possible line of reply would be to maintain that
the difference between the intuitions’ apparent contents is actually due to a differ-
ence in their real contents. It might be, for example, that consideration of whether
Smith necessarily has a justified true belief  without  knowledge has the effect  of
bringing forth an intuition with the necessitation of (3N) (i.e. the strict conditional
◻◻xp (GCxp  (JTBxp  Kxp)) as its real content, yet when one undergoes
this intuition only one of the two occurrences of the concept of necessity in its real
content is detected by the mind. No doubt these approaches admit of various refine-
ments. But whichever turns out to be the most suitable, it can hardly be said that
there is a lack of explanatory resources here.21
If the real content of the Gettier intuition is (3N), then since (3N) alone obvi-
ously does not entail the negation of (MC), it is a bit misleading to speak (as I have
done) of the Gettier intuition “clashing” with the traditional theory of knowledge.
This is another aspect of the Necessity Model we might find problematic, at least in-
sofar as we find it natural to speak of such a clash. As a matter of fact, however, the
logical compatibility of the Gettier intuition with the traditional theory of knowledge
21 Admittedly, my two lines of response to Pust’s argument are rather vague. Much more needs to
be said, for example, about why occurrences of the concept of necessity in the real content of the
Gettier intuition are not transparent to the mind. But I am not trying to come up with a detailed
and thorough explanation of the phenomenon Pust has observed. It is enough for my purposes
here if I make it plausible that there are sufficient explanatory resources for someone to do so.
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is just what we ought to expect, for we find an analogous logical phenomenon in the
practice of empirical experimentation. It is a familiar point from the philosophy of
science that the theories subjected to testing by scientists are typically logically com-
patible with all manner of observations (or, more properly, observation statements).
Logical incompatibilities emerge only when a theory is taken together with a de-
scription of the initial conditions of an experimental set-up. Logically, falsifications
in science are always based on observation statements in combination with such de-
scriptions, never on observation statements alone. For this reason it is always pos-
sible  (though by no means always sensible)  for  a  scientist  to  save his  favourite
theory from falsification by shifting the blame to the description of the initial condi-
tions of the relevant experimental set-up.22 Scientists, of course, often do speak in a
natural way of observations “clashing” with theories, but this abridged parlance of
theirs is plainly one of convenience. The initial conditions of experimental set-ups
are often not in any doubt, which makes it superfluous for scientists to explicitly re-
lativise “clashes” to them in many conversational contexts. To deal with the present
worry, therefore, the proponent of the Necessity Model, or of any model with a sim-
ilar structure, would do well to turn it to his advantage, by arguing that the roles
played by intuitions and hypothetical cases in thought experimentation are plausibly
analogous to the roles played in empirical experimentation by, respectively, observa-
tions and initial conditions. The metaphysical possibility of the Gettier case is not in
any doubt, which is why we find it natural to speak as if there is a direct conflict
between the Gettier intuition and the traditional theory of knowledge. Like scientists,
philosophers avail themselves of convenient yet slightly misleading ways of report-
ing their experimental results.
2.1. Underspecification
In spite of its attractions, however, the Necessity Model must ultimately be found in-
22 This is generally known as the Duhem/Quine thesis. The person to have first raised it seems to
have been Duhem (1991, first published in 1914), but Quine (1951) did much to revive interest in
it. Logically, the Duhem/Quine thesis is easy to grasp. Let “T” stand for any theory and “I” for
the description of the initial conditions of a relevant experimental set-up. From the conjunction T
 I, but not from T alone, we may derive an observational prediction O. If we then observe O,
we may derive the disjunction T  I, but we cannot derive T unless we have I in addition to
O. In other words, we may only treat T as falsified on the basis of O in combination with I.
For further discussion of the Duhem/Quine thesis, including several good examples of how it has
been applied throughout the history of science, see Chalmers (1999: 88-91).
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adequate. As Williamson has pointed out, its inadequacies stem from the fact that the
Gettier case is underspecified. He explains underspecification as follows:
In philosophy, examples can almost never be described in complete detail. An
extensive background must be taken for granted; it cannot all be explicitly stip-
ulated. Although many of the missing details are irrelevant to whatever philo-
sophical issues are in play, not all of them are. This applies not just to highly
schematic descriptions of examples […] but even to the much richer stories
Gettier and other philosophers like to tell (Williamson 2007: 185).
According to Williamson, the vignette with which we imaginatively engage when
we carry out our thought experiment by no means describes a complete possible
world or situation. Indeed, it is possible, while preserving the metaphysical coher-
ence of the text of the Gettier case, to  enrich it in an infinite number of different
ways. Many of these enrichments include details which have ramifications for the
distribution of the relations of knowledge and justified true belief. On the one hand,
we could enrich the text in such a way as to reinforce the Gettier intuition. But we
could also enrich the text in such a way as to generate an intuition about the epistem-
ic status of Smith’s true belief  which would run counter to our original intuition
about it. Enrichments of the latter variety may be divided into two kinds.
First, we could enrich the text of the Gettier case in such a way as to generate
the intuition that Smith’s true belief that there are kangaroos in the paddock is not
even justified. This may be done, for example, as follows:
… Smith looks into a nearby paddock and sees what looks exactly like a mob
of kangaroos standing next to a huge rock formation. “Ah,” he thinks to him-
self, “there are kangaroos in this paddock.” But Smith is letting his eagerness
to spot wildlife get the better of his reason. He knows that the extremely
powerful hallucinogens he consumed earlier in the day have been causing
him  to  hallucinate  native  animals  of  many  different  kinds,  including
kangaroos. 
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This enrichment obviously describes a metaphysical possibility. But since any meta-
physically possible realisation of it would also constitute a metaphysically possible
realisation of the original text, the following must hold:
(US1) ◇xp (GCxp  JTBxp  Kxp)
Second, we could enrich the text in such a way as to generate the intuition that
Smith’s true belief is not only justified but constitutes knowledge.23 An example is as
follows:
…  Even so, Smith’s belief in the proposition that there are kangaroos in the
paddock is actually true. A mob of real kangaroos is standing behind the huge
rock formation, completely hidden from his view. But Smith’s belief is based
not only on his perceptual experience, but also on his recollection of being
told that all of the paddocks on his walk would be empty, except for one,
which would contain both robotic kangaroos and real kangaroos. He had
been told this information earlier by someone whom he knows to be per-
fectly trustworthy about such matters.
This  is  another enrichment which obviously describes a metaphysical possibility.
But any metaphysically possible realisation of it would also constitute a metaphysic-
ally possible realisation of the original text. So this time we get:
(US2) ◇xp (GCxp  JTBxp  Kxp)
We may encapsulate underspecification as follows:
(US) ◇xp (GCxp  ((JTBxp  Kxp)  (JTBxp  Kxp)))24
23 In his (2007), Williamson himself only mentions enrichments of the first kind. But it is clear from
the general tenor of his discussion that he would recognise enrichments of this second kind as
well.
24 Of course, (US) is weaker than the conjunction of (US1) and (US2), but for our purposes here
(US) will be much more convenient to work with.
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The text of the Gettier case does not rule out (US). Of course, when carrying out our
thought experiment, we are not meant to imagine the metaphysical possibility of the
Gettier case in a way which establishes (US). For this reason I shall call any meta-
physically possible realisation of the text of the Gettier case in which the existential
statement embedded in (US) is true a deviant world.25
2.2. Inadequacy of the Necessity Model
We are now in a position to appreciate why the the Necessity Model is inadequate.
The underspecification of the text of the Gettier case, as represented by (US), is in-
compatible with the strict conditional (3N). For (3N) requires that modal space be al-
together devoid of deviant worlds, while (US) requires that there be at least one such
world. They cannot both be true; one of them has to go. But since only a modicum
of reflection is sufficient to impress upon our minds the truth of (US), we are ration-
ally obliged to acknowledge the falsity of (3N) and hence the unsoundness of the ar-
gument  from  (1),  (2),  and  (3N)  to  (5).  This  renders  the  Necessity  Model
objectionable, as Williamson (2007: 185), Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009: 224-5), and
Malmgren (2011: 275-77) have all observed. One objection may be stated as fol-
lows. According to philosophical orthodoxy, our thought experiment is a paradig-
matic example of a successful falsification of the theory it was designed to test. In
particular, the vast majority of contemporary philosophers would acknowledge that
the Gettier intuition—the intuition that Smith’s true belief is justified yet fails to
constitute knowledge—has a true content which we have justification for believing.
Most would even be of the opinion that we know the content of the Gettier intuition
to be true. Upon further investigation, I suppose, it might turn out that philosophical
orthodoxy is mistaken about the truth value and epistemic status of the Gettier intu-
ition; perhaps, contra the majority view, the Gettier intuition actually is false and our
belief in its content is epistemically defective. However, even if philosophical ortho-
doxy is mistaken on these scores, surely pointing to the obvious truth of (US) is not
enough to establish the fact; the victory of scepticism about philosophical thought
experimentation cannot be that easy. It may be helpful to restate the point here in a
different way. Epistemically, our thought experiment is about as good as it ever gets
25 More precisely, a metaphysically possible world counts as deviant if the embedded existential
statement xp (GCxp  (JTBxp  Kxp)  (JTBxp  Kxp)) is true at it.
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in philosophy. If it does not succeed, then it is doubtful whether any of the thought
experiments carried out by philosophers ever succeed. Accordingly, if the Gettier in-
tuition really expressed (3N), then since the truth of (US) is so obvious, there would
be no serious debate to be had about the general epistemic potency of philosophical
thought experimentation; only fools would continue the struggle against metaphilo-
sophical scepticism. But there is a serious debate to be had. Indeed, many philosoph-
ers are actually having it, and it is a hard intellectual fight for everyone involved.
A second objection to the Necessity Model builds upon the first one. As we
have already discussed, the truth of (US) may be established simply by enriching the
text of the Gettier case in a metaphysically coherent but unintended way. Given this
fact, the model now under consideration implies that underspecification must be of
great relevance to the way in which philosophers use thought experimentation to in-
vestigate the nature of knowledge. In particular, it should be appropriate for a pro-
ponent of the traditional theory of knowledge to challenge our thought experiment
by adducing any unintended enrichment of the text of the Gettier case he is able to
think of. For, by drawing our attention to such an enrichment, he would rationally
compel us to acknowledge that the Gettier intuition is false and our thought experi-
ment unsound. More generally, deviant worlds should be taken to pose a genuine
and acute threat to the success of any experiments carried out within the imagina-
tion. It should be imperative for philosophers who wish to test theories by means of
thought  experimentation  to  undertake the  laborious  and painstaking task of  con-
structing texts immune from deviancy. In point of fact, however, deviancy is irrelev-
ant. It is appropriate to dismiss unintended enrichments and the deviant worlds they
describe as wholly beside the point. Even if some philosophers do harbour sufficient
reserves of ingenuity and energy to construct texts which cannot be realised in unin-
tended ways, they are not obligated to draw on them. The reason, I think, is that un-
intended enrichments  are  clearly just  that:  unintended.  If,  for  example,  someone
were to criticise our thought experiment on the basis of an unintended enrichment of
the text of the Gettier case, we would surely feel no obligation to repudiate the Getti-
er intuition; instead, we would explain to him that he has egregiously missed the
point of what we are doing. We might say to him: “In order to properly run our
thought experiment, one is  obviously not meant to imagine a possible world of the
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kind you have just described. You have failed to appreciate this fact. Hence, your
criticism does nothing to undermine the negative result of our thought experiment.”
Contra the implication of the Necessity Model, we would be perfectly  right to say
so. The status of underspecification in the dialectics of philosophical thought experi-
mentation is therefore exactly the opposite of what the Necessity Model makes it out
to be.
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3. The Counterfactual Model
The lesson of the previous section is that the strict conditional (3N) is too strong to
be the real content of the Gettier intuition. The response which immediately comes
to mind is that the Gettier intuition must really express a counterfactual conditional.
According to this line of thinking, instead of expressing the very strong claim that
the Gettier case metaphysically necessitates justified true belief without knowledge,
our intuition expresses the much weaker claim that if the Gettier case were to obtain,
then there would be justified true belief without knowledge. The idea, as stated by
Williamson (2007: 186) in the lingo of Lewis-Stalnaker semantics, is that the real
content of the Gettier intuition “requires justified true belief without knowledge only
in the closest realisations of the Gettier case, not in all possible realisations.” Willi-
amson (2005; 2007) himself  is  perhaps the most prominent proponent of such a
view; others include Sören Häggqvist (1996; 2009), Christian Nimtz (2010b), and
Roy Sorensen (1998).26 Borrowing Williamson’s formalisation of the relevant coun-
terfactual, we get the following model of our thought experiment, which I shall call
the Counterfactual Model:
(1) T ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp)
(2) ◇xp GCxp
(3CF) xp GCxp ◻ xp (GCxp  (JTBxp  Kxp))
(4) ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp) From (2) and (3CF)
                                                                   
(5) T From (1) and (4)
26 In this connection it is worthwhile noting that, even though his metaphilosophical work has re-
ceived a lot of attention in recent times, Williamson was most certainly not the first philosopher
to construe philosophical thought experimentation in terms of counterfactuals. Thus the publica-
tion dates of the books by Sorensen and Häggqvist (1992 and 1996 respectively) give the lie to
Ichikawa’s bizarre claim that Williamson’s counterfactual approach “represents a radical depar-
ture  from prior  philosophical  theorizing  about  the  nature  of  thought  experiments”  (Ichikawa
2009: 436). 
25
Williamson’s (3CF) may seem odd. The relevant English counterfactual presumably
goes something as follows: “If a subject were to stand to a proposition as described
by the text of the Gettier case, then he would have a justified true belief in it which
does not constitute knowledge.” On the face of it, though, (3CF) says something quite
different and rather less natural: “If a subject were to stand to a proposition as de-
scribed by the text of the Gettier case, then anyone who stood that way to it would
have justified true belief in it which does not constitute knowledge.” But the relevant
English counterfactual is an instance of the notorious technical problem of donkey
anaphora. In general, capturing the logical form of such “donkey conditionals” is a
surprisingly difficult task.27 With regard to the particular donkey conditional of rel-
evance to us here, it is not at all obvious how we could do better than Williamson’s
(3CF) as a formalisation of it. The technical details of donkey anaphora and the ques-
tion of the formal adequacy of (3CF) need not detain our discussion, however, since
none of the remarks I should like to make about the programme of modelling philo-
sophical thought experimentation in terms of counterfactuals essentially depend on
whether (3CF) gets the formalisation exactly right. For our purposes (3CF) is close
enough.28
The Counterfactual Model is attractive. First of all, it is able to avoid the two
problems associated with the underspecification of the text of the Gettier case. If the
real content of the Gettier intuition is (3CF), then it does not follow from the truth of
(US) that our thought experiment is an epistemically defective exercise based upon a
falsehood. This is because, on any plausible semantics for counterfactuals, (3CF) does
not say that its antecedent metaphysically necessitates its  consequent.  For all  se-
mantic theory is able to tell us, both (US) and (3CF) could be true. Another attraction
27 Geach (1962) was the first to raise the problem of donkey anaphora. His original example was
the sentence “Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.” See King (2013) for a good introduc-
tion to why this sentence poses a challenge for semanticists, as well as the various proposals
which they have put forward to deal with it. 
28 Williamson devotes considerable attention to the problem of donkey anaphora as it applies to the
relevant English counterfactual. In addition to (3CF) he considers the formula xp (GCxp ◻
(JTBxp  Kxp)). To my mind this is the only other potential formalisation with any plausibility;
but Williamson rejects it in favour of (3CF), for what seem to be pretty good reasons. See his
(2007: 195-9). Some may find themselves attracted to the formula xp GCxp ◻ xp (GCxp
 JTBxp  Kxp)) or something like it. But close inspection reveals this to be a highly implaus-
ible formalisation. For, as Williamson (2007: 199) explains, “it does not require the instance of
the Gettier case with which we started to be an instance of justified true belief without know-
ledge; it is satisfied if some other instance of the Gettier case is an instance of justified true belief
without knowledge. That is not enough to vindicate [the relevant English counterfactual].”
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of the Counterfactual Model is that it would seem to do just as good a job as the Ne-
cessity Model of approximating the natural progression of the mental activity actu-
ally involved in carrying out our thought experiment. It furnishes an elegant and
sufficiently  comprehensive  model  of  the  test  procedure.  The steps  by which  we
transition from our imaginative engagement with the Gettier case to the conclusion
that the traditional theory of knowledge is wrong are modelled neatly and clearly,
and no crucial stages of the test procedure seem to have been left out. Of course,
(3CF) will be offensive to those who endorse the traditional idea that the real contents
of intuitions generated by philosophical thought experimentation must somehow in-
volve the concept of necessity. But that idea has just been shown to be on shaky
ground. And, in any event, it arguably lacks the naturalness of the counterfactual ap-
proach. This has been emphasised by Williamson, who maintains that the counter-
factual approach is  the “natural way to articulate what is  at  stake with a Gettier
counterexample” (2007: 204). Its naturalness is said to be rooted in the prevalence of
counterfactual thinking in ordinary life. According to Williamson, “counterfactual
questions arise continually in everyday thought, whereas questions of metaphysical
necessity rarely arise outside philosophy, so the burden of proof is on those who
claim that our initial questions about a hypothetical case are metaphysically modal
rather than simply counterfactual in nature” (2007: 204). The same suggestion is at
least implicit in the work of Häggqvist and Sorensen, neither of whom even thinks it
worth  his  while  to  give  any  consideration  whatever  to  non-counterfactual  ap-
proaches.
A further and related attraction of the Counterfactual Model, also emphasised
by Williamson, is that it holds out the prospect of demystifying the power of imagin-
ative mental activity to discover truths about the natures of philosophically interest-
ing properties and relations. Williamson warns against postulating the existence of a
special cognitive capacity reserved exclusively for philosophical investigations into
the natures of things. Humankind, he points out, “evolved under no pressure to do
philosophy”, so we should “expect the cognitive capacities used in philosophy to be
cases  of  general  cognitive  capacities  used  in  ordinary  life,  perhaps  trained,  de-
veloped, and systematically applied in various special ways” (2007: 136). Our gen-
eral capacity for counterfactual thinking would seem to fit  the bill  perfectly. We
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deploy it extensively and frequently throughout the course of ordinary life; it has be-
come  practically  indispensable  for  many  mundane  yet  very  important  cognitive
tasks. For example, counterfactual thinking is used to develop plans for the future,
learn from past mistakes, and reason about causal interactions.29 This general cognit-
ive capacity of ours, furthermore, normally functions in a reliable manner which
yields knowledge, and we understand, at least in rough outline, how it is able to do
so. To evaluate a counterfactual, “one supposes the antecedent and develops the sup-
position, adding further judgements within the supposition by reasoning, offline pre-
dictive mechanisms, and other offline judgements” (Williamson 2007: 152-3). The
counterfactual is assessed to be true if one’s development of its antecedent eventu-
ally leads one to add its consequent. The imaginative mental activity which underlies
this  evaluative process is generally reliable because it is guided by one’s overall
sense of how the world works, or what Williamson (2007: 143) calls “background
knowledge.” As he explains, “the reliability of our cognitive faculties in their online
applications across a wide range of possible circumstances induces reliability in their
offline applications too” (2007: 155).
We may thus feel as though we are beginning to get a grip on how it could be
possible for our thought experiment to tell us something about the nature of know-
ledge. Williamson’s alluring idea is that “the imagination is used in verifying [(3CF)]
just as it is used in verifying many everyday counterfactuals, such as ‘If the bush had
not been there, the rock would have landed in the lake.’ There is nothing peculiarly
philosophical about the way in which the counterfactual is assessed” (2007: 188).
More specifically, when we imaginatively engage with the Gettier case, the imagina-
tion is led to evaluate (3CF) as true “on the basis of of an offline application of our
ability to classify people around us as knowing various truths or as ignorant of them,
and as having or as lacking other epistemologically relevant properties” (2007: 188).
Nothing beyond this  quite  ordinary capacity  to  engage in  counterfactual  thought
about an obvious metaphysical possibility is needed in order to carry out our test of
the traditional theory of knowledge. Williamson (2005: 15) summarises the forego-
ing epistemological story thus: “We have our ordinary capacities for making judge-
ments about what we encounter, and a further capacity to evaluate counterfactuals
29 For further discussion of the various ways in which we deploy our general capacity for counter-
factual thought in ordinary life, see Byrne (2005).
28
by running those capacities ‘offline’; that is already enough to get philosophy going,
without any need of a kickstart from a special faculty.” Even though (as Williamson
himself admits) this is little more than a rough sketch of an epistemology for philo-
sophical thought experimentation, it does seem to steer us away from the mire of
epistemological obscurities which almost always attend the postulation of an ex-
traordinary mental faculty devoted specially to the task of philosophical cognition.
3.1. Contingency
Insofar as it is able to avoid the problems associated with the underspecification of
the text of the Gettier case, the Counterfactual Model constitutes a significant im-
provement upon the Necessity Model. Even so, it too must ultimately be found inad-
equate. The inadequacies of the Counterfactual Model stem from the fact that (3CF) is
contingent (as is any other plausible formalisation of the English counterfactual “If
someone stood to a proposition as described by the text of the Gettier case, then he
would have a justified true belief in it which does not constitute knowledge”). It will
be convenient to discuss the contingency of (3CF) and the resultant inadequacies of
the Counterfactual Model in terms of the standard Lewis-Stalnaker theory of se-
mantics of counterfactuals. For, even though that theory has been subjected to nu-
merous criticisms, it is both evocative and easy to grasp. And just as nothing I am
going to  say against  the counterfactual  approach essentially  depends on whether
(3CF) resolves the problem of donkey anaphora, nor does any of it essentially depend
on whether the Lewis-Stalnaker theory gets the overall semantics of counterfactuals
exactly right. Each of the objections I shall level against the Counterfactual Model
has to do with the contingency of (3CF), and surely any decent alternative semantics
for counterfactuals will make (3CF) (as well as any other plausible formalisation of
the relevant English counterfactual) come out contingent.
Very roughly, the Lewis-Stalnaker theory holds that a counterfactual p ◻q is
true if and only if q is true at every world nearest to the actual world at which p is
true.30 The structure of modal space, that is to say, the relative distances between
30 The classic discussions of this theory are to be found in Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1968). It
should hardly need to be said that my presentation of the theory is vastly oversimplified. For one
thing, the general version of the theory gives conditions under which p ◻q is true at a world;
whereas here I have presented a restricted version of the theory which only gives conditions un-
der which p ◻q is true, that is to say, actually true, or true at the actual world.  This restriction
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possible worlds, is said to be determined by comparative similarity. In general, if
world w is more similar to the actual world than world v is, then w is nearer than v
to the actual world in modal space. The counterfactual (3CF) is contingent because its
truth value depends on the location of the actual world in that space, in particular, on
the actual world’s proximity to what I have been calling deviant worlds. If, on the
one hand, the worlds nearest to the actual world at which the antecedent of (3CF) is
true are deviant, then (3CF) is false; but, on the other hand, if those worlds are non-
deviant, then, on the safe assumption that knowledge without justified true belief is
metaphysically impossible, (3CF) is true. So the underspecification of the text of the
Gettier case is unproblematic in and of itself. The mere existence of deviant worlds
is not enough to impugn the truth of (3CF). A deviant world’s existence is incompat-
ible with (3CF)’s being true if all non-deviant worlds are further away from the actual
world than it is; but no deviant world’s existence is incompatible with (3CF)’s being
true if there is at least one non-deviant metaphysically possible realisation of the
Gettier case nearer to the actual world than all of the deviant worlds are. Location, as
they say, is everything. There is thus a marked contrast between (3CF) and a counter-
factual like “If I were taller than you, then you would be shorter than me”, since the
latter is presumably true no matter where the actual world happens to be located in
modal space.
The reasoning underlying the contingency of (3CF) may not be immediately ap-
parent, so it will  be helpful to run though it here in greater detail.  We begin by
breaking down (3CF) into its propositional constituents, namely, its antecedent, which
is an existential statement, and its consequent, which is a universally quantified con-
ditional:
(A) xp GCxp
(C) xp (GCxp  (JTBxp  Kxp))
is for the sake of convenience: it obviates the need to continually add the cumbersome qualifica-
tion “at the actual world” whenever speaking of (3CF)’s truth value. Another oversimplification is
inherent in the name “the Lewis-Stalnaker theory.” Lewis and Stalnaker did not in fact develop a
single theory of the semantics of counterfactuals. Each developed his own theory, and they fam-
ously differ on several important points, such as the validity of conditional excluded middle. See
Sider (2010: 219-21) for a good summary of the differences. None of them bear on my discussion
of the Counterfactual Model.
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According to  the  Lewis-Stalnaker  theory, (3CF)  is  true if  and only  if  the  nearest
worlds to the actual world at  which its antecedent (A) is true are also worlds at
which its consequent (C) is true. For the sake of convenience let us call any world at
which (A) is true an “A-world”. We are going to show that the truth value of (3CF)
depends on whether or not the nearest A-worlds are deviant. We first consider the
case where they are deviant, since it is the most straightforward one. If the nearest
A-worlds are deviant,  then the existential  statement embedded in (US) is  true at
them:
(EM) xp (GCxp  ((JTBxp  Kxp)  (JTBxp  Kxp)))
Now suppose for reductio that (C) is also true at the nearest A-worlds. Then, by ele-
mentary logic, (C) and (EM) together entail the following:
(AB1) xp ((JTBxp  Kxp)  ((JTBxp  Kxp)  (JTBxp  Kxp)))
But since its first conjunct is inconsistent with each of the disjuncts in its second
conjunct, (AB1) is an absurdity. It follows that (C) must be false at the nearest A-
worlds given their deviancy. So we may conclude that if the nearest A-worlds are de-
viant, the antecedent of (3CF) is true at them but the consequent of (3CF) is false at
them; which is just another way of saying that if those worlds are deviant, then (3CF)
is false. 
Next, consider the more complicated case where the nearest A-worlds are non-
deviant. If the nearest A-worlds are non-deviant, then the negation of (EM), which is
logically equivalent to a universally quantified conditional, is true at them:
(EM) xp (GCxp  ((JTBxp  Kxp) (JTBxp  Kxp)))
It is easy to see that (LT) is a logical truth, and hence true in every possible world,
including the nearest A-worlds:
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(LT) xp ((JTBxp  Kxp) (JTBxp  Kxp) (JTBxp Kxp) (JT-
Bxp Kxp))
This logical truth depicts every permutation of the relations of knowledge and justi-
fied true belief. But its last disjunct is generally acknowledged to be ruled out by the
nature of knowledge. We may thus safely assume that, as a matter of metaphysical
necessity, no one ever has knowledge without justified true belief; in other words,
that in every possible world, including the nearest A-worlds, (SA) is true:
(SA) xp(JTBxp Kxp)
Now suppose for reductio that (C) is false at the nearest A-worlds. The negation of
(C) is logically equivalent to an existential statement:
C) xp (GCxp  (JTBxp  Kxp)) 
This together with (EM) and (SA) entails the following by elementary logic:
(AB2) xp ((JTBxp  Kxp) (JTBxp  Kxp) (JTBxp Kxp) 
(JTBxp Kxp))
(AB2) negates every permutation of the relations of knowledge and justified true be-
lief for at least one subject and one proposition in each of the nearest A-worlds. As a
result it is inconsistent with (LT). But anything inconsistent with (LT) is an absurdity
because (LT) is a logical truth. It follows that (C) must be true at the nearest A-
worlds given their non-deviancy. So we may conclude that if the nearest A-worlds
are non-deviant, both the antecedent and the consequent of (3CF) are true at them;
which is just another way of saying that if those worlds are non-deviant, then (3CF) is
true. Putting both of the foregoing conclusions together, therefore, we find that the
truth value of (3CF) depends on the relative distance between the actual world and
deviant worlds in modal space.
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3.2. Inadequacy of the Counterfactual Model
The contingency of (3CF) is the source of two objections to the Counterfactual Mod-
el. The first has been forcefully pressed by Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009: 225-6; see
also Ichikawa 2009: 436-8)) as well as Malmgren (2011: 78-81), and is best intro-
duced by considering the possibility of actual world deviancy. Let us suppose that by
an amazing coincidence the actual world happens to be such that a man stands to a
proposition just as described by the text of Gettier case. And let us further suppose
that by another amazing coincidence the actual world happens to be just as described
by one of the unintended enrichments of the Gettier case I presented earlier, so that
the man’s true belief is either unjustified because he knows he is under the influence
of hallucinogens, or constitutes knowledge because he remembers certain pertinent
information about the paddocks he is passing on his walk. Then the antecedent of
(3CF), (A), is true but (3CF)’s consequent, (B), is false. This is sufficient to fix (3CF)’s
truth value. The actual world is always the world (or among the worlds) most similar
to itself.  So given any true proposition whatever, the actual world counts  as the
world nearest to itself at which the given proposition is true. Since (A) is true, it fol-
lows that the actual world counts as the nearest world to itself at which the ante-
cedent of (3CF) is true. And since (B) is false, it also follows that the consequent of
(3CF) is false at the nearest world to the actual world at which the antecedent of (3CF)
is true. But then (3CF) is false.
However, surely the Gettier intuition would not be made false by actual world
deviancy. For consider how we would react, and indeed appropriately react, if we
were to ever find out that the actual world is deviant. The improbable nature of the
coincidence would certainly astonish us, but we would feel no obligation whatever
to repudiate the Gettier intuition. The reason is that we would straight away recog-
nise the deviancy of the actual world for what it clearly is: deviancy. We would, in
other words, straight away recognise the actual world as a deviant realisation of
some unintended enrichment of the text of the Gettier case. We might say: “How ex-
traordinary! But, as amazing as it is, it’s beside the point because it’s obviously not
what we had in mind when running our thought experiment.” And we would be per-
fectly  right to say so. A fanatical proponent of the traditional theory of knowledge
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who, upon finding out about our thought experiment, began scouring the Australian
countryside for evidence of actual world deviancy would truly be on a fool’s errand,
and not merely because of the great improbability of his ever finding his quarry. He
would be searching for something which is simply irrelevant to the truth value of the
Gettier intuition. But if deviancy is irrelevant to the Gettier intuition’s truth value
even when it is exhibited by the actual world, then it is surely irrelevant to the Getti-
er intuition’s truth value when it is exhibited by any other possible world. The prox-
imity of the actual world to deviant worlds does not determine whether or not the
Gettier intuition is true. Therefore, the real content of the Gettier intuition is not giv-
en by (3CF) (or any other plausible formalisation of the relevant English counterfac-
tual).
Williamson anticipates this objection to the Counterfactual Model. His reply
strikes me as fantastical, but it is worth examining it in detail if only because its au-
thor’s reputation may impart some credibility to it. Williamson concedes that, if it
were ever discovered, actual world deviancy would indeed  seem irrelevant to the
truth value of the Gettier intuition. But he claims that our situation would be analog-
ous to that of the person in the following example:
Suppose that someone says “Every man in the room is wearing a tie”; I look
around, see a man not wearing a tie, misidentify him as Dave (who is in fact
wearing a tie), and say “Dave isn’t.” When it is pointed out to me that Dave is
wearing a tie, I deceive myself if I insist that my original reply was correct be-
cause the man whom I had in mind was not wearing a tie; that was just not the
“counterexample” I actually presented. I spoke falsely when I said “Dave isn’t”
(Williamson 2007: 201).
Williamson is correct to hold that in this example the person’s adherence to the truth
of the statement “Dave isn’t” would amount to self-deception. This is because by ut-
tering “Dave isn’t” the person commits himself to the world’s being a certain way, in
particular, to its being such that Dave is not wearing a tie. Furthermore, the person’s
adhering to the truth of the statement “Dave isn’t” could be straightforwardly ex-
plained as a manifestation of the desire everyone has to be right. Williamson claims
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that adherence to the truth of the Gettier intuition even after finding out about actual
world deviancy would likewise amount to a kind of self-deception. It would do so,
he says, because acceptance of the Gettier intuition also commits us to the world be-
ing a certain way, in particular, to its being such that anyone who happens to stand to
a proposition as described by the text of the Gettier case has a non-knowledge justi-
fied true belief. And here as well, according to Williamson, our adhering to the truth
of the Gettier intuition could be straightforwardly explained as nothing more than a
manifestation of our desire to be right or, as he (2007: 201) puts it, “the common hu-
man characteristic of reluctance to admit having been wrong.” Williamson then goes
on to add:
We should not distort our account of thought experiments in order to indulge
that tendency. Often purported counterexamples fail for accidental reasons and
can easily be repaired. To attempt to build into the counterexample in advance
all repairs which might conceivably be needed is a futile exercise. It loads the
purported counterexample with complexity and in the the process weakens it in
other respects. The repairs need not articulate qualifications that were in some
obscure sense implicit in the thought experiment from the beginning. Rather,
they genuinely modify the thought experiment, but the similarity of the new
thought  experiment to the old one is  evidence that the old one was not far
wrong. (Williamson 2007: 201).
For Williamson, therefore, we would dismiss actual world deviancy as irrelevant not
because it really would be irrelevant but because we generally find it unpleasant to
acknowledge our own mistakes; furthermore, adherence to the truth of the Gettier in-
tuition in the face of actual world deviancy would be quite silly, since it may be eas-
ily dealt  with by adding modifications to the original text of the Gettier  case as
required.
One serious defect of Williamson’s reply, noted by Ichikawa (2009: 438), is
that his example of misidentification is importantly disanalogous to the example of
known actual world deviancy. In Williamson’s example of misidentification, the per-
son’s sincere assertion “Dave isn’t”  obviously commits  him to the world’s being
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such that Dave is not wearing a tie. It is obvious, in other words, that that assertion
means that Dave is not wearing a tie; it does not mean that some guy over there is
not wearing a tie. Language is a public activity governed by public rules. As it is
used in the person’s conversational context, “Dave” is a proper name, and according
to the public rules governing the use of such linguistic items, the person cannot use
it to refer to just someone or other; instead, those rules imply that in the person’s
conversational  context  “Dave”  must  refer  to  a  particular  object,  specifically,  to
Dave. So, given that the particular object referred to by the proper name “Dave” is in
fact wearing a tie, the person’s sincere assertion “Dave isn’t” is most plausibly re-
garded as a falsehood. In contrast, it is not obvious that, in the example of known ac-
tual world deviancy, the Gettier intuition commits us to the world’s being such that
anyone who happens to stand to a proposition as described by the text of the Gettier
case has a non-knowledge justified true belief. As a matter of fact, if anything is ob-
vious about that example, it is that we would not be committed to the actual world’s
being that way. The upshot of the disanalogy here is that Williamson’s reply does not
do much to make it plausible that actual world deviancy would turn the Gettier intu-
ition into a falsehood.
Another serious defect of Williamson’s reply is his idea that actual world devi-
ancy would put the original text of the Gettier case in need of repair. The original
text of the Gettier case may be enriched in a myriad of unintended ways and, as Wil-
liamson (2007: 185) himself admits, “[a]ny humanly compiled list of such interfer-
ing factors is likely to be incomplete.” It follows that if the real content of the Gettier
intuition is (3CF), then if we were to modify the original text of the Gettier case to
deal with some known actual world deviancy, the apparently repaired text could it-
self turn out to be broken because of some other actual world deviancy we do not
know about. And if we were to find out about this modified text’s brokenness and
add further modifications to deal with it, even the resultant apparently repaired ap-
parently repaired text could  also turn out to be broken because of yet more actual
world deviancy we do not know about. And so on. This process of textual broken-
ness and textual repair could continue indefinitely, since the actual world might turn
out to be absolutely riddled with deviancy. If so, the process would involve running
a series of thought experiments, each one of which would fail to falsify the tradition-
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al  theory  of  knowledge because  it  would  depend upon a  false  intuition  about  a
broken text. But it is surely absurd to think that a situation of that kind could ever
come about, even if deviancy were to be found everywhere in the actual world. Un-
der no circumstances would anyone need to sit around in such an absurd fashion “re-
pairing” broken text after broken text. There would be no need to do so because
actual world deviancy would not break the text of the Gettier case in the first place.31
The second objection to the Counterfactual Model is hinted at by Ichikawa and
Jarvis (2009: 225-6) and developed more fully by Ichikawa (2009: 439-40). To set it
up we must consider what it would take for us to know (3CF). The method for evalu-
ating counterfactuals has already been roughly delineated. In general, we evaluate a
counterfactual by supposing its antecedent and then imaginatively developing the
supposition in accordance with relevant background knowledge. As Ichikawa and
Jarvis (2009: 226) point out, if this method is to yield knowledge of (3CF), then since
(3CF) is contingent but obviously not contingent a priori, our imaginative develop-
ment of its antecedent will have to draw on “a great deal of empirical knowledge
about the actual world.” The requisite a posteriori knowledge must presumably in-
clude, among other things, knowledge of certain properties typically instantiated by
spotters of native wildlife and individuals and organisations which deploy sophistic-
ated robotic machinery. We need to know, for example, whether spotters of native
wildlife  tend to  consume powerful  hallucinogens prior to  going on walks in  the
countryside. For, if they do tend to do so, then perhaps the nearest worlds in which a
man stands to a proposition as described by the text of the Gettier  case are also
worlds in which his true belief is unjustified because he knows he is under the influ-
ence of hallucinogens. We also need to know whether individuals and organisations
which deploy sophisticated robotic machines tend to allow uninformed members of
the public to wander about in their vicinity, roughly, within a medium range viewing
31 Incidentally, Williamson’s reply to the first objection to the Counterfactual Model significantly
detracts from that model’s attractiveness relative to the Necessity Model. Williamson appeals to
the obvious truth of (US), that is to say, to the obvious existence of deviant worlds, as the source
of his motivation for moving from the Necessity Model to his Counterfactual Model. But if the
right reaction to the discovery of actual world deviancy is to admit the falsity of the Gettier intu-
ition and repair the text of the Gettier case, then it is surely also the right reaction to the discov-
ery of the mere existence of deviant worlds, whether or not the actual world is itself deviant. It
would be ad hoc for Williamson to maintain otherwise. So he must, on pain of ad hocery, allow
that the essence of his reply is equally available to the proponent of the Necessity Model. Of
course, this observation does not—and is not intended to—demonstrate that Williamson’s reply is
wrong, which is why I have relegated it to a footnote. See also Malmgren (2011: 280).
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distance. For, if they do not tend to do so, then perhaps the nearest worlds in which a
man stands to a proposition as described by the text of the Gettier  case are also
worlds in which his true belief is not only justified but constitutes knowledge be-
cause he remembers being told that the only non-empty paddock on his walk con-
tains both real and robotic kangaroos. The knowability of (3CF) is dependent on the
knowability of these and many other empirical matters.
However, there would seem to be little or no realistic prospect of our ever get-
ting all of the a posteriori knowledge required to know (3CF). For my own part, al-
though  I  think  I  do  know  that  spotters  of  wildlife  do  not  tend  to  consume
hallucinogens prior to going on walks in the countryside, I confess that I have no
idea whether the individuals and organisations which deploy sophisticated robotic
machines tend to allow uninformed people to wander about within eyeshot of them.
And there is no realistic prospect of my ever finding out. I take it that almost every-
one else is in the same boat as I am in this regard. We should thus be inclined to
agree  with  Ichikawa and Jarvis  that  (3CF)  is  a  counterfactual  which,  realistically
speaking at least, “cannot be known at all” (2009: 226). The epistemological attract-
iveness of the Counterfactual Model turns out to be rather specious.32 Note that ac-
knowledging this fact is quite compatible with also acknowledging that we possess a
general capacity for counterfactual cognition. There is no risk here of our falling into
anything like universal scepticism about counterfactual knowledge. “One may,” as
Ichikawa explains, “admit the general capacity to evaluate counterfactuals, while re-
maining skeptical about one’s ability to know a particular counterfactual” (2009:
440). This should come as no surprise because it is easy to see that the same thing
must hold for every other general cognitive capacity of ours. To borrow an example
from  Ichikawa:  although  Williamson  possesses  a  general  perceptual  capacity  to
identify the colours of objects, he has no way of knowing what colour shirt I am
wearing at the present moment.
Since knowledge of (3CF) is pretty much unattainable for us, it follows that if
(3CF) is the real content of the Gettier intuition, then our thought experiment is epi-
32 The difficulty of our coming to know (3CF) has also been observed by D. Sosa (2006: 640), who
writes: “It is not as if we have extensive practical experience with subjects in circumstances sim-
ilar to those of the envisaged case and have found, by something like empirical investigation, that
they have tended to have justified ignorance, so that we are now in a position to assert the coun-
terfactual with confidence that rests on that experience.”
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stemically defective because its negative result depends on an intuition which, for all
we are able to determine, may very well be false. Furthermore, we should be able
make rather major improvements to our thought experiment by making rather minor
modifications to the text of the Gettier case, specifically, minor modifications which
compensate for our ignorance of relevant empirical facts. We could, for example,
change the text to make it specify that the organisation responsible for deploying the
robotic kangaroos allows uninformed members of the public to walk around near the
paddock in which those sophisticated robots are enclosed; this minor textual change
would completely obviate the necessity of finding out whether the individuals and
organisations which deploy sophisticated robotic machines tend to allow such beha-
viour. We could then carry out a new thought experiment by imaginatively engaging
with the modified text, which may be represented using the open formula GCMxp. If
we did so, then according to Williamson we should undergo a new intuition with the
following counterfactual as its real content:
(3CFM) xp GCMxp ◻ xp (GCxp  (JTBxp  Kxp))
Knowledgeable evaluation of this counterfactual must also draw on a great deal of a
posteriori background knowledge, but due to the compensation built into the text
represented by GCMxp, it is going to be much easier for us to come to know (3CFM)
than (3CF). Our new thought experiment should thus be a much better thought experi-
ment than our original one. But surely it would  not be; the aforementioned minor
modification to the text of the Gettier case would simply not bring about a major im-
provement, or indeed any improvement at all. The fact of the matter, as Ichikawa
(2009: 440) points out,  is that the texts represented by GCxp and GCMxp would
“function equally well [or, perhaps, equally badly] for establishing knowledge of the
conclusion of the Gettier argument.” We may therefore conclude that the counterfac-
tual approach to modelling philosophical thought experimentation is liable to give
rise to distortions of the relative merits of case descriptions. This is another reason to
think that the real content of the Gettier intuition is not given by (3CF) (or any other
plausible formalisation of the relevant English counterfactual).
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3.3. Some bad objections
The Counterfactual Model, it will be recalled, has considerable attractions, so in or-
der to do it justice we must make sure that we condemn it on the basis of the most
compelling reasons. Ichikawa and Jarvis’s critique of the Counterfactual Model fails
to do it justice because they rather confusingly blend some bad objections with the
two good ones set forth in the previous sub-section. One of the bad objections we
can extract from their work appeals to the “traditional understanding of philosophic-
al  methodology” to  which  they  and many other  contemporary philosophers  give
their endorsement. In addition to the idea that the real contents of intuitions like the
Gettier intuition must somehow involve the concept of metaphysical necessity, an-
other defining element of traditionalism is the idea that philosophical thought exper-
imentation is an a priori activity. The arch-traditionalists Bealer and BonJour, for
example, both uphold the latter idea. Bealer says that philosophical thought experi-
mentation is a “procedure of a priori justification” (1996a: 4; 1996b: 122); while
BonJour rather more dramatically declares that “philosophy is a priori if it has any
intellectual standing at all” (1998: 106). But we have already observed that, since
(3CF) is contingent but obviously not contingent a priori, any knowledge of it has to
be a posteriori. This makes (3CF) repugnant from the very get go to the traditionalist
sensibilities of Ichikawa and Jarvis. They are moved to write: “If the Gettier intu-
ition is like this [i.e. contingent], then it is not the sort of thing that traditional philo-
sophy takes  it  to  be.  […] [It]  cannot  be  knowledge  a  priori.  This  is,  we think,
sufficient reason to look further for a treatment of thought experiment intuitions”
(2009: 226). In the view of Ichikawa and Jarvis, therefore, the aposteriority of (3CF)
is itself enough to render the Counterfactual Model inadequate.
However, Ichikawa and Jarvis are here putting more dialectical weight on their
“traditional understanding of philosophical methodology” than it is able to support
—or at least more than they have shown it is able to support. If the aposteriority of
(3CF) is to provide us with something in the vein of a sufficient reason to reject the
Counterfactual Model, then surely we require a vindication of the idea that philo-
sophical thought experimentation is an a priori activity; that idea cannot simply be
taken for granted. After all, even though there are many contemporary philosophers
who endorse it, there are also many who have argued strongly against it, and they
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are hardly fringe cranks. It is nowadays a matter of great controversy in mainstream
philosophy whether we can have a priori knowledge of anything at all, let alone a
priori knowledge of the natures of philosophically interesting properties and rela-
tions. Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009: 240-3) do contend that there is “a burden of proof
argument” in their favour, but their discussion of why the burden must fall on the
shoulders of non-traditionalists is sketchy at best and, in their own words, “some-
what speculative.” Since they neither vindicate the apriority of philosophical thought
experimentation nor tell us where such a vindication is to be found, their claim that
the  aposteriority  of  (3CF)  is  sufficient  reason  to  reject  the  Counterfactual  Model
should be taken with a grain of salt. We should also be wary about the unhelpful and
unnecessary  partisanship  it  introduces  into  our  model-building  project.  Perhaps
philosophical thought experimentation really is a posteriori. It may be, for example,
that the real content of the Gettier intuition is a posteriori not because knowledge of
it especially depends on the a posteriori knowledge required to know (3CF), but be-
cause epistemic justification is holistic. Even if the real content of the Gettier intu-
ition is a posteriori in this way, the Counterfactual Model is still inadequate—both
for the reason that actual world deviancy would make (3CF) but not the Gettier intu-
ition false (our first good objection), and for the reason that that model can distort
the relative merits of case descriptions (our second good objection). The perpetual
war between traditionalists and radical empiricists is just a distraction.
Another bad objection which we can extract from Ichikawa and Jarvis’s work
attempts to build upon our first good objection. Consider a situation in which the ac-
tual world happens to be deviant and we carry out our thought experiment in ignor-
ance  of  the  fact.  If  the  Counterfactual  Model  adequately  models  our  thought
experiment, then this situation is one in which we come to truly believe that the tra-
ditional theory of knowledge is wrong by validly deducing its negation from our true
beliefs in (1) and (2) and our false belief in (3CF). But due to the falsity of (3CF) the
thought experiment we carry out must be defective. With this in mind, Ichikawa and
Jarvis (2009: 226) go on to claim: “As we all know, deducing a true belief from a
false belief, even a justified one, does not confer knowledge. So Williamson’s view
implies that in this case […] a defective thought experiment has generated a Gettier
case about the analysis of knowledge! This, we take it, is unacceptable.” I shall call
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the situation on which the foregoing objection is based the ironic Gettier case.
It is worthwhile pointing out that the ironic Gettier case threatens to infect Ichi-
kawa and Jarvis’s critique of the Counterfactual Model with incoherence. In the situ-
ation now under consideration,  we end up with a true and justified belief  in the
negation of the traditional theory of knowledge only if our true beliefs in (1) and (2)
and our false belief in (3CF) are all justified. If this necessary condition is not satis-
fied, then our defective thought experiment does not, as Ichikawa and Jarvis claim,
generate  a  Gettier  case  about  the  analysis  of  knowledge.  It  might  be  wondered
whether Ichikawa and Jarvis can allow that such a condition could ever be satisfied.
As we have already seen, they are of the view that (3CF) “cannot be known at all”,
not even when it is true. But if (3CF) cannot be known by us even when it is true,
then we cannot have a justified belief in it either. (The reasoning behind this condi-
tional is straightforward. In general, unless it is Gettierised, a justified belief must
constitute knowledge when its content is true. And if we can have a justified belief
in (3CF), then surely we can do so without our justified belief being Gettierised. From
these obviously true premises it follows that we can have a justified belief in (3CF)
only if we can know (3CF) when it is true; but this is just the contrapositive of the rel-
evant conditional.) So Ichikawa and Jarvis would seem to be committed to the im-
possibility of our having a justified belief  in (3CF),  which would in turn seem to
commit them to denying that the relevant necessary condition is satisfiable. They are
here on the verge of incoherence. Of course, the question of whether Ichikawa and
Jarvis actually do fall into incoherence depends on whether they mean to claim that
it is metaphysically impossible for us to know (3CF) or, as I more charitably sugges-
ted above, only that there is no realistic prospect of our ever coming to know it. If
their claim is the former one, then the incoherence of their critique of the Counter-
factual Model is blatant; if it is the latter, then they may coherently hold that the
ironic Gettier case is a metaphysical possibility, albeit a very unrealistic one. They
do not make it clear where they stand on this matter, however.
Most importantly, though, nothing about the ironic Gettier case would seem to
be problematic for the Counterfactual Model other than that it describes a situation
in which actual world deviancy makes (3CF) but not the Gettier intuition false. In par-
ticular, the fact that the ironic Gettier case is a Gettier case is neither here nor there.
42
And this is just what we ought to expect. For we possess many cognitive capacities
in addition to  the imaginative ones  which underlie  philosophical  thought  experi-
mentation (such as our various perceptual capacities, mnemonic capacities, and in-
trospective capacities), and most if not all of them can become implicated in Gettier-
style cases. It would be very surprising if it turned out that our imaginative capacit-
ies could not become implicated in Gettier cases as well. The ironic Gettier case
therefore fails to build upon our first good objection; it adds nothing to that objec-
tion at all. In defence of Ichikawa and Jarvis here, it may perhaps be suggested that
they intend the ironic Gettier case to merely facilitate comprehension of our first ob-
jection, rather than to add anything to it. But the ironic Gettier case is unhelpful in
this regard because no help is required: our first objection is easy enough to compre-
hend in itself.  The ironic Gettier  case does nothing but generate confusion as to
whether Ichikawa and Jarvis’s critique of the Counterfactual Model is even coherent.
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4. The Possibility Model
In the previous section we learned that the Counterfactual Model is also too demand-
ing. Williamson’s (3CF) requires that the nearest A-worlds to the actual world be non-
deviant, but the Gettier intuition imposes no such requirement upon modal space.
One response might be to weaken (3CF) to its mere possibility:
(3CFP) (◇ xp GCxp ◻ xp (GCxp  (JTBxp  Kxp)))
This possibility claim only requires that there be some world such that the nearest A-
worlds to it are non-deviant; it makes no difference whether the world is the actual
world or some other one. The requirement is presumably satisfied; (3CFP) is true.
Moreover, within the modal logical system S5, (3CFP) along with (1) and (2) provides
us with a valid argument to the conclusion that the traditional theory of knowledge is
wrong. But here we might complain with Williamson (2007: 202) that “it is strained
to attribute the commitment to S5 to people who have never considered matter.”
(Neither the models we have already looked at, nor any of the ones we are yet to
look at, commit us to making such a strained attribution.) And we might also com-
plain, this time with Malmgren (2011: 281), that (3CFP) “seems like overkill, given
that there is another, simpler possibility claim in the vicinity.” The possibility claim
Malmgren has in mind forms the core of the following model of our thought experi-
ment, which I shall call the Possibility Model:
(1) T ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp)
(2P) ◇xp (GCxp  JTBxp  Kxp)
(4) ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp) From (2P)
                                                                   
(5) T From (1) and (4)
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On this model the intended real content of the Gettier intuition is (2P), the claim that
it is metaphysically possible for someone to stand to a proposition as described by
the text of the Gettier case, have a justified true belief in it, but not know it.
As Malmgren has emphasised, the Possibility Model is attractive principally
because it is able to avoid the problems faced by the other two models we have dis-
cussed so far. First of all, the Possibility Model avoids the problems which render
the Necessity Model inadequate. It is able to do so because the underspecification of
the text of the Gettier case has no impact on the truth value of (2P). More specific-
ally, the mere fact that there are deviant worlds is not enough to make (2P) false; (2P)
is compatible with the truth of (US). The Possibility Model also avoids the problems
which render the Counterfactual Model inadequate. It is able to do so because the re-
lative distance between the actual world and deviant worlds has no impact on the
truth value of (2P). More specifically, if the nearest A-worlds to the actual world hap-
pen to be deviant, that fact is not enough to make (2P) false; (2P) is true no matter
where in modal space the actual world happens to be located. All of these problems
are avoided by the Possibility Model, yet it still manages to provide us with a valid
argument to  the conclusion that  the traditional  theory of knowledge is  wrong. It
would therefore seem as though the Possibility Model does a much better job of rep-
resenting our thought experiment than the Necessity and Counterfactual Models do,
at least with regard to the irrelevance of deviancy considerations for the truth value
of the Gettier intuition.
In addition to these attractions, the Possibility Model may also present those
sympathetic to the “traditional understanding of philosophical methodology” with an
alluring compromise in light  of the inadequacy of the Necessity Model.  For, al-
though (2P) does not directly involve the concept of necessity, it is presumably a
non-contingent truth. And there seems to be no good reason why, if we are able to
know some possibility claims a priori, we could not know (2P) a priori as well. Tra-
ditionalists could even modify the Possibility Model in order to bring it further into
line with their desiderata. If, for example, (2P) is replaced with its necessitation (i.e.
◻◇xp (GCxp  JTBxp  xp)), the result is a model on which the real content
of the Gettier intuition is given by something which not only involves the concept of
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necessity, but can at least arguably be known a priori. Since everything I am going to
say about the Possibility Model applies equally to this traditionalist variant of it, I
shall set the latter aside in what follows.
Another potential attraction of the Possibility Model is the simple structure it
attributes to our thought experiment. This has been emphasised by David Sosa. Ac-
cording to Sosa, it is doubtful whether “there is even as much structure in the Gettier
cases as Williamson supposes” (2006: 642). We should, he says, regard the Neces-
sity  and Counterfactual  Models  as  exaggerating the  structural  complexity  of  our
thought experiment, because our imaginative engagement with the Gettier case does
not seem to get us to the negation of (MC) “as the result, in any way, of a derivation
from the possibility of the case together with [a counterfactual] or [a strict condition-
al]” (2006: 642). Although Sosa does not elaborate on this observation, I suspect he
is impressed by how natural we find it to speak of the Gettier intuition “clashing”
with the traditional theory of knowledge. The naturalness of that locution certainly
does make it seem as though there must be an incompatibility between the Gettier
intuition and the traditional theory of knowledge. But if the real content of the Getti-
er intuition is (2P), then there really is an incompatibility between them because (2P)
directly entails the negation of (MC) and hence also the negation of the traditional
theory of knowledge. Neither the Necessity Model nor the Counterfactual Model is
able to accommodate the naturalness of the “clash” locution in such a straightfor-
ward manner; proponents of those models are forced to treat it as misleading. So,
owing to its simplicity, the Possibility Model would also seem to do a better job of
representing our thought experiment in this regard. But no matter how natural it is to
speak of the Gettier intuition clashing with the traditional theory of knowledge, we
must take care not to overestimate the attractiveness of the Possibility Model’s sim-
plicity. For it has a significant trade-off. As I discussed earlier (in Section 2), pro-
ponents of the Necessity Model or any other model with a similar structure, such as
the Counterfactual Model, are able to explain away the naturalness of the “clash”
locution by appealing to the fact that, for most philosophers, the metaphysical pos-
sibility of the Gettier case is typically not in any doubt and hence not worth men-
tioning. This approach, furthermore, receives independent support from the practice
of  empirical  experimentation:  scientists  often  find  it  natural  to  speak  of  clashes
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between observations and theories which are in all strictness compatible with one
another, the explanation being that descriptions of the initial conditions of experi-
mental set-ups are often not in any doubt and hence not worth mentioning. The Ne-
cessity  and  Counterfactual  Models  are  therefore  suggestive  of  a  pleasing  and
plausible uniformity of structural complexity between thought experimentation and
empirical experimentation. But such uniformity is uncongenial to the simplicity of
the Possibility Model.
It could be tempting to think that the Possibility Model involves a redundant
element which may be excised without affecting the model’s adequacy. This tempta-
tion is felt by Sosa, who writes: “it is not clear that an objection to the claim that
knowledge is equivalent to justified true belief needs to depend on more than the ob-
servation that, possibly, an agent could have justified true belief without knowledge”
(2006: 642). In other words, Sosa entertains and may actually endorse a variant of
the Possibility Model where (2P) is replaced by the following:
(2PS) ◇xp (JTBxp  Kxp)
Sosa’s variant of the Possibility Model excises (2P)’s reference to the Gettier case.
And, to be sure, there is no question that (2P)’s reference to the Gettier case is wholly
superfluous insofar as the validity of the argument from (1), (2P), and (4) to (5) is
concerned. However, we are trying to find the answer to the content problem, and
Malmgren has shown that, given this objective of ours, the replacement (2P) with
(2PS) must lead to complete disaster. She begins by pointing out “that an adequate
content proposal should generalize in natural ways to intuitive judgements other than
the Gettier judgement, and that it should not ride roughshod over our pre-theoretical
classifications of those judgements” (2011: 283). She then continues as follows:
But [(2PS)] does precisely that (on what looks like the only natural way to gen-
eralize the proposal). Simply put: it is hard to see how we could accept [(2PS)]
—as an analysis of the Gettier judgement—without committing to giving ex-
actly the same analysis of, for example, the intuitive judgement that might be
expressed by saying ‘Jill has a justified true belief but does not know that the
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president has been assassinated’, and of the judgement that might be expressed
by saying ‘Henry has a justified true belief but not know that there is a barn in
front of him.’ But it is absurd to suppose that the Gettier judgement is the same
judgement  as—that  it  has  the  same content  as—either  of  those  judgements
(Malmgren 2011: 284).
The temptation to excise (2P)’s logically superfluous reference to the Gettier case
should therefore be resisted by anyone sympathetic to the Possibility Model.
4.1. Rational commitment
The  Possibility  Model  has  some  significant  advantages  over  the  Necessity  and
Counterfactual Models, but even it must ultimately be found inadequate. The inad-
equacies of the Possibility Model stem from the fact that there are rational commit-
ments associated with the practice of thought experimentation. Rationality imposes
various requirements on our minds. In general, if rationality requires one to F when
one is in the mental state (or collection of mental states) M, then we say that one’s
being in M rationally commits one to F. The requirement to avoid contradictory be-
liefs is a paradigmatic example: the state of believing p rationally commits one to re-
frain from believing p’s negation. Other examples include requirements to believe
what one believes to be entailed by one’s beliefs, and to intend the necessary means
to one’s ends. A fully rational agent fulfils all of its rational commitments. For any
such agent, there is no M such that the agent is in M, M rationally commits the agent
to F, but the agent does not F. So, for instance, no fully rational agent both believes p
and believes p’s negation, because such a combination of mental states would be in-
coherent. But although the failure to fulfil just one rational commitment is enough to
make one less than fully rational, it need not make one irrational overall. Rationality
and irrationality are matters of degree. Since the phenomenon of rational commit-
ment is a very general one, it should come as no shock to find it associated with the
practice of thought experimentation.33
33 See Broome (1999) for the seminal discussion of rational commitment. Since Broome’s paper,
two interrelated problems have come to dominate the debate. One is the problem of whether the
requirements of rationality are wide scope or narrow scope. The other is the problem of whether
the requirements of rationality have any normative force. For a good recent overview of both
problems, see Way (2010). My discussion of rational commitment in thought experimentation
does not presuppose any particular answers to them, so there is no need for me to take a stand on
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It is easy to appreciate how our particular thought experiment can lead to the
incurrence of certain rational commitments. The first thing we do when we carry out
our thought experiment is bring the Gettier case before the mind and apprehend its
metaphysical possibility in imaginative thought. This imaginational state consists at
least in part of a modal judgement or belief. Next, we proceed to ask ourselves about
the epistemic status of Smith’s true belief, which induces us to undergo the Gettier
intuition, that is to say, to intuit the following:
(I1) Smith has a justified true belief that there are kangaroos in the paddock,
but he does not know that there are.
The  Gettier  intuition,  as  I  explained  earlier,  may  or  may  not  be  a  belief.  But
whatever the nature of the Gettier intuition turns out to be, when we carry out our
though experiment we somehow come to form a judgement or belief which we ex-
press using (I1). Doing so amounts to taking a stand on the question of the epistemic
status of Smith’s true belief. We accept that the verdict delivered by the tribunal of
our own imagination is the correct verdict about the distribution of the relations of
knowledge and justified true belief in the Gettier case. In principle, however, we
need not have undergone the Gettier intuition at all. Although the Gettier intuition is
probably what most philosophers would undergo if they were to imaginatively en-
gage with the Gettier case, other intuitions about the epistemic status of Smith’s true
belief are possible.34 In particular, instead of (I1), we could have intuited either of
the following:
(I2) Smith has an unjustified true belief that there are kangaroos in the paddock,
and he does not know that there are.
(I3) Smith has a justified true belief that there are kangaroos in the paddock,
them here.
34 And it very well may turn out that there are many people who would undergo an intuition other
than the Gettier intuition. After all, there is a growing body of research suggesting that non-philo-
sophers do not react to Gettier-style cases in the way most (or many) philosophers do. See Star-
mans and Friedman (2012) and Weinberg, Nichols,  and Stich (2001).  However, there is  also
research suggesting the contrary; see Turri (2013).
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and he knows that there are.35
But as it happens, we do not intuit them and so we do not come to form any judge-
ment or belief which we would express using (I2) or (I3). Insofar as we give any
consideration to these alternative distributions of the relations of knowledge and jus-
tified true belief, we reject them as incorrect verdicts about the epistemic status of
Smith’s true belief. So carrying out our thought experiment puts our minds in at least
two mental states: a state of apprehending in imagination the metaphysical possibil-
ity of the Gettier case and a belief state which we use (I1) to express.
Now, in and of itself, there is nothing wrong with that pattern of mental states,
but the mere fact that our minds exhibit it certainly has ramifications for what else
we are able to believe about Smith’s epistemic situation without falling foul of the
requirements of rationality. Let us suppose that someone who carries out our thought
experiment holds an (I1)-belief and then comes to hold an (I2)-belief as well. At one
and the same time, this person would not only hold the beliefs that the Gettier case is
metaphysically possible and that Smith’s true belief is justified, but he would also
believe Smith’s true belief is unjustified. Or suppose instead that this person also
comes to hold an (I3)-belief. Then he would not only hold the beliefs that the Gettier
case  is  metaphysically  possible  and  that  Smith’s true  belief  does  not  constitute
knowledge, but he would also believe Smith’s true belief does constitute knowledge.
It is  obvious that there is something intrinsically wrong with those two patterns of
mental states. They strike us as irrational; to exhibit either pattern of mental states is
to suffer from a genuine failure of reason. Indeed, if someone were to tell us that he
holds one or the other of those combinations of beliefs, then although we would per-
haps initially regard him as joking, or even as using words in non-standard ways, we
would have to regard him as at least somewhat mentally disordered if he continued
to press the point. Our belief in the Gettier case’s metaphysical possibility in com-
bination with our (I1)-belief simply cannot be made to fit coherently together with
an (I2)-belief or an (I3)-belief. In virtue of holding them, we incur both a rational
35 In addition to (I2) and (I3), there is perhaps one other thing we could have intuited: (I4) Smith
has an unjustified true belief that there are kangaroos in the paddock, but he knows that there are.
Of course, even if it is possible to intuit (I4), the manifest incoherence of the idea of knowledge
without justification makes it is highly improbable that anyone would ever do so. I shall set aside
(I4) in what follows because it can only serve to add unnecessary complications to our discus -
sion; I can make the points I want to make by dealing exclusively with (I1), (I2), and (I3).
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commitment to refrain from holding an (I2)-belief and a rational commitment to re-
frain from holding an (I3)-belief.
4.2. Inadequacy of the Possibility Model
It is widely acknowledged by philosophers that rational commitments are not brute
facts. They are phenomena in need of explanation. And, for at least some rational
commitments, there are good explanations already available. The rational require-
ment to avoid holding beliefs in both p and p’s negation, for example, is explicable
in terms of the nature of the mental state of belief and the logico-analytical relation-
ship between the contents p and not-p. Believing p rationally commits us to refrain
from believing p’s negation because, first, it is in the nature of belief to aim at truth36
and, second, p and not-p stand in the contradictory relation to one another (i.e. one is
true if and only if the other is false). Explanations of rational commitments need not
be of one kind only. Some rational commitments may admit of explanations similar
to  the  one  just  presented,  while  yet  others  may  call  for  different  explanatory
strategies altogether. But either way there are no explanatorily brute requirements of
rationality. What is most important for present purposes is that an explanation is
needed for the two rational commitments we incur in virtue of holding a belief in the
Gettier case’s metaphysical possibility together with an (I1)-belief. No approach to
modelling philosophical thought experimentation can be adequate if it fails to fur-
nish the resources for such an explanation, or at least, if it gets in the way of the pro-
vision  of  such an  explanation.  The objection  I  should  now like  to  level  against
Malmgren’s possibility approach is that it does just that: it makes it impossible to
provide a explanation of the relevant rational commitments.
It is natural to think that the most straightforward way to go about explaining
those rational commitments is in terms of the nature of belief and the logico-analyt-
ical relationships between contents. An explanation of that kind immediately comes
to mind because belief aims at truth, the Gettier case is a metaphysical possibility,
36 The ideas that belief has an aim and that its aim is truth are, of course, metaphorical. Although
they are very often taken for granted by philosophers, in recent years a debate has erupted around
the question of how to best interpret them literally. See the papers collected by Chan (2013) for
some representative contributions to this debate. The explanation I am setting forth in the main
text does not oblige me to attach myself to any particular literal interpretation of the metaphor;
though it does depend on the assumption that there is at least one such interpretation which is
both intelligible and plausible. I take this assumption to be a safe one.
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and (I1), (I2), and (I3), which are claims about the distribution of the relations of
knowledge and justified true belief in that metaphysical possibility, would seem to
be incompatible. They may be said to stand in something like the contrary relation to
one another: given any two of them, both may be false but at most one can be true.
However, no explanation along such lines is available to Malmgren. Since she holds
that (2P) is the real content of the Gettier intuition, she is committed to holding that
the real contents of (I2) and (I3) must also be possibility claims, in particular, pos-
sibility claims of the same kind as (2P). For it would be exceedingly bizarre if (I2)
and (I3) turned out to have real contents of a different kind to the real content of the
Gettier intuition. The respective possibility claims Malmgren must give as the real
contents of (I1), (I2), and (I3) are as follows:
(2P) ◇xp (GCxp  JTBxp  Kxp)
(PC2) ◇xp (GCxp  JBxp  TBxp  Kxp)37
(PC3) ◇xp (GCxp  JTBxp  Kxp)38
But due to the underspecification of the Gettier case, these possibility claims are not
37 It might be wondered why I have used JBxp  TBxp rather than JTBxp in (PC2). After all,
not only did I use JTBxp in (US1) and (US) when I was discussing the underspecification of
the Gettier case, but it is a simpler formula than the conjunction JBxp  TBxp. My reason for
preferring  JBxp   TBxp over  JTBxp in the present context is that the latter formula is too
coarse grained to fully capture the meaning of the English expression “unjustified true belief”
which occurs in (I2). The coarseness of JTBxp is due to the fact that a subject’s failure to have
a justified true belief in a proposition does not imply that he has an unjustified true belief in it. He
may have a justified false belief in the proposition, or no belief in it at all. (The converse implica-
tion, of course, does hold: a subject’s having an unjustified true belief in a proposition implies
that he fails to have a justified true belief in it.) The point here may be put another way. The for -
mula JTPxp is just an abbreviation for the formula JBxp  TBxp. So a subject-proposition pair
satisfies JTBxp if and only if it satisfies JBxp  TBxp. Suppose such a pair fails to satisfy JTBxp.
Then it either fails to satisfy JBxp or it fails to satisfy TBxp. It may fail to satisfy JBxp while sat -
isfying TBxp. But it may also satisfy JBxp while failing to satisfy TBxp, or it may fail to satisfy
both JBxp and TBxp. Consequently, JTBxp is unsuitable for capturing the meaning of “unjusti -
fied true belief”;  we need JBxp   TBxp to do the job. Note that I  used  JTBxp rather than
JBxp  TBxp in (US1) and (US) because, logically speaking, JTBxp is easier to work with
than JBxp  TBxp, and there was no need for me to fully capture the meaning of “unjustified
true belief” when I was discussing the underspecification of the Gettier case.
38 This possibility claim is the same as (US2). I have labelled it “(PC3)” here because Malmgren’s
association of it with (I3) is what matters most in the present context.
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only perfectly compatible, they are also all true. They cannot be said to stand in any-
thing like the contrary relation to one another: given any two of them, the truth of
one does not rule out the truth of the other. Our imaginative engagement with the
Gettier case, furthermore, essentially involves no mental state the content of which
could be combined with (2P), (PC2), and (PC3) to generate the required incompatib-
ilities. It is at this point that Malmgren’s possibility approach runs out of resources.
It  cannot  deliver  the incompatibilities  which are necessary for an explanation in
terms of the nature of belief and the logico-analytical relationships between con-
tents. If the real contents of (I1), (I2), and (I3) are given by (2P), (PC2), and (PC3)
respectively, then an altogether different kind of explanatory strategy must be found.
Malmgren anticipates this challenge. Her response is that the relevant rational
commitments tell us “something about the grounds, not the content, of the intuitive
judgement”  (2011:  291).  The  main  idea  of  Malmgren’s  alternative  explanatory
strategy is that “[t]here is a certain generality to my grounds (or reasons) for judging
that Smith has a justified true belief but does not know […] and this generality of
grounds rationally  constrains  my options when it  comes to  making certain other
judgements” (2011: 291-2). To introduce this idea, Malmgren asks us to consider a
situation in which one of her students, student A, puts her feet up on the table and
Malmgren judges that she should put them down. “Other things equal,” observes
Malmgren, “I can be expected to react in the same way to the next student who puts
her feet up […] If I do not, then I betray some kind of inconsistency or confusion”
(2011: 292). The irrationality of making a divergent judgement about whether the
next student, student B, should also put her feet down is then said to be explicable as
follows:
[N]ormally, the reasons for which an (overall reasonable) person would judge
that a given student should put her feet down have a certain generality—per-
haps they apply to everyone in the room, or at least to everyone in the room
whose feet are dirty. What my divergent judgements betray is that I did not in
fact base my original judgement on reasons of the presumed generality (even
though, perhaps, I should have done so)—or I did, but I failed to see that those
reasons applied to the next student too. A third possibility is that my reasons
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were defeated in some non-obvious way in the latter situation. Any which way,
the tension between my two judgements reflects something about the reasons
on which they are based (Malmgren 2011: 292).
By way of elaboration, Malmgren adds that the grounds on which her original judge-
ment are based include, first, “the minor premiss that [student A] put her feet on the
table” and, second, “a major premiss roughly to the effect that anyone who puts their
feet up in my seminar—and, perhaps, meets some further specification—should take
them down” (2011: 293). The original judgement thus “results from the application
of a general principle or rule to a particular instance, an instance that falls under it
(and/or is taken by the subject to fall under it)” (2011: 293). A divergent judgement
about student B would be irrational because, in Malmgren’s words, “‘if I do it once I
should do it twice’—I should apply that principle or rule in any other circumstance
that is  relevantly similar to that in which I first applied it […] This point is some-
times expressed by saying that reasons must be consistently applied” (2011: 293).
Having in this way illustrated that the generality of grounds is a real phenomen-
on with the potential to do explanatory work, Malmgren continues as follows:
[M]y suggestion is that the rational commitment that an intuitive judgement
seems to  ‘bring  on’ is  fundamentally  the  same kind of  commitment  that  is
manifest  in  the  above  examples—a commitment  that  can  be  found  in  any
reason-based activity (in the practical as well as the epistemic domain). The
nature of this commitment is by no means fully, or even particularly well, un-
derstood as yet. But it is a commitment that we are all familiar with. It is impli-
citly  invoked at  any time someone is  called on to  defend why she  made a
certain judgement (or performed a certain action) in a circumstance C1—given
that C1 seems to match another circumstance C2 in all relevant respects, and
that, in C2,  she made a judgement (or performed an action) of a contrasting
type. (Malmgren 2011: 294-5)
According to the explanatory strategy which emerges from Malmgren’s discussion,
when we carry out our thought experiment, we have grounds or reasons for making
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a certain judgement about the epistemic status of Smith’s belief, some or even all of
which may come from our imaginative engagement with the Gettier case. We re-
spond to these grounds by forming an (I1)-belief on their basis. They are grounds
which have a certain generality. And it is because of their generality that making di-
vergent (or “contrasting”) judgements about the epistemic situation of the subjects in
cases relevantly similar to the Gettier case would be irrational. For example, if we
now go on to imaginatively engage with a case which is the same as the Gettier case
except that it specifies that Smith has two sons, or that he dislikes cabbage, or the
case features someone called “Brown” rather than “Smith”, then we must refrain
from making a judgement  about  the subject’s epistemic situation which diverges
from our original (I1)-belief. A divergent judgement here would be irrational be-
cause of the generality of the grounds for that original belief of ours. The rational
constraint imposed by its grounds would, as it were, extend beyond our thought ex-
periment involving the Gettier case to any thought experiment involving a relevantly
similar case. But the limit of similarity is identity. At the limit, we would, if we were
irrational, make a judgement about the epistemic situation of Smith in the Gettier
case, and then go on to make a further and divergent judgement about the epistemic
situation of the same subject (Smith) in the same case (the Gettier case). The explan-
ation for why that pattern of mental states would be irrational—specifically, for why
we are rationally committed to avoid forming either an (I2)-belief or an (I3)-belief
when we already hold an (I1)-belief—is again to be given in terms of the generality
of the grounds for our original (I1)-belief.
Malmgren does not say much about what she thinks the grounds or reasons for
our (I1)-belief might be. She tells us that, in holding an (I1)-belief, we are “attribut-
ing justified true belief without knowledge to a subject who stands to a proposition
in a certain peculiar way” and “it seems clear that we are attributing those properties
to him in part  because we take him to stand to a proposition in that peculiar way”
(2011: 296). She adds that “it seems very plausible” that our imaginative engage-
ment with the Gettier  case “has more than  causal  significance—specifically, that
(some or all) of the information that is explicitly stipulated in that description consti-
tutes a reason for [us] to make a certain intuitive judgement” (2011: 297). This reas-
on is then said to be the possibility claim ◇xp GCxp. Malmgren acknowledges
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that ◇xp GCxp by itself is an insufficient ground for believing what she takes to
be the real content of (I1), in other words, for believing (2P). She worries about “how
this [i.e. ◇xp GCxp] could be among our  reasons for believing [(2P)]—how a
claim of the form ‘possibly p’ could be a reason for believing a claim of the form
‘possibly p & q’” (2011: 296, fn.53). There must be at least one additional reason if,
as Malmgren holds, the real content of (I1) is (2P) and our belief in it is a justified
one  based  on  sufficient  grounds.  At  no  stage  in  her  discussion,  however,  does
Malmgren spell out the additional reason(s). One option is the strict conditional (3N).
But since (3N) is false and known to be so, Malmgren would probably not wish to
accept it as being among our grounds for believing (2P). A second option is the coun-
terfactual (3CF). But since (3CF)’s truth value depends on the location of the actual
world in modal space, and its epistemic standing for us is rather doubtful, this is an-
other conditional Malmgren probably would not wish to accept as being among our
grounds for believing (2P). It is by no means obvious what she would accept instead.
As a consequence of this lack of detail, Malmgren’s alternative explanatory strategy,
which makes so much of the generality of the grounds or reasons for our belief in (I-
1), is in danger of falling into obscurantism.
More important than that, however, is the fact that it is simply impossible for
Malmgren to make this or any other explanation work in a coherent fashion with her
other commitments. According to Malmgren’s possibility approach, the three possib-
ility claims (2P), (PC2), and (PC3), each of which is compatible with the other two,
are the real contents of,  respectively, (I1),  (I2),  and (I3).  In conformity with the
philosophically orthodox view of our thought experiment, Malmgren acknowledges
—as we do—that the metaphysical possibility of a justified true belief which is not
knowledge may be demonstrated by means of imaginative engagement with the Get-
tier case, and hence that the first possibility claim, (2P), must be true (whether or not
it turns out to be the real content of the Gettier intuition). Malmgren also acknow-
ledges—as we do—that the text of the Gettier case is obviously underspecified, and
hence that both of the other possibility claims, (PC2) and (PC3), must likewise be
true. So our minds as well as Malmgren’s exhibit the following pattern of mental
states: belief in the metaphysical possibility of the Gettier case, belief in (2P), belief
in (PC2), and belief in (PC3). Now, we do not find anything irrational in that pattern
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of mental states; indeed, we regard ourselves as being quite reasonable in holding
those beliefs. And presumably Malmgren agrees with us on this score, for she holds
exactly the same combination of beliefs. But Malmgren further acknowledges—as
we do—that in virtue of our belief in the Gettier case’s metaphysical possibility and
our (I1)-belief, we incur a rational commitment to refrain from holding an (I2)-belief
and a rational commitment to refrain from holding an (I3)-belief. It is at this point
that Malmgren cannot help but fall into incoherence. For, on the one hand, she her-
self holds beliefs in the Gettier case’s metaphysical possibility and  (2P) while also
holding beliefs in (PC2) and (PC3), and finds no irrationality in doing so; but, on the
other hand, she says that holding that combination of beliefs is, in fact, irrational,
and tries her best to account for this irrationality in terms of the so-called generality
of grounds. It is easy enough for us to evade this kind of incoherence: we need only
reject the possibility approach to modelling philosophical thought experimentation.
Things are quite otherwise for Malmgren qua champion of the possibility approach.
If Malmgren is to extricate herself from the incoherent position she has got herself
into, she must reverse her opinion about the underspecification of the text of the Get-
tier case or else reverse her opinion about the existence of the very rational commit-
ments she thinks it necessary to explain. Either way, the cost of extrication is ad
hocery.
But even setting such ad hocery aside, neither reversal of opinion would be de-
fensible. First, there is nothing abstruse about the underspecification of the text of
the Gettier case. It is an easy fact to grasp (especially when examples of unintended
enrichments are adduced to illustrate it); so easy, in fact, as to put it beyond reason-
able doubt. Malmgren in any event could not deny it without undermining her objec-
tions to the Necessity and Counterfactual Models, and hence also the primary and
perhaps only motivations for her alternative proposal, the Possibility Model. After
all, to deny that the text of the Gettier case is underspecified is to deny that there are
deviant worlds; but all of the objections which Malmgren levels against the Neces-
sity and Counterfactual Models are dependent upon the metaphysical possibility of
deviant realisations of the text of the Gettier case. (She objects to the Necessity and
Counterfactual Models in broadly the same ways as I have done; see especially sec-
tions 1.4 and 1.5 of her paper (Malmgren 2011: 275-81).) Malmgren’s second option
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here is to deny that our belief in the Gettier case’s metaphysical possibility and our
(I1)-belief together rationally commit us to refrain from holding either an (I2)-belief
or an (I3)-belief. If she were to go down this path, Malmgren could perhaps appeal
to the fact that the alleged rational commitments seem to turn on certain logico-ana-
lytical characteristics of the apparent contents of (I1), (I2), and (I3). The idea would
then be that since those apparent contents are known to be illusions, the alleged ra-
tional commitments must also be illusions brought about by putting too much faith
in the appearances. But this line of argument is borne out of desperation. The real
contents of the intuitions and beliefs generated by philosophical thought experiment-
ation must differ in some ways from their apparent contents, but they cannot differ
so much that it becomes difficult to make sense of our own mental lives. The firm
hand of rationality really does seem to impose itself on the practice of thought ex-
perimentation, just as it does on many other activities of the mind. It is as though the
beliefs we form about the distribution of properties and relations in hypothetical
cases steer us away from forming divergent beliefs. Specifically, when we appre-
hend in imagination the metaphysical possibility of a hypothetical case and form a
belief that in it a certain property or relation is distributed in a certain way, there is a
compulsion to refrain from forming a further belief that in it the same property or re-
lation is distributed in a different way. To deny the reality and rational origin of these
apparent constraints is to risk losing our grip on what is going on in our own heads
when we carry out philosophical thought experiments. The risk here is a big one,
and it is not a risk worth running just to save Malmgren’s Possibility Model.
4.3. Comparison with rivals
The explanatory failure of the possibility approach is compounded by the fact that
each of its rivals provides sufficient resources to support an explanation of the relev-
ant rational commitments. According to the necessity approach, our initial imaginat-
ive act of apprehending the metaphysical possibility of the Gettier case consists at
least partly in a state of judging or believing the content ◇xp GCxp. We then ask
ourselves about the epistemic status of Smith’s true belief and undergo an intuition;
we could intuit either (I1), (I2), or (I3). The proponent of this approach gives the fol-
lowing strict conditionals as their respective real contents:
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(3N) ◻xp (GCxp  (JTBxp  Kxp))
(SC2) ◻xp (GCxp  (JBxp TBxp  Kxp))
(SC3) ◻xp (GCxp  (JTBxp  Kxp))
These strict conditionals are compatible; they do not entail one another’s negations.
This is because they are all vacuously true if ◇xp GCxp is false. Even so, on the
safe assumption ◇xp GCxp is true, they may be said to stand in something like
the contrary relation to one another: given any two of them, both may be false but at
most one can be true. So the necessity approach has the result that the combination
of ◇xp GCxp with the real content of our (I1)-belief rules out the real contents of
(I2) and (I3). It is therefore congenial to an explanation of the relevant rational com-
mitments  in  terms  of  the  nature  of  belief  and  the  logico-analytical  relationships
between contents.
The  counterfactual  approach  also  delivers  the  incompatibilities  required  for
such an explanation to work. It does so in a parallel fashion. Once more, our appre-
hension in imagination of the metaphysical possibility of the Gettier case is said to
consist at least partly in a judgement or belief with ◇xp GCxp as its content. But
the proponent of the counterfactual approach gives not strict conditionals but the fol-
lowing counterfactuals as the respective real contents of (I1), (I2), and (I3):
(3CF) xp GCxp ◻ xp (GCxp  (JTBxp  Kxp))
(CF2) xp GCxp ◻ xp (GCxp  (JBxp TBxp  Kxp))
(CF3) xp GCxp ◻ xp (GCxp  (JTBxp  Kxp))
Given the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals, these counterfac-
tuals are compatible; they do not entail one another’s negations. This is because, like
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the  strict  conditionals  above,  they  are  vacuously  true  if  ◇xp  GCxp  is  false.
However, on the safe assumption ◇xp GCxp is true, it follows from any plausible
counterfactual semantics that they too may be said to stand in something like the
contrary relation to one another: given any two of them, both may be false but at
most one can be true. The result is again that the combination of ◇xp GCxp with
the real content of our (I1)-belief rules out the real contents of (I2) and (I3). So the
counterfactual approach is also congenial to an explanation of the relevant rational
commitments in terms of the nature of belief and the logico-analytical relationships
between contents.
Of course, the inadequacy of both of these approaches to modelling philosoph-
ical thought experimentation has already been established. But in light of the forego-
ing explanatory considerations, it behoves us to take another look at the idea that the
real content of the Gettier intuition is some kind of conditional which connects the
Gettier case to a certain distribution of the relations of knowledge and justified true
belief. What is getting in the way of making that idea work? The principal obstacles
so far have had do with the metaphysical possibility of deviant realisations of the
text of the Gettier case. Williamson’s formula GCxp, which represents the text of the
Gettier case, is complicit in this obstruction because of its metaphysical weakness.
To his credit, Williamson provided us with the springboard we needed to first launch
our model-building endeavours, but now we must abandon it if we are to make fur-
ther progress on solving the content problem. In the next section I turn to an ap-
proach to modelling our thought experiment which does just that. The approach put
forward by Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009) does away with the formula GCxp and aims
to replace it with something much stronger. To anticipate: Ichikawa and Jarvis hold,
first, that our imaginative engagement with the Gettier case involves apprehending a
highly determinate metaphysical possibility, and second, that the real content of the
Gettier intuition is a strict conditional which says, in effect, that this highly determ-
inate metaphysical possibility is one which metaphysically necessitates justified true
belief without knowledge. As we shall see, not only does this general kind of ap-
proach avoid the problems faced by the Necessity and Counterfactual Models, but
there are ways of implementing it which are congenial to explaining the rational
commitments associated with our thought experiment in terms of the nature of belief
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and the logico-analytical relationships between contents,  thereby improving upon
the Possibility Model as well.
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5. The Truth in Fiction Model
The key to Ichikawa and Jarvis’s abandonment of Williamson’s formula GCxp is the
intuitive distinction between texts and stories. This distinction is an absolutely fun-
damental one in the philosophical study of the nature of fiction.39 The set of sen-
tences an author produces when he creates a fictional work is what constitutes a text.
These sentences are sometimes called fictive sentences. Texts are used by the authors
of fiction to tell stories. “There is”, as Ichikawa and Jarvis observe, “more to a story
than the literal claims of the sentences used to tell it” (2009: 227). A story is a cer-
tain enrichment or filling in of a text; it includes a very large number of sentences in
addition to the ones explicitly stated in the text used to tell it.40 These additional sen-
tences are sometimes called metafictive sentences. Metafictive sentences are some-
how generated from texts, that is to say, sets of fictive sentences, in accordance with
the rules or principles governing fictional discourse.41 The union of a given text with
the set of metafictive sentences generated from it is what constitutes a story.42 The
elements of a story S are  fictional truths  with regard to a certain work of fiction;
39 The most influential works in this field include Currie (1990), Lewis (1978; reprinted with a
postscript in his 1983), and Walton (1990). Woods (2007) is an excellent and wide-ranging intro-
duction; see also Woodward (2011).
40 Stories are also known as “maximal accounts”. See Parsons (1980).
41 The terms “fictive” and “metafictive” are due to Currie  (1990).  He also introduced the term
“transfictive”. This applies to sentences which relate the characters and events of a fictional work
to things existing outside of that work. Note that, although the set of a story’s fictive sentences
and the set of its metafictive sentences are always disjoint, neither of those sets need be disjoint
with the set of transfictive sentences about the story’s fictional characters and events.
42 This, perhaps, is a bit simplistic. One complication arises around the literary device of unreliable
narration. If an author makes use of that device, then at least some of the sentences in the text he
uses to tell his story will not count as elements of the story. For a recent discussion of unreliable
narration, see Nünning (2005). Another potential complication arises around inconsistent texts,
that is to say, texts which contain contradictory sentences. Some philosophers, such as Lewis
(1983: 277-8), hold that no story is internally inconsistent. If they are right, then no story corres -
ponding to an inconsistent text can contain every sentence of that text. But although these two
complications merit further attention, doing justice to them here would require a rather lengthy
and distracting digression from the main topic of discussion. Furthermore, unreliable narration
and contradictory texts are pretty atypical anyway. This is especially so with regard to the case
descriptions used in philosophical  thought experimentation. In light  of such considerations,  I
shall set the foregoing complications aside in what follows. My simplistic characterisation of
stories will be enough for our purposes.
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they are said to be true in S. The concept of truth in fiction is of course not the same
as the concept of truth simpliciter. A sentence’s being true does not imply that it is
true in any particular story; conversely, a sentence’s being true in some story does
not imply that it  is  true.  But that is  not to say that fictional truths always make
claims which fail  to be true of the world.  Although stories generally do contain
many fictional truths which are not true, they also generally contain a great number
of fictional truths which are true simpliciter as well.
We are more or less competent with fictional discourse. This competency of
ours consists mainly in a tacit grasp of the rules or principles governing the enrich-
ment of texts. Although those principles have proved very difficult to formulate ex-
plicitly, we nonetheless have a general capacity to apply them to a given text and
thereby come to recognise whether something is true in the story, false in the story,
or indeterminate in the story.43 Let us consider, for example, Thackeray’s novel Van-
ity Fair (2001), which portrays the vices and follies of middle and upper class Brit-
ish society during the Napoleonic era  and its  aftermath.  The text  of  Vanity  Fair
comprises many thousands of sentences, among which are the following (see Thack-
eray (2001: 16 and 374-5)):
- ‘Revenge may be wicked, but it’s natural,’ answered Miss Rebecca.
- Towards evening, the attack of the French, repeated and resisted so bravely,
slackened in its fury.
Since these are fictive sentences of Vanity Fair, they count as fictional truths with
regard to that work; they are, as we say, true in the Vanity Fair story.44 But there is
much more to the story of Vanity Fair than the mere text Thackeray used to tell it.
We are able to identify many of its metafictive sentences. They presumably include:
43 See Woodward (2011) for a recent discussion of the difficulty of giving explicit formulations of
the principles of fictional discourse. Woodward is doubtful whether we will ever be able to for-
mulate those principles explicitly. Similar doubts are expressed by Currie (1990) and Walton
(1990).
44 As for truth simpliciter, the two fictive sentences arguably diverge. The first of them may be held
to be not true on the grounds that Becky Sharp never really existed and hence nothing was ever
said by her about the naturalness of revenge. It may very well be, however, that the second sen-
tence truthfully describes how things stood at the Battle of Waterloo in the tense moments lead-
ing up to the famous attack of Napoleon’s Imperial Guard.
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- Becky Sharp had a central nervous system.
- The French were defeated at the Battle of Waterloo by Britain and its allies.
Despite the fact that these sentences are nowhere explicitly stated in the text of Van-
ity Fair, they too count as fictional truths with regard to that work. The principles of
fictional discourse rule them in; they are just as much elements of the Vanity Fair
story as the above fictive sentences are.45 In addition to this story’s metafictive sen-
tences, we are also able to identify many sentences which fall into neither the fictive
nor the metafictive category. They presumably include:
- Several of Becky Sharp’s ancestors were wizards from another galaxy.
- Becky Sharp had a mole on her lower back.
Although each of these sentences is consistent with the text of Vanity Fair, neither
counts as a fictional truth with regard to that work. The first of them is plainly a ri-
diculous way to enrich or fill in the text of Vanity Fair. The principles of fictional
discourse rule it out; it is false in the Vanity Fair story. The second sentence, in con-
trast, is not ridiculous, but seems to be neither ruled in nor ruled out by the prin-
ciples of fictional discourse. Its fictional truth value with regard to  Vanity Fair  is
indeterminate.46
Ichikawa and Jarvis assimilate the case descriptions deployed in philosophical
thought experimentation to standard works of fiction. Accordingly, just as we distin-
guished between the text of Vanity Fair and the Vanity Fair story, Ichikawa and Jar-
vis distinguish between the text of the Gettier case and what they call  the Gettier
45 And as for truth simpliciter, these two metafictive sentences are also like the above fictive sen-
tences in that they at least arguably diverge. The first of them may be held to be not true on the
grounds that Becky Sharp never really existed and hence no central nervous system has ever be-
longed to her. The second sentence, however, is a truth of European military history.
46 This time it is at least arguable that, as for truth simpliciter, the status of the two sentences is the
same. They may both be held to be not true. After all, Becky Sharp never really existed. So there
has never been anything biologically related to her and no mole has ever been located on her
lower back.
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story.47 There is much more to the Gettier story than the mere text used to tell it. This
is so even though the Gettier story’s metafictive sentences are generated from a very
small set of fictive sentences. As with other stories, our tacit grasp of the principles
which govern the enrichment or filling in of texts puts us in a position to recognise
many of its fictional truths, fictional falsehoods, and fictional indeterminacies. First
of all, we are able to identify many of the Gettier story’s metafictive sentences. They
presumably include:
- Smith is conscious.
- There is life on Earth.
These sentences are nowhere explicitly stated in the text of the Gettier case, but they
are ruled in by the principles of fictional discourse. They count as true in the Gettier
story just like its fictive sentences do. We also have the ability to identify many non-
fictive and non-metafictive sentences. They presumably include:
- Smith is one nanometre tall.
- Smith has brown hair.
The first of these sentences may or may not be consistent with the text of the Gettier
case, but even if it is consistent, it seems to be ruled out by the principles of fictional
discourse. It counts as false in the Gettier story. The other sentence, in contrast, is
plainly consistent with the text of Gettier case, but it seems to be neither ruled in nor
ruled out by the principles of fictional discourse. Its fictional truth value with regard
to the Gettier story is indeterminate.
According to Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009: 227), the distinction between texts and
stories is “just what we need” to deal with the obstacles presented by the metaphys-
ical possibility of deviant realisations of the text of the Gettier case. The general idea
47 Lewis is surely the inspiration for Ichikawa and Jarvis’s introduction of the distinction between
texts and stories into our model-building project. In the postscript to his influential paper on truth
in fiction, he observes that “[f]iction might serve as a means of discovery of modal truth. […]
note that the philosophical example is just a concise bit of fiction” (Lewis 1983: 278).
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is that when we carry out our thought experiment, our competency with fictional dis-
course somehow guides the imaginative activity of the mind. We imaginatively en-
gage not only with the text of the Gettier case but with the much richer Gettier story.
An integral component of this imaginative mental activity is the mind’s recognition
that the principles of fictional discourse rule out enrichments of the text of the Getti-
er case which are conducive to deviancy. More specifically, the mind recognises that
such enrichments are unintended; even if they are consistent with the text of the Get-
tier case, they are not how the Gettier case is meant to be filled in. Note that this ap-
proach has a certain naturalness about it. The text of the Gettier case does tell a story
about a man’s encounter with robotic kangaroos in the Australian countryside. And,
in general, our tacit grasp of the principles of fictional discourse does provide guid-
ance to the mind when we imaginatively engage with fictional works. So we may in-
deed have found just what we need.
Ichikawa and Jarvis, however, do not simply equate the practice of thought ex-
perimentation with the practice of reading standard fictional works such as novels,
narrative poems, and the like. They regard the proposal that the Gettier intuition is
just another judgement about what is true in a fiction as rather unhelpful.48 And, it
seems to me, they are right to do so. First of all, there is no standard analysis of the
concept of truth in fiction; so it is not even clear what the real content of the Gettier
intuition would be if  the Gettier  intuition were nothing but  an ordinary fictional
judgement.49 Second, and relatedly, it is questionable whether the contents of such
judgements have anything much to do with the metaphysical modalities; so it could
very well turn out that they have no logical bearing at all on the the truth or falsity of
philosophical theories such as the traditional theory of knowledge.50 In short,  the
48 As confirmed by the fact that they do not discuss the proposal, not even just to dismiss it. The
two reasons I go on to mention for why Ichikawa and Jarvis seem to regard it as unhelpful are
reasons I have gleaned from the general tenor of their discussion.
49 Woods (2007) discusses most of the competing analyses of truth in fiction. If any of them have
any claim to being the standard one, Walton’s (1990) pretence analysis does and perhaps Lewis’s
counterfactual analyses (in particular, his Analysis 1 and Analysis 2) do as well. But these ana-
lyses have also come in for severe criticism. Woods (2007) delivers a powerful broadside against
Walton’s pretence analysis. As for Lewis’s counterfactual analyses, Lewis himself raises several
objections  against  them (Lewis  1978:  42-6).  See  also  Currie  (1990),  Byrne  (1993),  Phillips
(1999),  Le  Poidevin  (1995),  Proudfoot  (2006),  Walton  (1990),  Wolterstorff  (1980),  Woods
(2007), and Woodward (2011). For a vigorous defence of Lewis’s analyses, see Hanley (2004).
50 There are several analyses of truth in fiction on which this would be so. Walton’s (1990) influen-
tial pretence analysis, for example, analyses fictional truth in terms of what is authorised by the
games of make-believe we (allegedly) engage in when reading fictional works. If something like
Walton’s pretence analysis is right, then it is hard to see how the contents of ordinary fictional
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proposal that the Gettier intuition is simply an ordinary fictional judgement is quite
uninformative and may in fact be fundamentally misguided. Ichikawa and Jarvis
therefore explore several alternative ways of implementing the truth in fiction ap-
proach to modelling philosophical thought experimentation. We shall now consider
each of them in turn.
5.1. Mark 1
Taking the logical structure of the Necessity Model as their point of departure, Ichi-
kawa and Jarvis start out by developing a model which directly invokes the concept
of truth in fiction without making the Gettier  intuition into just  another fictional
judgement. Williamson’s formula GCxp is replaced with the formula GCTFxp, which
is to be understood as saying that x stands to p in the relation in which it is true in
the fiction that Smith stands to the proposition that there are kangaroos in the pad-
dock. This replacement yields the following model of our thought experiment, which
I shall call the Truth in Fiction Model Mark 1:
(1) T ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp)
(2TF-M1) ◇xp GCTFxp
(3TF-M1) ◻xp (GCTFxp  (JTBxp  Kxp))
(4) ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp) From (2) and (3TF-M1)
                                                                   
(5) T From (1) and (4)
On this model, truth in fiction is invoked at the level of content. Our imaginative en-
gagement with the Gettier case involves apprehending the truth of (2TF-M1), the claim
that it is metaphysically possible for a subject to be related to a proposition in the
same way that,  in  the  fiction,  Smith  is  related  to  the  proposition  that  there  are
kangaroos in the paddock. The real content of the Gettier intuition is given by (3TF-
M1), the claim that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, anyone so related to a pro-
position has a justified true belief in it which fails to constitute knowledge.
judgements  could  bear  on  the  truth  or  falsity  of  philosophical  theories.  The  same  goes  for
Woods’s (2007) analysis of fictional truth in terms of labels.
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The Truth in Fiction Model Mark 1 would seem to be a big step in the right dir-
ection. First, we now begin to see how the obstacles presented by deviant worlds
might be overcome. The principles of fictional discourse are said to generate an en-
richment of the text of the Gettier case which precludes Smith’s true belief that there
are kangaroos in the paddock from being either unjustified or knowledge. Since the
formula GCTFxp pertains to that enrichment, that is to say, to the Gettier story, it
should  carry  with  it  the  clout  to  metaphysically  necessitate  justified  true  belief
without knowledge. So if the Gettier intuition has (3TF-M1) as its real content, consid-
erations of deviancy should have nothing to do with its truth or falsity, just as we
have  been  insisting  all  along.  Another  attraction  of  this  model  is  that  there  are
enough resources in the vicinity to support an explanation of the rational commit-
ments associated with our thought experiment. The explanation parallels the ones
discussed in Section 4.3 above. On the present way of implementing the truth in fic-
tion approach, the respective real contents of (I1), (I2), and (I3) are given by the fol-
lowing strict conditionals:
(3TF-M1) ◻xp (GCTFxp  (JTBxp  Kxp))
(TFM1-2) ◻xp (GCTFxp  (JBxp  Bxp  Kxp))
(TFM1-3) ◻xp (GCTFxp  (JTBxp  Kxp))
These strict conditionals are compatible; they do not entail one another’s negations.
This is because they are all vacuously true if ◇xp GCTFxp is false. But if we as-
sume the truth of ◇xp GCTFxp, then they may be said to stand in something like
the contrary relation to one another: given any two of them, both may be false but at
most one can be true. As a result, the combination of ◇xp GCTFxp with the real
content of our (I1)-belief rules out the real contents of (I2) and (I3). So the relevant
rational commitments are straightforwardly explainable in terms of the nature of be-
lief and the logico-analytical relationships between contents.
Despite  its  attractions,  Ichikawa and Jarvis  find the Truth in  Fiction Model
Mark 1 inadequate. They level three objections against it. First, they doubt whether
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(3TF-M1) is knowable a priori given that it directly invokes truth in fiction. The worry,
as Ichikawa and Jarvis put it, is that “everything would depend on the correct theory
of truth in fiction; the Gettier intuition would seem to be a priori only if we can ac-
cess fictional truths, given texts, a priori; and this is far from clear” (2009: 227). To
illustrate, they adduce one of David Lewis’s (1978) proposed analyses of the concept
of truth in fiction, on which something is true in a story S if and only if it would be
true if S were told as known fact. This analysis of Lewis’s has it that truth in fiction
claims are really counterfactuals, many of which are contingent and knowable only
by a posteriori means, if they are knowable at all.51 According to Ichikawa and Jar-
vis, the Lewis view would turn the present model into something “similar to Willi-
amson’s, with respect to the epistemic status of the Gettier intuition” (2009: 228).
They go on to add that although “there are good reasons to think that the Lewis view
is not right […] the correct theory of truth in fiction will very likely share this fea-
ture of Lewis’s: it will have it that fictional truths cannot be known a priori” (2009:
228). If this aposteriority contaminates (3TF-M1), then (3TF-M1) is the real content of the
Gettier intuition only if one of the main tenets of the “traditional understanding of
philosophical methodology” is mistaken. Ichikawa and Jarvis uphold the tenets of
traditionalism, and since they anticipate empirical contamination of (3TF-M1), they do
not think it can be what we are searching for.
However, this first line of objection is defective. One problem is that Ichikawa
and Jarvis are strangely confused about the potential for truth in fiction to lead to
empirical contamination. Let us grant that fictional truths are only knowable a pos-
teriori. Then it is an empirical question as to how, in the fiction, Smith is related to
the proposition that there are kangaroos in the paddock. But whatever the answer
turns out to be, it plainly does not follow that it is also an empirical question as to
whether a subject’s being so related to a proposition metaphysically necessitates his
having a non-knowledge justified true belief. The point here holds generally. For ex-
ample, it is an empirical question as to how I am related to my mug; but whatever
51 The analysis is only one of several proposed by Lewis in his (1978). The statement I have given
of it here is a simplification of Lewis’s original. Note that Lewis himself does not endorse the
analysis; instead, he seems inclined toward one of his others, the one on which something is true
in a story S if and only if, in the worlds nearest to the collective belief worlds of the community
of origin of S, it is true and S is told as known fact. Ichikawa and Jarvis do not discuss this ana -
lysis, but it would certainly lead them to worry about (3TF-M1) just as much as the analysis which
they do discuss leads them to worry about it, for the question of which worlds constitute a given
community’s collective belief worlds is presumably an empirical one.
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the answer turns out to be, it plainly does not follow that it is also an empirical ques-
tion as to whether a subject’s being so related to a mug metaphysically necessitates
the existence of at least one drinking utensil. Indeed, if anything is knowable a pri-
ori, then it is surely knowable a priori that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, if a
subject is related to a mug in the way I am related to my mug, then at least one
drinking utensil exists. So Ichikawa and Jarvis need to clarify why it is that they are
doubtful about the a priori epistemic status of (3TF-M1); as it stands, their doubt seems
wholly devoid of motivation. Another problem is that, even if (3TF-M1) is empirically
contaminated,  only those who harbour traditionalist  sympathies need be unhappy
about the fact. Traditionalism is not mandatory. Furthermore, I have already pointed
out (in Section 3.3), first, that Ichikawa and Jarvis say nothing to vindicate tradition-
alism, and second, that their devotion to it introduces an unhelpful and unnecessary
element of partisanship into our model-building project.
Ichikawa and Jarvis’s second objection to the Truth in Fiction Model Mark 1 is
that it fails to establish enough distance between the Gettier intuition and ordinary
fictional judgements. This alleged failure has to do with the model’s invocation of
truth in fiction at the level of content. Ichikawa and Jarvis acknowledge that since
many philosophers are of the view that “our ordinary sentences about fictional char-
acters include an unnoticed elliptical ‘it is true in the fiction’ operator […] it is per-
haps not terribly worrying that our Gettier intuitions don’t feel like judgements about
fictions” (2009: 228). What is said to be terribly worrying is that Gettier-style cases
known or believed to be actual (i.e. non-fictional) “work just as well as fictional
ones to set up the Gettier conclusion” (2009: 228). More specifically, Ichikawa and
Jarvis tell us that if our particular Gettier case had been presented to us as fact rather
than fiction, then we would “have gone through the Gettier reasoning in just the
same way” (2009: 228). Insofar as I understand them, Ichikawa and Jarvis are here
claiming that, in terms of real content, intuitions about Gettier-style cases taken to be
fictional are very much akin to intuitions about Gettier-style cases taken to be actual.
Since the latter intuitions pertain to what we take to be actual, they are obviously not
fictional judgements of any kind. Truth in fiction is not an essential conceptual con-
stituent of such intuitions; we are able to reason from their contents to the negation
of the traditional theory of knowledge without invoking truth in fiction. For Ichi-
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kawa and Jarvis, therefore, “it seems wrong to suppose that invocation of fiction is
an essential part of Gettier reasoning […] it does not seem as though the concept of
truth in fiction can play a role at this level” (2009: 228).
This is another defective line of objection. It is hard to know what to make of
Ichikawa and Jarvis’s assertion that we would “have gone through the Gettier reas-
oning in just the same way” if the Gettier case had been presented to us as fact rather
than fiction. No elaboration of the import of this assertion is provided. On the one
hand, Ichikawa and Jarvis may intend for us to take it at face value, as I do above.
Then part of its import would seem to be that the real content of our intuition about
the epistemic status of Smith’s true belief is the same whether the Gettier case is
taken to be fact or taken to be fiction. But this interpretation makes Ichikawa and
Jarvis’s assertion highly problematic. If the Gettier case were a factual description
and we had taken it to be so when we originally asked ourselves about the epistemic
status of Smith’s true belief, then the content problem would not even have arisen.
This is because our intuition would have been just another intuition or judgement
about the actual epistemic situation of an actual individual, and we would not have
baulked at the existential commitments of its apparent content. Instead, we would
have found it perfectly natural to identify our intuition’s real content with its appar-
ent content. The upshot is that it actually matters a great deal whether the Gettier
case is taken to be fact or taken to be fiction. On the other hand, Ichikawa and Jarvis
may intend for us to interpret their assertion in some other way. (After all, it is per-
haps  uncharitable  to  take  it  at  face  value.)  But  if  Ichikawa and  Jarvis  do  have
something else in mind, then the onus is on them to spell it out, because it is not ob-
vious what it could be.52
Ichikawa and Jarvis’s third objection to the Truth in Fiction Model Mark 1 is
somewhat more pressing than the preceding ones. The strict conditional which the
model gives as the real content of Gettier intuition, (3TF-M1), makes use of the for-
mula GCTFxp. We understand the formula GCTFxp to say that x stands to p in the re-
lation in which it is true in fiction that Smith stands to the proposition that there are
kangaroos in the paddock. Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009: 228) ask: “Which relation,
however, is the relation?” This simple question has the effect of casting doubt on our
52 Malmgren also expresses puzzlement at Ichikawa and Jarvis’s second objection; she calls it “con-
fused” (2011: 304, fn.69). 
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very understanding of the formula GCTFxp and hence also on the potential of that
formula to do serious theoretical work. For, as Ichikawa and Jarvis go on to point
out, Smith “stands in many relations to the proposition in question. […] Specifying
one is difficult, but without specifying one we have not fully offered a formulation
[of the real content of the Gettier intuition]” (2009: 228). To put the objection anoth-
er way, the formula GCTFxp is shot through with ambiguity. Unless this ambiguity is
resolved, it cannot be said that (3TF-M1) is the solution to the content problem. We
must  disambiguate the formula GCTFxp before making any such pronouncement.
This will necessarily involve specifying which relation is the relation and then some-
how restating the formula GCTFxp in terms of it. Ichikawa and Jarvis rightly draw at-
tention to the fact that the task here is a difficult one, but they do not say much about
what the difficulty consists in. Presumably, what they have in mind is that any satis-
factory disambiguation of the formula GCTFxp should guarantee the truth of (3TF-M1)
without trivialising it. This requirement is imposed by the philosophically orthodox
view of our thought experiment, on which the Gettier intuition is both non-trivial
and true. There is no straightforward way to meet the requirement. Since, therefore,
they find the prospects of coming up with a satisfactory disambiguation of the for-
mula GCTFxp to be rather dim, Ichikawa and Jarvis set the present model aside as in-
adequate and explore other ways of implementing the truth in fiction approach.
5.2. Marks 2 and 3
Ichikawa and Jarvis “suggest that a better application of truth in fiction in a Gettier
formulation will make use of the notion less directly” (2009: 229). They put forward
the proposal that our tacit grasp of the principles governing the enrichment of texts
is “useful for picking out and thinking about propositions that are key to the Gettier
argument” (2009: 229). The propositions Ichikawa and Jarvis have in mind here are
propositions corresponding to the Gettier story’s fictive and metafictive sentences.53
53 Ichikawa and Jarvis’s use of the terms “story”, “sentence”, and “proposition” is undisciplined. In
the philosophical study of the nature of fiction, stories are normally held to be sets of sentences,
and fictional truth is normally discussed with regard to sentences. But sometimes Ichikawa and
Jarvis talk of the Gettier story as though it is a set of sentences, and at other times as though it is
a set of propositions. And they slide freely between talk of sentences being true in the Gettier
story and propositions being true in the Gettier story. This makes it difficult to elucidate the ways
in which they have implemented the truth in fiction approach. The two models I present in this
sub-section seem to me to do the best job of clarifying what Ichikawa and Jarvis are trying to get
at. See the next footnote for further clarificatory remarks.
72
In carrying out our thought experiment, we entertain the set of those propositions,
“and in particular, the proposition that every member of that set is true, and then
subsequently reason with that proposition to the conclusion of the thought experi-
ment” (2009: 229). The cardinality of the set is very large, probably infinitely so.
Due to normal cognitive limitations, we “cannot, of course, entertain each proposi-
tion of this infinite set individually, but [we] can think about the set containing all of
them, and refer to it” (2009: 229). Ichikawa and Jarvis go on to postulate that the
mind baptises the set for referential convenience. The mind gives it a name, say,
“STORY”, and then entertains the proposition g, that every element of STORY is
true. Putting all of this together yields the following model of our thought experi-
ment, which I shall call the Truth in Fiction Model Mark 2:
(1) T ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp)
(2TF-M2) g◇
(3TF-M2) (g ◻  xp (JTBxp  Kxp))
(4) ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp) From (2) and (3TF-M2)
                                                                   
(5) T From (1) and (4)
On this model, there is no invocation of truth in fiction at the level of content. Our
imaginative engagement with the Gettier case involves apprehending the truth of
(2TF-M2), the claim that it is metaphysically possible for all of the elements of STORY
to be true.54 The real content of the Gettier intuition is given by (3TF-M2), the claim
54 The elements of STORY, as I have said, are propositions “corresponding” to the Gettier story’s
fictive and metafictive sentences. But there is a question as to what this means with regard to the
sentences in the Gettier story which  involve either a fictional proper name—e.g. the sentence
“One day Smith is walking through the Australian countryside”—or a fictional pronoun—e.g. the
sentence “He is an avid and experienced spotter of native wildlife who has the ability to identify
animals such as kangaroos, wallabies, wombats, koalas, and so on, with a very high degree of re-
liability.” Either such sentences express propositions or they do not. Let us first assume they do
not (maybe they do not express propositions because, as some philosophers say, fictional proper
names and fictional anaphoric pronouns are empty). Then Ichikawa and Jarvis will have to intro-
duce certain descriptive propositions to “correspond” to them. This is straightforward enough.
But now let us assume that the sentences in the Gettier story which involve either a fictional
proper name or a fictional pronoun do express propositions. Should Ichikawa and Jarvis then
identify STORY with the set of propositions expressed by the Gettier story’s fictive and metafict-
ive sentences? Kripke (1980: 157-8) has argued that fictional characters like Smith are essentially
fictional. As Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009: 229, fn.13) point out, it would seem that, if Kripke’s
view is right, then given our assumption, all sentences in the Gettier story which involve either a
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that the elements of STORY metaphysically necessitate justified true belief which
fails to constitute knowledge.
The Truth in Fiction Model Mark 2 points to a very specific role for truth in fic-
tion in our test of the traditional theory of knowledge. Truth in fiction is deployed by
the mind only as a kind of medium for imaginatively engaging with the Gettier case.
We draw on our tacit grasp of the principles of truth in fiction in order to pick out a
certain set of propositions in imaginative thought. In doing so, we put ourselves in a
position to entertain a certain proposition about that set, viz. the proposition that all
of the set’s elements are true. No further use of truth in fiction is made by the mind.
Ichikawa and Jarvis, who endorse this broad characterisation of truth in fiction’s role
in the performance of our thought experiment, elaborate on it as follows:
Here, our invocation of fictional truth explains how we come to entertain the
proposition [g], but the concept [of truth in fiction] does not enter into the Get-
tier reasoning itself. Competence with truth in fiction is an important step in en-
gaging with the thought experiment, but its role is exhausted before the actual
invocation  in  reasoning  of  [(3TF-M2)],  the  Gettier  intuition.  Put  another  way,
one’s ability to grasp a story told through a text serves only as a means to grasp
a certain proposition, which will figure into the intuition; the content of the in-
tuition itself makes no use of the notion of truth in fiction (Ichikawa and Jarvis
2009: 230).
Like its predecessor, this indirect way of implementing the truth in fiction approach
would seem to have what it takes to overcome the obstacles presented by deviant
worlds. According to it, the set STORY corresponds to an enrichment of the text of
the Gettier case which precludes Smith’s true belief that there are kangaroos in the
paddock from being either unjustified or knowledge. The Gettier intuition is a mani-
festation of the mind’s recognition of this preclusion. The mind comes to recognise
fictional proper name or a fictional pronoun will express metaphysically impossible propositions.
Consequently, simply identifying STORY with the set of propositions expressed by the Gettier
story’s fictive and metafictive sentences could make (2TF-M2) come out false. This is potentially
problematic because our thought experiment surely involves the apprehension in imagination of a
genuine metaphysical possibility. To deal with it without giving offence to Kripke, Ichikawa and
Jarvis will  once again have to introduce certain descriptive propositions to “correspond” to the
sentences in the Gettier story which involve either a fictional proper name or a fictional pronoun.
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the preclusion when, guided by our tacit  grasp of the principles of fictional dis-
course, it picks out the set STORY and apprehends the metaphysical possibility of
all of STORY’s elements being true. Considerations of deviancy have nothing to do
with the Gettier intuition’s truth or falsity because this metaphysical possibility is
such a highly determinate one.
The Truth in Fiction Model Mark 2 constitutes an advance on its predecessor
insofar as the set STORY is free from much of the obscurity which mars the formula
GCTFxp. As Ichikawa and Jarvis point out, we have no clear and distinct conception
of what the formula GCTFxp is supposed to amount to. In the absence of any satis-
factory disambiguation of it, we cannot appeal to that formula for illumination of the
real content of the Gettier intuition. From the standpoint of model-building, it would
seem that the formula GCTFxp is not much more than an amorphous placeholder. In
contrast, stories and the sets of propositions corresponding to them are familiar to
most of us from ordinary life. We are accustomed from childhood to picking out
such sets and thinking about them. We are able to bring them before the mind, de-
ploy them in our reasoning, and thereby come to adopt various intellectual and emo-
tional attitudes toward fictional works, for example, attitudes of admiration, hatred,
satisfaction, disappointment, contempt, puzzlement, condemnation, and so on. This
is something we have the ability to do despite the fact that, for almost any given set
of propositions corresponding to a story, we lack the cognitive power to identify all
of the set’s elements and entertain each of them individually. More generally, sets of
very large cardinality are quite within reach of the mind. For example, in addition to
the set STORY, we are able to pick out and think about the set of stars, the set of
sub-atomic particles, and the set of numbers. This is so despite the fact that it is im-
possible for creatures like us to identify all of the elements of those sets and enter-
tain each of the elements individually. The familiarity and generality of such mental
activity greatly enhances the theoretical utility of the set STORY relative to the for-
mula GCTFxp. The set STORY is not an amorphous placeholder; it has the potential
to do serious theoretical work.
The very large cardinality of the set STORY may, however, occasion the worry
that the Truth in Fiction Model Mark 2 threatens to epistemically compromise our
test procedure, in particular, the stage of our test procedure at which we commence
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our imaginative engagement with the Gettier case. Although we are able to pick out
and think about the set STORY, we lack the cognitive power to bring each of its ele-
ments  before  the  mind  and  combine  them  into  a  representation  in  imaginative
thought. The construction of such an immensely complex representation is beyond
us. Only a creature of much greater cognitive power than ourselves could ever hope
to determine by that means whether the elements of the set STORY are metaphysic-
ally compossible. But it would be hasty to conclude from this that (2TF-M2) is simply
unknowable for us. Many genres of fiction, including the one to which the text of
the Gettier case belongs, are governed by a principle to the effect that metaphysical
coherence is to be preserved whenever it can be. According to this principle, if there
are no metaphysical incoherencies in a text, then the story it is used to tell should not
contain any either. And even if there are some metaphysical incoherencies in a text,
the story it is used to tell should contain no additional ones which are of no relev-
ance to them. We tacitly grasp this principle. Given that we do, it would seem that if
we have good reason for thinking that a certain text contains no metaphysical inco-
herencies (say, because a careful and thorough examination of it has failed to bring
any to our attention), then, plausibly, we also have good reason for thinking that the
propositions corresponding to the story it is used to tell must be metaphysical com-
possible. This makes room for optimism about the knowability of (2TF-M2). In carry-
ing out our thought experiment, the mind runs through the text of the Gettier case,
searching for metaphysical incoherencies in it. Of course, none are found. We thus
have good reason for thinking that the text of the Gettier case contains no metaphys-
ical incoherencies. That fact, together with our tacit grasp of the foregoing principle
of fictional discourse, plausibly provides us with good reason for thinking that the
elements of the set STORY are metaphysically compossible.
Ichikawa and Jarvis hold that the Truth in Fiction Model Mark 2 is in keeping
with the traditionalist tenet that the intuitions generated by philosophical thought ex-
perimentation are a  priori.  Although they admit  that  “the ability  to  grasp stories
through texts involves (perhaps tacit) a posteriori knowledge”, they also suggest that
this  a  posteriori  knowledge  “does  not  prevent  the  thought-experiment  reasoning
from being a priori” (2009: 230). Its role is said to be analogous to the role of a pos-
teriori knowledge of the English language in reasoning. To understand a piece of
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reasoning in English (without the aid of a translator or translating device), an agent
needs to have a posteriori knowledge of the relevant English words and the relevant
fragments of English grammar. The fact that such a posteriori knowledge is required
need not make the reasoning a posteriori. Ichikawa and Jarvis give the following se-
quence of sentences as an illustration:
-  If  Julius Caesar is the successor of the number one,  then Julius Caesar is
identical to the number two.
- Two is a prime number.
- If Julius Caesar is the successor of the number one, then Julius Caesar is a
prime number.
We are able to understand reasoning which proceeds from the first two of these sen-
tences to the third one. This involves drawing on whatever a posteriori knowledge is
required to interpret the sentences. Our a posteriori knowledge of the English lan-
guage enables us to bring the propositions expressed by those sentences before the
mind; it is deployed “as a means to get to that content” (Ichikawa and Jarvis 2009:
230). But it plays no other role in addition to this merely enabling one. Furthermore,
the reasoning is plausibly immune from empirical contamination from elsewhere.
We run through it in an a priori manner; “[t]he reasoning is a priori because of the a
priori status of [the premise] and the a priori entitlement to move from [the premise]
to the conclusion” (Ichikawa and Jarvis 2009: 230). Even if, as radical empiricists
would claim, the reasoning is in fact a posteriori, it is doubtful whether our a posteri-
ori knowledge of the English language has much to do with it.
Similarly, say Ichikawa and Jarvis, the a posteriori knowledge involved in our
grasp of the principles of fictional discourse need not empirically contaminate (3TF-
M2). They point out that there would be empirical contamination “[o]nly if the a pos-
teriori knowledge were deployed as warranting” (2009: 231). But they insist that it
is not so deployed, adding: “It is merely deployed as a means to come to grasp the
propositions involved in reasoning involving the thought experiment intuition. The a
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posteriori knowledge serves as a […]  casual enabler for the reasoning process; it
does not play a warranting role within the reasoning itself” (2009: 231). Up to this
point, Ichikawa and Jarvis may very well be in the right, but they straight away fall
back into their strange confusion about the potential for truth in fiction to lead to
empirical contamination. They point out that although we may find it tempting to
think of g descriptively as the proposition that all of the fictional truths of the Gettier
story are true, g “does not have that descriptive (Fregean) sense; it is merely true in
all the same possible worlds” (2009: 231). Allegedly, this is “crucial to note” be-
cause if things were otherwise the concept of truth in fiction “would be a constituent
in the thought-experiment intuition, and one’s a posteriori knowledge of what is true
in the Gettier fiction would stand in the warrant relation to the conclusion that know-
ledge is not necessarily justified true belief” (2009: 231). But Ichikawa and Jarvis
fail to tell us why invocation of truth in fiction at the level of content would have
such an epistemic consequence. Furthermore, it is not obvious what they could have
in mind. Let p be any empirical proposition whatever, even one which has truth in
fiction as a constituent. It plainly does not follow that, if the strict conditional (p◻
 q) is knowable at all, then it is only knowable a posteriori. There is an abundance
of plausible counterexamples.55 In short, Ichikawa and Jarvis should give up their
fixation on the a posteriority of truth in fiction. It is unmotivated and it contributes
nothing to the furtherance of their traditionalist agenda.
Although Ichikawa and Jarvis regard the Truth in Fiction Model Mark 2 as ba-
sically correct, they worry that some may find its appeal to baptismal reference ob-
jectionable  on  phenomenological  grounds  (2009:  231).  For,  in  carrying  out  our
thought experiment, it does not obviously seem as though we baptise the set of pro-
positions corresponding to the Gettier story with a proper name. To deal with this
worry, Ichikawa and Jarvis advert to demonstrative reference, suggesting that “in
many cases the Gettier intuition may come to many people with a demonstrative in
55 And they are very easy to think up. Thus: It is an empirical question as to whether I am taller than
you, but it is plausibly knowable a priori that, necessarily, if I am taller than you then you are
shorter than me. Here is a counterexample involving truth in fiction: It is an empirical question as
to whether it is true in the Vanity Fair story that Becky Sharp is a sociopath, but it is plausibly
knowable a priori that, necessarily, if it is true in the Vanity Fair story that Becky Sharp is a so-
ciopath then it is true in the Vanity Fair story that she has a personality disorder. Of course, there
are also many trivial counterexamples. Thus: It is an empirical question as to whether the Earth is
round, but it is plausibly knowable a priori that, necessarily, if the Earth is round then the Earth is
round.
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the content” rather than a proper name (2009: 231-2). They put forward the proposal
that when we imaginatively engage with the Gettier case, we pick out the set of pro-
positions corresponding to the Gettier story and proceed to think and reason about it
not via the proposition g, but via another proposition d, that things are like that. In
the proposition d “that” functions as a demonstrative which directly refers to how
things are according to the Gettier story. Our competence with fictional discourse,
Ichikawa and Jarvis explain, “goes toward fixing and apprehending the reference of
the demonstrative” (2009: 232). Replacing g with d, we get the following model of
our thought experiment, which I shall call the Truth in Fiction Model Mark 3:
(1) T ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp)
(2TF-M3) d◇
(3TF-M3) (d ◻  xp (JTBxp  Kxp))
(4) ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp) From (2) and (3TF-M3)
                                                                 
(5) T From (1) and (4)
On this model, there is once again no invocation of truth in fiction at the level of
content. Our imaginative engagement with the Gettier case involves apprehending
the truth of (2TF-M3), the claim that it is metaphysically possible for things to be like
that.  The real content of the Gettier  intuition is  given by (3TF-M3),  the claim that
things’ being like that metaphysically necessitates justified true belief which fails to
constitute knowledge.
It might be wondered whether the Truth in Fiction Model Mark 3 constitutes
much of an advance on its predecessor. For one thing, the failure of baptismal refer-
ence to accord with the phenomenology of our thought experiment is not especially
worrisome. We know that at least some of what actually happens during the per-
formance of our thought experiment cannot be as it seems. In particular, we know
that when we undergo the Gettier intuition we enter into a mental state the real con-
tent of which must differ from its apparent content. Given this fact, it should come
as no surprise if our model-building endeavours lead us to postulate something phe-
nomenologically incongruous. Of course, that is not to say that considerations of
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phenomenology  carry  no  theoretical  weight  in  model-building.  If  we  postulate
something which makes it difficult to make sense of our own mental lives, then we
should probably get rid of it. But the postulate that the mind deploys baptismal refer-
ence to pick out and think about the set of propositions corresponding to the Gettier
story can hardly be said to make us lose our grip on what is going on in our own
heads. Furthermore, even if baptismal reference does have that consequence, it can-
not simply be taken for granted that demonstrative reference accords any better with
the phenomenology of our thought experiment. After all, what Ichikawa and Jarvis
say about baptismal reference may equally be said about demonstrative reference as
well: in carrying out our thought experiment, it does not obviously seem as though
we deploy “that” to demonstratively refer to the set of propositions corresponding to
the Gettier story. If Ichikawa and Jarvis wish to persuade us that, of the two kinds of
reference, the demonstrative one does the best phenomenological job, then they need
to back it up, for example, by providing a suitable description of what it is like to
carry out our thought experiment. But they provide no such thing. For all they say
about  the  phenomenology  of  our  thought  experiment,  there  is  little  to  choose
between baptismal reference and demonstrative reference.
In any event, the Truth in Fiction Model Marks 2 and 3 both turn out to be inad-
equate in a way that the Truth in Fiction Model Mark 1 is not. They are undermined
by the same objection which undermines Malmgren’s Possibility Model: there are
insufficient resources in their vicinity to support an explanation of why our (I1)-be-
lief  rationally commits us to both refrain from holding an (I2)-belief  and refrain
from holding an (I3)-belief. Ichikawa and Jarvis do not have the option of explaining
these rational commitments in terms of the nature of belief and the logico-analytical
relationships between contents. The respective real contents of (I1), (I2), and (I3) are
to be given by strict conditionals with existential statements as their consequents:
(3TF-M2/M3) (g/d ◻  xp (JTBxp  Kxp))
(TFM2/M3-2) (g/d ◻  xp (JBxp  Bxp  Kxp))
(TFM2/M3-3) (g/d ◻  xp (JTBxp  Kxp))
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These strict conditionals are compatible; they do not entail one another’s negations.
This is because they are all vacuously true if g/d is false. But unlike the other sets◇
of conditionals (strict and counterfactual) which we have looked at so far, no incom-
patibilities emerge between the conditionals in this set even under the assumption of
the metaphysical possibility of their antecedents. Assuming the truth of g/d, they◇
cannot be said to stand in anything like the contrary relation to one another: given
any two of them, the truth of one does not rule out the truth of the other. This is be-
cause  the  consequents  of  the  strict  conditionals  are  jointly  consistent  existential
statements.56 Our imaginative engagement with the Gettier case, furthermore, essen-
tially involves no mental state the content of which could be combined with g/d◇
and the strict conditionals to generate the required incompatibilities. If, therefore, the
Truth in Fiction Model Marks 2 and 3 are to be saved, Ichikawa and Jarvis need to
find an alternative explanatory strategy. But as with Malmgren’s Possibility Model,
there do not seem to be any good ones available.
5.3. A dilemma for Marks 1, 2, and 3
Ichikawa and Jarvis do not explore any other ways of implementing the truth in fic-
tion  approach to  modelling  philosophical  thought  experimentation.  Even  so,  our
model-building endeavours have made a great deal of headway. With help from Ichi-
kawa and Jarvis, we have finally begun to get a handle on how to overcome the
obstacles presented by the metaphysical possibility of deviant realisations of the text
of the Gettier case. The general idea of their approach, as I have explicated it, is that
our  competency with  the  principles  governing the  enrichment  of  texts  somehow
guides the imaginative activity of the mind, leading it to recognise that the text of
the Gettier case is not to be enriched in a manner conducive to deviancy. This ap-
proach is very promising, but the discussion of the previous two sub-sections sug-
56 Indeed, not only are those existential statements consistent with one another, it may well be that
they are all true in the actual world. Regarding xp (JBxp  Bxp  Kxp), there are surely
actual subjects who hold some unjustified true beliefs. Regarding  xp (JTBxp   Kxp)), only
sceptics would venture to deny it; everyone else will surely admit that there are actual subjects
who hold some justified true beliefs which constitute knowledge. As for xp (JTBxp  Kxp),
its actual truth also strikes me as quite probable. After all, there are many hundreds of millions of
subjects in the actual world, and Gettier-style cases need not be recherché or outlandish. Gettier-
style cases involving stopped watches or other faulty timepieces are just one kind of example. As
Williamson (2007: 192) observes, “sometimes a stopped watch really does show the right time.”
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gests that Ichikawa and Jarvis have struggled to come up with an adequate imple-
mentation of  it.  How, then,  should our model-building endeavours  proceed? The
way forward emerges from another line of objection, one which threatens to under-
mine the Truth in Fiction Model Marks 1, 2, and 3 equally. Those models are caught
in a dilemma. As we shall see presently, the dilemma’s horns are dangerous, but they
do not show that Ichikawa and Jarvis have thrown our model-building endeavours
wildly and hopelessly off-course. Instead, the dilemma leads us naturally toward the
development of a new and better implementation of the truth in fiction approach.
The first horn of the dilemma has to do with a certain subjective aspect of our
thought experiment. According to the Truth in Fiction Model Marks 1, 2, and 3,
when we imaginatively engage with the text of the Gettier case, our tacit grasp of the
principles of fictional discourse guides the mind to form a representation of a meta-
physical possibility which accords with what is true in the Gettier story. The content
of this imaginational state is said to be given by (2TF-M1), (2TF-M2), or (2TF-M3). Surely,
however, our tacit grasp of the principles of fictional discourse need not prevent the
imaginative activity of our minds from straying beyond what is true in the Gettier
story. It is possible, in other words, for us to add extra details to the Gettier story by
filling in at least some of its many fictional indeterminacies. We might imagine, for
example, that Smith has brown hair, that he is wearing blue jeans and a grey t-shirt,
that there are no clouds in the sky, that it is two o’clock in the afternoon, that the
grass  in  the  paddock  is  lush  and  green,  that  the  paddock  contains  ten  robotic
kangaroos and ten real kangaroos, that the rock obscuring the real kangaroos from
Smith’s view is made of granite, that there is a barbedwire fence around the pad-
dock, and that Smith, in addition to being an avid and experienced spotter of native
wildlife, is a scholar of Latin. Or we might imagine the opposite, or perhaps not ima-
gine anything at all with regard to these particular fictional indeterminacies. The lat-
itude of the mind’s imaginative activities is very wide even within the constraints
imposed by our tacit grasp of the principles of fictional discourse. Of course, since
we have this ability to fill in the fictional indeterminacies of the Gettier story in ima-
ginative thought, it is perfectly natural to think that any extra details which we do
happen to add to the Gettier story must be somehow captured by the content of our
imaginational state. This is so, despite the fact that such details are strictly unneces-
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sary for falsifying the traditional theory of knowledge. But Ichikawa and Jarvis’s
models cannot do justice to this natural thought. For nothing is represented in (2TF-
M1), (2TF-M2), or (2TF-M3) which goes beyond what is true in the Gettier story.
 The foregoing considerations put pressure on Ichikawa and Jarvis to subjectiv-
ise their models, in particular, to reconstrue the formula GCTFxp and the propositions
g and d so that (2TF-M1), (2TF-M2), and (2TF-M3) accord not merely with what is true in
the Gettier story, but with one’s privately filled in version of it. In the case of the
Truth in Fiction Model Mark 1, this requires understanding the formula GCTFxp to
say that x stands to p in the relation that, in one’s privately filled in version of the
Gettier story, Smith stands to the proposition that there are kangaroos in the pad-
dock. In the case of the Truth in Fiction Model Marks 2 and 3, it requires under-
standing the proper name “STORY” and the demonstrative “that” to pick out one’s
privately filled in version of the Gettier story. One corollary of Ichikawa and Jarvis’s
models would then be that different people can enter into imaginational states with
different contents. Obviously, however, any such subjectivisation must flow straight
through to the strict conditionals (3TF-M1), (3TF-M2), and (3TF-M3), so another corollary
would be that the Gettier intuition itself can have different real contents for different
people. This brings us to the second horn of the dilemma, which has to do with a
certain  objective (or inter-subjective) aspect of our thought experiment.  It  is per-
fectly natural to think that our intuitional state is shared with people who, like us, re-
port  their  intuition  about  the  epistemic  status  of  Smith’s true  belief  by  uttering
“Smith has a justified true belief, but does not know, that there are kangaroos in the
paddock.” If someone carries out our thought experiment and then utters that sen-
tence, we do not wonder whether he means the same by it as we do—whether, that
is, he has intuited what we have intuited. It would be silly and bizarre for us to ask
him to clarify his meaning (unless we already have reason to regard him as using
words non-standardly). But Ichikawa and Jarvis’s subjectivised models cannot do
justice to this second natural thought. For since different people not only can, but in
all  probability  do,  fill  in  the Gettier  story’s fictional  indeterminacies in  different
ways, those models will pretty much guarantee that our intuitional state is not shared
with anyone else.
To sum up: the Truth in Fiction Model Marks 1, 2, and 3 ride roughshod over
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either a subjective aspect of our thought experiment or an objective one. Although it
is open to Ichikawa and Jarvis to bite one or the other of these bullets, we should
look on that course of action as a last resort. After all, the bullets are rather unpalat-
able. And even if Ichikawa and Jarvis are happy to go through with it, their models
still face the problems discussed in the previous two sub-sections. The best course of
action for us is to seek a new and better way of implementing the truth in fiction ap-
proach. We should focus our efforts first and foremost on extricating ourselves from
the horns of the foregoing dilemma, since it poses the most general threat to the truth
in fiction approach. Why, it is worth asking, are the Truth in Fiction Model Marks 1,
2, and 3 equally vulnerable to it? My diagnosis is that their common vulnerability
has its source in the assumption that the Gettier intuition is an intuition about the
distribution of the relations of knowledge and justified true belief in a specific scen-
ario. This assumption is understandable and widespread, but I counsel its abandon-
ment for the sake of making further progress on solving the content problem. In the
next section, I develop and defend an implementation of the truth in fiction approach
on which undergoing the Gettier intuition involves entering into an intuitional state
about the distribution of the relations of knowledge and justified true belief in all
scenarios of a certain general kind.
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6. The New Truth in Fiction Model
The presentation of my own model requires the introduction of some further appar-
atus for theorising about fiction. An enrichment or filling in of a given text is consti-
tuted  by  that  text’s  fictive  sentences  together  with  any  non-fictive  sentences
whatever. The text of  Vanity Fair together with, for example, the sentence “Becky
Sharp had a central nervous system” constitutes an enrichment of that text. The text
of Vanity Fair together with the sentences “Becky Sharp had a central nervous sys-
tem” and “Becky Sharp had a mole on her lower back” constitutes another one. And
there are also much more detailed enrichments of the text of  Vanity Fair, like the
Vanity Fair story. In general, texts can be enriched in an infinite number of different
ways. We may divide the enrichments of a given text into two disjoint and exhaust-
ive categories: the category of fictionally permissible and the category of fictionally
impermissible. An enrichment of a text is fictionally permissible if no conjunction of
two or more of its elements is ruled out by the principles of fictional discourse; oth-
erwise, the enrichment is fictionally impermissible. Enriching a text with one fic-
tionally  false  sentence  is  always  enough  to  violate  fictional  permissibility.  For
example,  adding the sentence “Several  of Becky Sharp’s ancestors were wizards
from another galaxy” to the text of Vanity Fair results in a fictionally impermissible
enrichment. Since that sentence is ruled out by the principles of fictional discourse,
its conjunction with any other sentence must be ruled out by them as well. But even
enriching a text with fictionally indeterminate sentences can lead to a violation of
fictional permissibility. The sentences “Becky Sharp had a mole on her lower back”
and “Becky Sharp had no moles on her lower back” are fictionally indeterminate,
but if both are added to the text of Vanity Fair the result is a fictionally impermiss-
ible enrichment, since their conjunction is ruled out by the principles of fictional dis-
course.
We may also divide the enrichments of a given text into two other disjoint and
exhaustive categories: the category of  fictionally complete  and the category of  fic-
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tionally incomplete. An enrichment of a text is fictionally complete if every sentence
ruled in by the principles of fictional discourse is a member of it, that is to say, if the
story told by the text is one of the enrichment’s subsets; otherwise, the enrichment is
fictionally incomplete. Stories are always fictionally complete enrichments of the
texts used to tell them. This, of course, is because every story is trivially a subset of
itself. But stories are, as it were, limiting cases of fictional completeness. The union
of a story with any set of sentences whatever counts as a fictionally complete enrich-
ment of the text used to tell the story. For example, there is a fictionally complete
enrichment of the text of  Vanity Fair comprising the sentences of the  Vanity Fair
story together with the fictionally indeterminate sentence “Becky Sharp had a mole
on her lower back”. There is another such enrichment comprising the sentences of
the  Gettier  story  together  with  the  fictionally  false  sentence  “Several  of  Becky
Sharp’s ancestors were wizards from another galaxy”. There is even a fictionally
complete enrichment of the text of Vanity Fair comprising the sentences of the Van-
ity Fair story together with all of that story’s fictional indeterminacies and fictional
falsehoods. The categories of fictional completeness and incompleteness obviously
overlap with the categories of fictional permissibility and impermissibility. Each en-
richment of a given text must therefore fall into one and only one the following four
groups: fictionally permissible and complete, fictionally permissible and incomplete,
fictionally impermissible and complete, or fictionally impermissible and incomplete.
The Vanity Fair story is one example of a fictionally permissible and complete en-
richment of the text of Vanity Fair, but there are many others.
The final piece of apparatus I need to introduce is that of fictional roles. Most
texts and their enrichments purport to attribute properties and relations to particular
entities or things, such as people, animals, plants, machines, buildings, furniture, and
so on. The text of Vanity Fair, for example, purports to attribute thousands of prop-
erties and relations to a particular person called “Rebecca Sharp”. These include a
purported attribution of the property of uttering “Revenge may be wicked, but it’s
natural”. Although Thackeray’s novel is a relatively long one, the large number of
purported attributions found in the text of Vanity Fair is dwarfed by the even larger
numbers of purported attributions found in many of the text’s enrichments, such as
the Vanity Fair story. Becky Sharp is depicted in much greater detail by the Vanity
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Fair story than by the text used to tell it. Presumably, this depiction includes a pur-
ported attribution of the property of having a central nervous system, as well as pur-
ported attributions of the properties of having arteries and veins, muscles and bones,
a heart and lungs, a liver, kidneys, intestines, fingers and toes, a belly button, and an
alimentary canal. There are, of course, other enrichments of the text of Vanity Fair
which depict Becky Sharp in even greater detail than the Vanity Fair story does. Fic-
tional roles are specifications of the properties and relations purportedly attributed to
particular entities or things by texts and enrichments. They may be characterised
roughly as follows. We start by taking a text or an enrichment and conjoining its ele-
ments. Then we existentially quantify over each of the particular entities or things to
which properties and relations are purportedly attributed. Finally, we remove one of
the existential quantifiers. The resultant open formula is, or expresses, a certain a
fictional role, and anything which satisfies the open formula may be said to play that
role. Thus, the text of  Vanity Fair has a Becky-role associated with it, as does the
Vanity Fair story and every other enrichment of the text of Vanity Fair. As a matter
of fact, there are many different Becky-roles. None of them are played by things in
the actual world, but at least some of them are probably played by things in non-
actual metaphysically possible worlds.57
57 The (admittedly rough) way in which I have characterised fictional roles is intended to guarantee
that no fictional proper names or fictional pronouns are ever used in them. All uses of such names
and pronouns are to be replaced with variables.  Consider, for  example,  the sentence “Becky
Sharp attended the same academy for young ladies as Amelia Sedley.” This is a metafictive sen-
tence of the Vanity Fair story. (For evidence, see the first chapter of Thackeray (2001).) The fic-
tional proper names “Becky Sharp” and “Amelia Sedley” are used in it. To form the Becky-role
associated with the Vanity Fair story, we must conjoin that metafictive sentence with the rest of
the Vanity Fair story’s elements (i.e. with the Vanity Fair story’s fictive sentences and its other
metafictive sentences). We must then replace “Becky Sharp” (as well as “Becky”, “Rebecca”,
“Rebecca Sharp”, “Miss Sharp”, etc.) and any relevant fictional pronouns with an existentially
quantified variable throughout, say, the variable x. We must also replace “Amelia Sedley” (as
well as “Amelia”, “Miss Sedley”, etc.) and any relevant fictional pronouns with an existentially
quantified variable throughout, say, the variable y. And, of course, we must do likewise for every
other use of a fictional proper name and fictional pronoun. The final step in forming the Becky-
role associated with the Vanity Fair story is to remove the existential quantifier quantifying over
the variable x. The resultant fictional role will include among its many conjuncts the formula “x
attended the same academy for young ladies as y”, where x is unbound and y is bound. (Of
course, if we were forming the Amelia-role associated with the Vanity Fair story, we would in-
stead remove the existential quantifier quantifying over the variable y, leaving y unbound and x
bound.) The elimination of all uses of fictional proper names and fictional pronouns in the forma-
tion of fictional roles allows for at least some fictional roles to be played by things in metaphys-
ically possible worlds. This is so even if, as Kripke (1980; 157-8) has argued, fictional characters
like Becky Sharp and Amelia Sedley are essentially fictional. Kripke’s doctrine of essential fic-
tionality is problematic here only if we countenance fictional roles in which fictional names or
fictional pronouns are used. Suppose that, in the foregoing example, we fail to eliminate “Amelia
Sedley”, resulting in a Becky-role with the formula “x attended the same academy for young
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All of this apparatus straightforwardly applies to the Gettier case and the other
fictions deployed in philosophical thought experimentation. An enrichment of the
text of the Gettier case is constituted by the text’s fictive sentences together with any
non-fictive sentences whatever. There are enrichments of the text of the Gettier case
which add only a little bit of detail to it, such as the enrichment consisting of the text
together with the sentence “Smith is conscious”. There are other enrichments, like
the Gettier story, which add much more detail to it. We may exhaustively divide the
enrichments of the text of the Gettier case into the disjoint categories of fictionally
permissible and fictionally impermissible. The text of the Gettier case together with
the sentence “Smith is conscious” is a permissible enrichment, as is the Gettier story,
and the Gettier story together with the sentence “Smith has brown hair”. But the text
of the Gettier case together with the sentence “Smith is one nanometre tall” is pre-
sumably a violation of fictional permissibility. We may also exhaustively divide the
enrichments of the text of the Gettier case into the disjoint categories of fictionally
complete and fictionally incomplete. The Gettier story is fictionally complete, as is
the the union of the Gettier story with any set of its fictional indeterminacies or fic-
tional falsehoods. But if an enrichment lacks one or more of the Gettier story’s fict-
ive or metafictive sentences, then it must be fictionally incomplete, no matter how
much detail it contains. Since the categories of fictional permissibility and imper-
missibility can overlap with the categories of fictional completeness and incomplete-
ness, each enrichment of the text of the Gettier case must fall into one and only one
of four groups. For the purposes of modelling our thought experiment, the most im-
portant of them is the group of fictionally permissible and complete enrichments.
There are many enrichments in this group. The Gettier story is one of them. The oth-
er enrichments in the group all have the Gettier story as a subset because they are
fictionally complete. Since they are also fictionally permissible, it follows that they
cannot contain any fictional falsehoods and must therefore amount to fillings-in of
some or all of the Gettier story’s fictional indeterminacies.
The text of the Gettier case and its enrichments all have fictional roles associ-
ated with them. This is because they purport to attribute properties and relations to
ladies as Amelia Sedley” as one of its conjuncts. Assuming Kripke is right, it would then follow
that this Becky-role is not played in any metaphysically possible world, for it would be meta-
physically impossible for anything to attend the same academy as Amelia Sedley. But I do not
countenance any such fictional roles.
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particular  entities  or  things.  One  of  those  things  is  a  particular  person  called
“Smith”. The text of the Gettier case, for example, purports to attribute several prop-
erties and relations to Smith. These include a purported attribution of the property of
walking through the Australian countryside and a purported attribution of the prop-
erty of being an expert spotter of native wildlife. But there are enrichments of the
text of the Gettier case which purport to attribute many more properties and relations
to Smith. The Gettier story, for example, depicts Smith in much greater detail than
the text used to tell it. Presumably, this depiction of Smith includes a purported attri-
bution of the property of being conscious, as well as purported attributions of the
properties of being alive, being in space and time, and being capable of locomotion.
Another entity or thing to which the text of the Gettier case and its enrichments pur-
port to attribute properties and relations is the proposition that there are kangaroos in
the paddock. For example, in the text of the Gettier case, this proposition is pur-
portedly  related  to  Smith,  in  particular,  it  is  a  proposition  to  which  Smith  pur-
portedly stands in the relation of belief. Some enrichments of the text of the Gettier
case depict the proposition in greater detail. For example, in the Gettier story, Smith
purportedly stands to the proposition in both the relation of justified true belief and
the relation of ignorance (i.e. the complement of the relation of knowledge). Thus,
the text of the Gettier case has a Smith-role and a kangaroo-proposition-role associ-
ated with it, as does the Gettier story and every other enrichment of the text of the
Gettier case. There are many different such roles. For the purposes of modelling our
thought experiment, the most important are those associated with fictionally per-
missible and complete enrichments. They include not only the Smith-role and the
kangaroo-proposition-role associated with the Gettier story, but also the ones associ-
ated with enrichments that, in addition to containing all of the Gettier story’s fiction-
al truths, fill in some or all of its fictional indeterminacies without entailing any of
its fictionally false conjunctions.
My implementation of the truth in fiction approach is based on two key ideas
about the mind’s deployment of the conceptual apparatus of fictional permissibility,
fictional  completeness,  and  fictional  role  in  our  test  of  the  traditional  theory  of
knowledge. The first idea is that, guided by our tacit grasp of the principles of fic-
tional discourse, we pick out one of the many fictionally permissible and complete
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enrichments of the text of the Gettier case, and enter into an imaginational state rep-
resenting a scenario in which there are entities or things which play the Smith-role
and the kangaroo-proposition-role associated with that particular enrichment.  The
second idea is that, after we have brought this scenario before the mind in imaginat-
ive thought, we enter into an intuitional state about the distribution of the relations
of knowledge and justified true belief in any scenario of the same general kind. Ac-
cording to this way of implementing the truth in fiction approach, our imaginational
state pertains to a highly specific scenario, viz. a scenario which accords with what is
true in the Gettier story and our own private filling in of the Gettier story’s fictional
indeterminacies; whereas our intuitional state pertains to something much more gen-
eric, viz. the kind of scenario in which there are entities or things which play the
Smith-role and the kangaroo-proposition-role associated with some fictionally per-
missible and complete enrichment of the text of the Gettier case. To state these two
ideas another way, the traditional theory of knowledge is tested against a scenario of
considerable specificity, but the tribunal of the imagination delivers a verdict—the
Gettier intuition—which applies to a whole family of kindred scenarios. 
We can represent something’s playing the Smith-role associated with a fiction-
ally permissible and complete enrichment using the open formula RSxe, where the
variable “x” occupies the position for the thing playing the role and the variable “e”
occupies the position for the enrichment. This formula is to be understood as saying
that  x  plays  the  Smith-role  associated  with  e.  Similarly,  we  can  represent
something’s playing the kangaroo-proposition-role associated with a fictionally per-
missible and complete enrichment using the open formula RKpe, where the variable
“p” occupies the position for the thing playing the role and the variable “e” once
again occupies the position for the enrichment. This second formula is to be under-
stood as saying that p plays the kangaroo-proposition-role associated with e. We can
use “i” as a singular term for the particular enrichment we happen to pick out when
we carry out our thought experiment. Of course, additional singular terms (i´, i´´,
etc.) will be required to stand for different fictionally permissible and complete en-
richments picked out by other people. With this symbolism in hand, I am now in a
position to put forward my own model of our thought experiment, which I shall call
the New Truth in Fiction Model:
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(1) T ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp)
(2NTF) ◇xp (RSxi RKpi)
(3NTF) ◻xpe ((RSxe RKpe)  (JTBxp  Kxp))
(4) ◻xp (Kxp  JTBxp) From (2NTF) and (3NTF)
                                                                   
(5) T From (1) and (4)
On this model, our imaginative engagement with the Gettier case involves appre-
hending the truth of (2NTF), which affirms the metaphysical possibility of a scenario
in which entities or things play the Smith-role and the kangaroo-proposition-role as-
sociated with the fictionally permissible and complete enrichment i. The real content
of the Gettier intuition is given by (3NTF), which affirms the metaphysical necessita-
tion of non-knowledge justified true belief by every scenario of that general kind.
At first glance, the New Truth in Fiction Model may seem overly elaborate and
contrived, especially in comparison with some of the other models we have looked
at. More specifically, when we imaginatively engage with the Gettier case and un-
dergo the Gettier intuition, it does not obviously seem as though the mind deploys
anything as baroque as the conceptual apparatus of fictional permissibility, fictional
completeness, and fictional roles. The contrast between the baroqueness of the strict
conditional (3NTF) and the simplicity of the apparent content of the Gettier intuition is
particularly marked. Before proceeding any further, therefore, it is important for me
to say something to assuage the worry that I am taking our model-building endeav-
ours down the wrong path. There are three points I should like to emphasise in this
connection. The first point is one that I have already made several times over the
course of the discussion, but it bears re-emphasising here. The apparent content of
the Gettier intuition is an illusion; it must differ from the Gettier intuition’s real con-
tent in some way or another. Since this fact obliges us to considerably temper our
faith in the appearances, the postulation of something phenomenologically incongru-
ous (such as the mind’s deployment of the foregoing apparatus) need not be objec-
tionable in and of itself. To be sure, as we go about pursuing our model-building
endeavours, we should avoid postulating things which make it  difficult for us to
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make sense of our own mental lives. But even if the apparatus I have introduced in
the present sub-section is rather baroque, it can hardly be said to make us lose our
grip on what is going on in our own heads when we carry out our thought experi-
ment.
The second point I should like to emphasise is that the concepts of fictional per-
missibility, fictional completeness, and fictional role are simply refined statements
of certain notions already familiar to us from ordinary life, in particular, notions fa-
miliar to us from the practice of reading novels and other standard kinds of fictional
works. The concept of fictional permissibility is a refinement of the ordinary notion
that some ways of filling in a given text are wrong while other ways are not wrong.
The concept of fictional completeness is a refinement of the ordinary notion that
some ways of filling in a given text fall short of the whole story while other ways do
not fall short and even go beyond it. And the concept of a fictional role is a refine-
ment of the ordinary notion that story-telling involves descriptions of characters and
other particular entities or things. Since these concepts are in these ways rooted in
the practice of reading standard fictional works, it is by no means implausible that
our tacit grasp of the principles of fictional discourse brings with it a tacit grasp of
them as well. The third, and perhaps most important, point for me to emphasise here
is that none of the existing models of philosophical thought experimentation have
turned out to be adequate. We must look elsewhere if we are to make further pro-
gress on solving the content problem. This, furthermore, may require setting aside
the sorts of misgivings which might otherwise induce us to dismiss a novel approach
like mine without giving it much consideration. The upshot is that worrying about
the apparatus I have introduced in this sub-section is not very helpful at this late
stage of our discussion. We should be open to the possibility of it performing serious
theoretical work.
6.1. Adequacy of the New Truth in Fiction Model
Having put forward my new way of implementing the truth in fiction approach to
modelling philosophical thought experimentation, I now turn my efforts to the task
of supporting its adequacy. The New Truth in Fiction Model avoids all of the prob-
lems which render the other models we have looked at inadequate. To begin with,
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unlike the Necessity and Counterfactual Models, the New Truth in Fiction Model
overcomes the obstacles presented by the metaphysical possibility of deviant realisa-
tions of the text of the Gettier case. On my model, when we imaginatively engage
with the Gettier case, we pick out a fictionally permissible and complete enrichment
i. This particular enrichment represents a highly specific scenario in which there are
entities or things which, together with the particular enrichment i, satisfy the open
formulae RSxe and RKpe. Since RSxe and RKpe respectively stand for the Smith-roles
and the kangaroo-proposition-roles associated with fictionally permissible and com-
plete enrichments, any world at which they are satisfied is a world at which each of
the Gettier story’s fictional falsehoods is false and each of its fictional truths is true.
The Gettier story precludes Smith from justifiedly and truly believing, but failing to
know, that there are kangaroos in the paddock. In other words, at any world at which
RSxe and RKpe are satisfied, the entity or thing which plays the Smith-role is pre-
cluded from standing in either the relation of unjustified true belief or the relation of
knowledge to  the entity or thing which plays  the kangaroo-proposition-role.  The
mind is led to recognise the preclusion by first apprehending the metaphysical pos-
sibility of there being entities or things which, together with the particular enrich-
ment i, satisfy RSxe and RKpe, and then reflecting on the general kind of scenario to
which this highly specific scenario belongs. The mind’s recognition of the preclu-
sion is manifested by the Gettier intuition. Considerations of deviancy have nothing
to do with the truth or falsity of the Gettier intuition because no world at which RSxe
and RKpe are satisfied is a deviant world.
Next, unlike the Possibility Model and the Truth in Fiction Model Marks 2 and
3, there are enough resources in the vicinity of my model to support an explanation
of why the (I1)-belief we come to form when we carry out our thought experiment
rationally commits us to both refrain from holding an (I2)-belief and refrain from
holding an (I3)-belief. The explanation of these rational commitments parallels the
explanations given in connection with the Necessity and Counterfactual Models and
the Truth in Fiction Model Mark 1. On my implementation of the truth in fiction ap-
proach, the respective real contents of (I1), (I2), and (I3) are given by the following
strict conditionals:
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(3NTF) ◻xpe ((RSxe RKpe)  (JTBxp  Kxp))
(NTF-2) ◻xpe ((RSxe RKpe)  (JBxp  Bxp  Kxp))
(NTF-3) ◻xpe ((RSxe RKpe)  (JTBxp  Kxp))
There is no incompatibility between these strict conditionals; they do not entail one
another’s negations. This is because they are all vacuously true if there is no meta-
physically possible world at which some entities or things together with some en-
richment  satisfy  RSxe  and  RKpe.  But  under  the  safe  assumption  of  the  truth  of
◇xp (RSxi RKpi), the strict conditionals may be said to stand in something like
the contrary relation to one another: given any two of them, both may be false but at
most one can be true. The result is that the combination of ◇xp (RSxi   RKpi)
with the real content of our (I1)-belief rules out the real contents of (I2) and (I3). So
my implementation of the truth in fiction approach supports a straightforward ex-
planation of the rational commitments associated with our thought experiment in
terms of the nature of belief and the logico-analytical relationships between con-
tents.
Finally, the New Truth in Fiction Model constitutes an advance on the Truth in
Fiction Model Marks 1, 2, and 3 because, unlike its predecessors, it can simultan-
eously do justice to the natural thoughts underlying the dilemma I levelled against
them in Section 5.3. We find it natural to think, on the one hand, that any extra de-
tails we add to the Gettier  story by filling in its fictional indeterminacies should
somehow be captured by the content of our imaginational state. But on the other
hand we also find it natural to think that we share our intuitional state with people
who, like us, report their intuition about the epistemic status of Smith’s true belief by
uttering  “Smith  has  a  justified  true  belief,  but  does  not  know,  that  there  are
kangaroos in the paddock.” The Truth in Fiction Model Marks 1, 2, and 3, as I have
already shown, are all caught in this dilemma; they ride roughshod over either a sub-
jective aspect of our thought experiment or an objective (or inter-subjective) one.
The New Truth in Fiction Model, however, has been expressly designed to avoid
both horns. It avoids the first horn of the dilemma because it subjectivises the con-
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tent of our imaginational state. The content of that state, on my model, is fully de-
termined by whatever fictionally permissible and complete enrichment we happen to
pick out in imaginative thought. If our privately filled in version of the Gettier story
is different from someone else’s, then the content of his imaginational state must di-
verge from the content of our own. This is so even if the difference between the two
privately filled in versions of the Gettier story is very small. It could, for example,
amount to nothing more than that we imagine Smith with brown hair while the other
person imagines Smith with black hair. A divergence in content is still guaranteed,
since we will have picked out one particular enrichment in imaginative thought (viz.
the enrichment i) and he will have picked out another (e.g. i´). As for the second
horn of the dilemma, the New Truth in Fiction Model avoids it as well. This is be-
cause the strict conditional (3NTF) is given as the real content of everyone’s Gettier
intuition,  regardless  of  the divergent  contents  of  different  people’s imaginational
states.
In addition to avoiding the problems which render its  rivals  inadequate,  the
New Truth in Fiction Model avoids offending against the “traditional understanding
of philosophical methodology.” By giving the strict  conditional (3NTF) as the real
content of the Gettier intuition, the New Truth in Fiction Model automatically falls
in  line  with the traditionalist  tenet  that  the  intuitions  generated by philosophical
thought experimentation always involve the concept of metaphysical necessity. And
nothing prevents traditionalists like Ichikawa and Jarvis from combining the New
Truth in Fiction Model with the other traditionalist tenet that philosophical thought
experimentation is an a priori activity. Setting aside radical empiricism, there is no
special reason to worry that (3NTF) is empirically contaminated. (In particular, from
the fact that it is an empirical question as to whether the open formulae RSxe and
RKpe are satisfied, it does not follow that it is also an empirical question as to wheth-
er  their  being  satisfied  metaphysically  necessitates  justified  true  belief  without
knowledge.) Ichikawa and Jarvis should therefore be willing to defend the a priori
knowability of (3NTF), given that they are willing to defend the a priori knowability
of the strict conditionals (3TF-M2) and (3TF-M3). Of course, for anyone uncommitted or
unsympathetic to the traditionalist tenet of the apriority of philosophical thought ex-
perimentation, its compatibility with the New Truth in Fiction Model will have little
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or no bearing on that model’s adequacy. But as there are many contemporary philo-
sophers who do give their endorsement to traditionalism, it is worthwhile noting that
commitment to this particular traditionalist tenet is no impediment to acknowledging
that, on the whole, the New Truth in Fiction Model does a better job of modelling
our Gettier-style thought experiment than any of the existing models.
6.2. In defence of the truth in fiction approach
We are almost in a position to bring our model-building endeavours to a conclusion.
So far we have found that the New Truth in Fiction Model outdoes all of its rivals.
Malmgren (2011), however, has subjected the truth in fiction approach to a series of
objections the intention of which is to undermine every possible way of implement-
ing it, including my own. The overall thrust of her attack is that the assimilation of
the practice of thought experimentation to the practice of reading standard fictional
works is  specious.  There are  significant  disanalogies between testing theories  in
imaginative thought and reading novels, narrative poems, and the like. The identific-
ation of these disanalogies is something which, in Malmgren’s view, the truth in fic-
tion approach simply cannot survive. If, therefore, the adequacy of my (or any other)
implementation of the truth in fiction approach is to be upheld, it is incumbent on
me to defend it from Malmgren’s series of objections. In the present context, under-
taking such a defence will also serve the useful purpose of further elucidating both
the truth in fiction approach and my own way of implementing it.
The first of Malmgren’s objections appeals to Kripke’s (1980) doctrine of the
essentially fictional nature of fictional characters. According to that doctrine, there is
no metaphysically possible world at which some woman is identical to Thackeray’s
Becky Sharp. For Thackeray wrote the novel Vanity Fair as a work of fiction. The
discovery that, by an amazing coincidence, there was once an actual woman who
completely satisfied Thackeray’s description of Becky Sharp would not show that he
was writing about  that woman. And if this actual woman could not be said to be
identical to Becky Sharp, then surely no non-actual yet metaphysically possible wo-
man satisfying Thackeray’s description of Becky Sharp could be said to be identical
to  Becky  Sharp  either.  Becky  Sharp  is  fictional  and  she  is  essentially so.  As
Malmgren suggests, one consequence of this doctrine of Kripke’s is that an ordinary
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fictional judgement about Becky Sharp expressed by uttering, say, “Becky Sharp has
a mole on her lower back” would not be verified (or falsified) by the existence of an
actual woman who both satisfied Thackeray’s description and did (or did not) have a
mole on her lower back. “In contrast,” Malmgren (2011: 298) goes on to argue, “an
intuitive judgement—for example, the Gettier judgement—does  seem to be verifi-
able/falsifiable by actual realisations of the relevant problem case [e.g. the text of the
Gettier case]. We might put the point by saying that fictional characters are essen-
tially fictional, whereas characters in philosophical problem cases are not.” A char-
acter like Becky Sharp, in other words, is significantly disanalogous to a character
like Smith. Becky Sharp is nowhere to be found within the sphere of the metaphys-
ically possible, but there are many metaphysically possible worlds at which some
man is identical to Smith—indeed, by an amazing coincidence, it could even turn
out that the actual world is among them.
This initial line of objection, however, is defective. The most the alleged disan-
alogy can show is that the Gettier intuition is not just another judgement about what
is true in a fiction. But as I have already explained, the truth in fiction approach is
not about equating the Gettier intuition with an ordinary fictional judgement. Ichi-
kawa and Jarvis’s models as well as my own model are all implementations of the
truth in fiction approach, yet none of them pretend to equate the Gettier intuition
with an ordinary fictional judgement. They are members of a family of models ex-
emplifying the general idea that the imaginative mental activity which constitutes
our thought experiment is guided by our tacit grasp of the principles or rules govern-
ing fictional discourse. It is this general idea which underlies the truth in fiction ap-
proach; but the disanalogy Malmgren claims to have identified poses no threat to it.
This is because, even if it is granted that the characters in standard fictional works
are essentially fictional while those in case descriptions are not, it obviously does
not follow that our tacit grasp of the principles of fictional discourse (or perhaps our
tacit grasp of principles akin to them) cannot guide the mind during the performance
of our thought experiment. Malmgren, at any rate, does not tell us why such guid-
ance of the mind would be impossible under such conditions. The truth in fiction ap-
proach must therefore remain unscathed. Note, parenthetically, that in attempting to
establish the disanalogy between characters like Becky Sharp and characters like
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Smith, Malmgren is led into incoherence. The culprit is her assertion that the Gettier
intuition contrasts  with ordinary fictional judgements by being “verifiable/falsifi-
able” by actual realisations of the text of the Gettier case. Malmgren cannot coher-
ently  maintain  this  assertion  because,  as  I  mentioned  in  Section  3.2,  she  joins
Ichikawa and Jarvis and myself in rejecting Williamson’s Counterfactual Model on
the grounds that the Gettier intuition would not be falsified by the existence of an ac-
tual man who realised the text of the Gettier case while failing to have a justified
true belief without knowledge.
Malmgren’s second objection against the truth in fiction approach stems from
her observation that “what counts as a permissible interpretation of a case descrip-
tion seems to depend, at least in part, on the specific  use to which the case is put;
more precisely, the tacit constraints [or principles] that govern our interpretation of a
case description are sensitive to the target of the given thought experiment—to what
theory  is  being  tested”  (2011:  299).  To  illustrate  what  she  has  in  mind  here,
Malmgren compares the Gettier case with Foot’s (1967) and Thomson’s (1976) fam-
ous trolley cases. Normally, the Gettier case is used to test the traditional theory of
knowledge, whereas trolley cases are used to test utilitarianism (and the doctrine of
double effect). Malmgren points out that in a test of the former kind “we may not
suppose that the subject in the Gettier case has more than one route to knowledge
available, but we may suppose that killing him would cause a riot in which fifty oth-
er people die” (2011: 299). The opposite goes for the potential victim in a trolley
case used to test utilitarianism. In the latter kind of test, says Malmgren, “we may
not suppose that killing him would cause a riot in which fifty people die, but we may
indeed suppose that he has more than one route to knowledge available (here: know-
ledge of any proposition of our choice)” (2011: 299). Malmgren then asks us to con-
sider the case description that results from combining the Gettier case with a trolley
case.  The resultant  Gettier-Trolley case will  not be permissibly enrichable in the
same ways as its constituent case descriptions are permissibly enrichable (when they
are put to their normal uses). Instead, “[w]hat we may and may not import into the
Gettier-Trolley case once again depends on what we are using it for: whether we are
using the case to test the JTB theory, utilitarianism, both—or something else togeth-
er” (2011: 300). But the principles governing the enrichment of the texts of standard
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fictional works exhibit no analogous sensitivity, according to Malmgren, “unless, of
course, the text is being hijacked for the purpose of a thought experiment” (2011:
300).
This second line of objection is also defective. Malmgren has at most shown
that there are different kinds of fictional discourse governed by different sets of prin-
ciples or rules. But this fact about fictional discourse should come as no surprise to
anyone,  for  we  are  all  familiar  with  what  are  commonly  referred  to  as  genres.
Thackeray’s novel Vanity Fair, for example, belongs to the genre of broadly realistic
fictional discourse, in that the way things are described to be in Vanity Fair does not
constitute a great departure from the way things are (or at least once were) in reality.
The characters and events in Vanity Fair are realistic characters and events; indeed,
some of the characters, like Napoleon, actually existed and many of the events, like
the Battle of Waterloo, actually happened. Of course, there are other genres in addi-
tion to realistic fictional discourse, such as science fiction, surrealist fiction, fantasy
fiction, and so on. Importantly, we find that the set of principles governing the en-
richment of texts in one genre often differ quite a lot from the set of principles gov-
erning the enrichment of texts in another genre. Thus, realistic fictional discourse is
presumably governed by principles which blanketly prohibit the attribution of tele-
pathic and telekinetic powers to humans, whereas the set of principles governing the
discourse of science fiction presumably contains no blanket prohibition against tele-
pathy and telekinesis. In light of this important observation, it is perfectly natural to
regard philosophical thought experimentation as also constituting its own kind of
fictional discourse governed by its own set of principles. Although it is an interesting
question how the set of principles governing philosophical thought experimentation
might differ from the sets governing other kinds of fictional discourse, it is not ne-
cessary for me to address it here in order to defend the truth in fiction approach. For
Malmgren’s alleged disanalogy does nothing more than draw attention to one of the
potential differences, viz. the sensitivity of that set of principles to whatever theory a
given case description is being used to test.
The third objection Malmgren levels against the truth in fiction approach is that
the actual world (or perhaps the way we take the actual world to be) is more in-
volved in fixing what is true in realistic stories like the Vanity Fair story than it is in
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fixing what is true in the Gettier story. As Malmgren puts it, the principles governing
realistic fictional discourse “impose a greater degree of overall similarity to the actu-
al world (or better: the actual world as the author and her immediate audience take it
to be) on the fiction,  than the corresponding constraints impose a problem case”
(2011: 300). For example, it is presumably false in the Vanity Fair story that Becky
Sharp has the telekinetic power to move cups across tables, but it would seem to be
indeterminate in the Gettier story whether Smith has such a power. We would thus
rightly complain against any enrichment of the text of Vanity Fair in which Becky
Sharp  is  able  to  move  cups  across  tables  using  only  her  mind.  In  contrast,  if
someone carrying out our thought experiment imagined Smith with this telekinetic
power, then, says Malmgren, “we might well complain that she has filled out the
given description in  idiosyncratic  or  irrelevant  ways […] But I do not think we
would complain that her embellishments are illegitimate, or that the envisaged real-
ization of the case is deviant—as indeed we would if she had filled it out in such a
way that,  say, Smith’s justification  is  defeated”  (2011:  300,  fn.64).  Having  thus
claimed to have identified yet another significant disanalogy, Malmgren goes on to
admit  that  “fantasy, science  fiction,  and surreal  fiction  are  associated  with  con-
straints that are more permissive” than those governing realistic fictional discourse
(2011: 300); but she straight away dismisses this observation as immaterial to the
matter at hand on the alleged grounds that “it would be very implausible to assimil-
ate problem cases to, say, outré science fiction” (2011: 300, fn.63). In Malmgren’s
view, consideration should only be given to the genre of realistic fiction.
This third line of objection fails as well. There is no warrant for Malmgren’s in-
sistence that the truth in fiction approach can survive only if the principles governing
philosophical thought experimentation give the same (or nearly the same) weight to
the actual world as the principles governing realistic fictional discourse do.  As I
pointed out in my reply to Malmgren’s second objection, there are several different
kinds of fictional discourse, and the sets of principles governing them can differ
from one  another  quite  a  lot.  Furthermore,  in  the  previous  paragraph,  I  quoted
Malmgren herself as admitting that one way in which those sets can differ has to do
with the degree of overall similarity to the actual world which they impose on the
enrichment of texts. An example is that the principles governing the enrichment of
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texts belonging to genres such as fantasy, science fiction, and surreal fiction are, in
Malmgren’s words, “more permissive” than the principles governing the enrichment
of texts belonging to the genre of realistic fiction. Since, therefore, philosophical
thought experimentation is naturally regarded as constituting its own kind of fiction-
al discourse governed by its own set of principles, Malmgren has at most shown that
the principles governing the enrichment of case descriptions are likewise more per-
missive than the principles governing the enrichment of texts belonging to the genre
of realistic fiction. But even though the fact that they exhibit this greater permissive-
ness is an interesting one, it obviously does nothing to undermine the truth in fiction
approach or the adequacy of my particular implementation of it. To insist otherwise
(as Malmgren does) is to arbitrarily privilege the genre of realistic fiction in our
model-building endeavours.
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7. Conclusion
The project of building a model of philosophical thought experimentation is pro-
paedeutical. It is necessary to undertake it, as I said in my introductory remarks, in
order to prepare the ground for serious discussion of the epistemological challenge
which  threatens  the  legitimacy  of  contemporary  philosophical  methodology. The
present monograph advances the propaedeutical work already done by Williamson,
Malmgren, and Ichikawa and Jarvis.  Following the lead of those philosophers,  I
have focused on a single Gettier-style thought experiment and the problem of identi-
fying  the real  content  of  the  Gettier  intuition.  My contribution  to  the  project  of
model-building is twofold. First, I have established the inadequacy of all of the ex-
isting models. The Necessity Model is inadequate because the strict conditional (3N)
is made false by the existence of deviant worlds while the Gettier intuition is not.
Williamson’s Counterfactual  Model  is  inadequate  because  the  truth  value  of  the
counterfactual (3CF), but not that of the Gettier intuition, depends on the relative dis-
tance between the actual world and deviant worlds in modal space. Malmgren’s Pos-
sibility Model is inadequate because there are rational commitments associated with
our Gettier-style thought experiment which the possibility claim (2P) renders inex-
plicable. And Ichikawa and Jarvis’s Truth in Fiction Model Marks 1, 2, and 3 are in-
adequate because they ride roughshod over either a subjective aspect of our Gettier-
style thought experiment or an objective one.
Ichikawa and Jarvis, however, do not exhaust every way of implementing the
general idea behind the truth in fiction approach. The second of my contributions to
the project of model-building springs from my appreciation of this fact. I have taken
the general idea behind the truth in fiction approach and used it to develop a new
model of my own. The New Truth in Fiction Model is very attractive. I have shown,
first of all, that it does a better job of modelling our Gettier-style thought experiment
than any of the existing models. I have also defended it from Malmgren’s attempt to
undermine every possible implementation of the truth in fiction approach. Further-
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more, I have been unable to find any major defects peculiar to it. (The worry that the
New Truth in Fiction Model is overly elaborate and contrived, which I mentioned
above, is rather minor in and of itself; not only that, it rapidly fades away upon con-
sideration of the New Truth in Fiction Model’s attractions.) We should therefore feel
confident that the New Truth in Fiction Model is an adequate representation of our
Gettier-style thought experiment, and more particularly, that the solution to the con-
tent problem is given by the strict conditional (3NTF) or at least something very much
like it. We should also feel confident that the New Truth in Fiction Model is general-
isable, for our Gettier-style thought experiment is paradigmatic of the phenomenon
to be modelled. Philosophical thought experimentation is guided by the principles of
truth in fiction.
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